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Higher education of Ukraine did not stay immune to political and economic 
turbulence the country has been undergoing since 2014. As a result of the political 
turmoil, Ukrainian higher education suffered a massive decline in student population 
and a halt in the education process for some institutions. In the process of military 
actions in eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, 18 state universities, two 
private universities and 11 research institutions were evacuated. The educational 
infrastructure of Donetsk and Luhansk regions suffered major infrastructural, 
financial and organizational losses. Limited understanding of the impacts the armed 
conflict had on the higher education institutions in Ukraine guided this research. 
Therefore, the aim of the study is to identify how the Ukrainian higher education 
institutions have been impacted by and have been coping with the crisis. The study 
focuses attempts to elicit the impacts that disrupt the functions of the Ukrainian 
crisis-affected universities and crisis management practices that have been used by 
these institutions to cope with the crisis.  
 
This study used a qualitative research design. The researcher selected five conflict-
affected higher education institutions as a research site using a purposive sampling 
technique. The participants of the research were sampled using the expert and 
snowball sampling techniques. The data was collected with the help of the qualitative 
semi-structured interviews and the secondary data analysis. The research findings 
revealed the armed conflict negatively impacted the universities’ human resources, 
educational and research infrastructure, organizational operations and institutional 
legitimacy. The institutional crisis management capacity has been undermined and 
delayed as a result of the lack of a national and university evacuation plans, 
inconsistent and weak communication efforts and untrained self-appointed crisis 
personnel. Additionally, the efforts of the crisis teams were subverted by the self-
proclaimed Donetsk National Republic and Luhansk National Republic governing 
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“One of the most difficult things is to make people understand that higher education 
[in crisis] is not a luxury but one of the most strategic investment” (PEER, n.d.). 
Chapter I - Introduction 
  
For many decades’ universities across the world have been leading or facilitating 
political movements, and we cannot deny that a significant amount of the higher 
education systems have been or currently are operating in the time of crisis. Violent 
conflicts have played a profound role in exacerbating the crisis in higher education. 
In the last decade, the spreading national and international conflicts in the Middle 
East, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Balkans and Southeast Asia have 
caused many challenges for higher education systems, namely infrastructural 
destruction, human loss, vast population displacement, psychological damage 
(UNESCO, 2010; INEE, 2011; Milton & Barakat, 2015; Barakat & Milton, 2016; 
Milton, 2017). According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s (IEP’s), which 
studied 162 countries, only 11 countries were conflict-free in 2014 (IEP, 2014). 
Whether due to conflict and war or other causes, such as natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks, academic institutions face similar security concerns and losses.  Ukraine’s 
higher education system during an armed conflict in the East has undergone many 
transformations. A total of 18 public higher education institutions have been 
displaced from the occupied territories of Ukraine. By now almost all of them 
resumed their operation, struggling to survive on scarce resources. Little is known 
regarding the impact of a violent armed conflict on these institutions and the 
mechanisms they have been utilizing to cope with the constant disruptive changes. 
Therefore, the study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the impact of the armed 
conflict on the displaced higher education institutions and identify crisis 
management mechanisms that allowed the higher education institutions to survive 
and cope with the ongoing crisis caused by the conflict.  
1.1. Background information on Ukraine 
 
To understand the subject of Ukrainian conflict-affected institutions, one also needs 
to know the conditions in which the higher education has been operating, and the 
events that led to the collapse of the state.  
 
Ukraine is one of the former Soviet republics, which gained its independence in 1991. 
Since then Ukraine has undergone a transition period from a planned to market 
economy. The population of Ukraine is 45.5 million, the number has been decreasing 
since 1991 due to the declining fertility rates and a large migration of Ukrainians to 
the West during the 90s (UNESCO-CEPES, 2006). The migration has been spurred 
by the uneven economic growth and failure to introduce structural economic reforms 
and combat corruption. The current per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of 
Ukraine is the fifth lowest among the former Soviet republics (OECD, 2017). 
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However, Ukraine’s expenditures on education are one of the highest among the 
developed countries, around 6% of the GDP. It is 1% higher than the average 
spending of the OECD countries (CEDOS, 2015). The GDP expenditure on education 
equals to that of or above the developed countries, such as the US, Canada, 
Switzerland, Finland, Sweden.  While the spending on education is indeed high, it 
should be noted that Ukraine funds a ramified and dispersed education sector, the 
supply of which does not correspond with the demand. Of the total education 
spending, 36,8% is allocated to higher education. Due to the economic struggles of 
Ukraine and attempts to optimize the state spending, the higher education sector has 
undergone cuts of 5% since 2011 (CEDOS, 2016). 
 
Ukraine has undergone few historical periods that marked the development in the 
higher education sector. The government adopted a set of laws that shaped a legal 
ground of the higher education system. Constitution of Ukraine that was enacted in 
1996 had the greatest steering power which helped to control the decision-making 
process of the state. The Ukrainian Constitution guarantees equal access to education 
and rights to obtain free higher education (Verkhovna Rada, 1996). In the same year, 
Ukraine adopted ‘Law of Ukraine on Education’ and in 2002 adopted ‘Law on Higher 
Education.’ These laws built a legal ground for the higher education in Ukraine and 
defined “the main directions of Ukrainian state policy for higher education” (Stepko, 
2006, p.1). 
 
An essential step in Ukraine’s higher education advancement occurred after the 
historical Revolution of Dignity in 2014. The revolution created necessary conditions 
for transformation. The people of Ukraine demanded a total reformation of the 
public sector, moving away from the Soviet past. Ukraine has a strong civic 
engagement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a considerable 
strong lobbying power which enabled implementation of a new ‘Law on Higher 
Education’ enacted in 2014 (MESU, 2014). The law challenges the state power and 
numerous old academic traditions, such as giving more autonomy to universities, 
curbing the immunity of leadership of higher education institutions, establishing 
internal and external quality assurance procedures (British Council, 2015). It also 
has many prospects, positively influencing university autonomy, accountability, 
transparency, quality assurance and enabling quick reaction to the international 
cooperation (Knutson & Kushnarenko, 2015). 
 
Indeed, the ramifications of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 brought some 
advancement for the stagnant post-Soviet higher education system. Nonetheless, a 
short-lived ‘silver lining’ of the revolution followed the political and economic 
turbulence, caused by the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in the East. 
Suffice to say, higher education of Ukraine did not stay immune during this turbulent 
time. Ukrainian higher education institutions suffered a massive decline in student 




1.2. Statement of research problem  
 
The events in the East developed in a rapid fashion, after the pro-Russian protesters 
seized the regional administrative buildings in Donets, the Ukrainian government 
began military counter operations. These events gave a birth to self-proclaimed 
separatist groups of ‘Donetsk National Republic’ (DNR) and ‘Luhansk National 
Republic’ (LNR) in May 2014 (Szpak, 2017). The nature of the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine has been a subject for discussions due to a lack of available facts regarding 
the number of casualties and parties involved in the conflict. In this study, the events 
in the East are characterized as armed conflict. This perspective is supported by 
works of Kovalov (2014), Szpak (2017), and OSCE (n.d.), who name number of 
criteria that classify the events in eastern Ukraine as armed conflict. These primarily 
are: prolonged nature of hostilities, organization of separatist groups, armament of 
the separatist groups and number of victims involved.  
 
As a direct result of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, 
18 public higher education institutions, 2 private universities and 11 research 
institutes have been evacuated from the rebel-held territories of Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions. The displaced universities suffered a period of cutbacks, as 
economic austerity and defense spending became government's’ priority. Around 40 
thousand of students and more than 3.5 thousand of research and teaching staff were 
forced to leave the occupied territories (CISID, n.d.). Currently, Ukraine has 1.5 
million internally displaced people (IDPs), who moved from the occupied territories 
(Kvit, 2015). In total, the educational infrastructure of Donetsk and Luhansk regions 
suffered losses of $4.9 billion (Euromaidan Press, 2017). 
  
The universities suffered heavy material, infrastructural and institutional losses, 
being deprived of any adequate service delivery capacity and competent managerial 
and technical personnel support. The physical destruction of the university campuses 
has been devastating. Shelling raged over the universities’ premises during the first 
months of occupation of the eastern Ukrainian territories by the self-proclaimed 
rebel groups in 2014. The Luhansk National University has been under the series of 
attacks ten times before the university administration vacated the campus. Shortly 
after terrorists occupied the territory of Donetsk, the students and professors from 
Donetsk National University gathered in protest in the capital city of Kyiv and 
demanded the Ministry of Education and Science (MESU) to relocate the university 
functioning in the conflict-affected area.  
 
The actions to relocate the universities from the occupied territories were not 
executed immediately, due to a non-existent national evacuation plan, which could 
have address such problem more swiftly. After many demands and requests to the 
MESU to take decisive action, the government evacuated the universities. The first 
eastern university was transferred to the central Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia, and so 




The process of evacuation, as well as the lobbying to ease the legislative requirements 
for the conflict-affected universities, were orchestrated by a number of stakeholders 
(i.e., university rectors, managers, Ministry officials, foreign donors). The 
government, as well as the universities found themselves in the absence of 
information and approaches that ensure their preparedness to crisis events, such as 
an armed conflict.  While many of the crisis consequences were difficult if not 
impossible to plan for or predict (i.e., total displacement), some efforts have been 
better initiated to avoid certain impacts (i.e., forfeiting university database with 
study plans and curricula). 
 
The exact fate of the abandoned campuses is unknown, but many academics who 
remain in touch with their relatives on the occupied territories state that almost each 
of their home universities has ‘an eponymous twin’ on the territory controlled by the 
so-called ‘LNR’ (Luhansk National Republic) and ‘DNR’ (Donetsk National 
Republic). The illegal twin universities use the property, stolen resources, and award 
diplomas, despite not being recognized by neither Ukrainian nor Russian authorities 
(Donetsk Law Institute of MFA, 2016).   
 
Currently, all of the displaced universities have resumed their education process in 
various locations, where they found a ‘temporary home,’ albeit struggling to survive 
on the scarce resources and shattered reputation. The conflict in eastern Ukraine 
certainly played a crucial role in the destabilization of these institutions. However, 
the lack of an existing evacuation plan played an essential role in forfeiting not only 
the premises and assets of these universities, but also losing a share of university 
academic staff and students. In most of the displaced universities, the enrolment rate 
has drastically dropped, where universities were able to retain only one-fourth of 
their student population and academic staff.  
 
There are many issues the displaced institutions needed to solve, some of the most 
pressing ones are: rebuilding universities’ organizational structure and management, 
finding the educational and scientific equipment, information and communication 
technology (ICT), office furniture, accommodation for students and staff. In 
addition, these institutions need to amend the legal system of Ukraine to create more 
responsive regulations for higher education institutions operating in the time of 
conflict. Lastly, the conflict-affected institutions needed to provide sufficient 
counselling for the displaced students and staff, who were deprived of their basic 
constitutional rights. The operation of the displaced universities in the conditions of 
the armed conflict becomes almost impossible, while the universities currently do 
not own the essential equipment and are struggling to equip all the classrooms with 
basic infrastructure. The losses were unusually heavy for the universities of applied 
universities, who lost their laboratory facilities for natural and engineering sciences. 
Likewise, there is a lack of resources for the research activities and limited access to 
library resources.  
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1.3. Literature gap  
 
Literature has been mostly silent about the role of higher education in crisis-affected 
and fragile contexts. Little is known about the functioning of such systems especially 
amidst an armed conflict. Besides, the scientific publication on higher education and 
crisis management could be argued as being dominated by the publications produced 
mostly in the English-speaking parts of the developed world, such as the US, UK, 
Australia and Europe. These higher education systems, on relative terms, have been 
operating under democratic and mostly stable political systems where armed 
conflicts and war have been rare occurrences. The higher education research 
produced in the politically stable countries positively contributes to the overall 
discourse on crisis management in higher education. Nonetheless, it adds to the so-
called ‘geographic gap’ in research, where there is an overrepresentation of particular 
cases from the Anglo-Saxon context, and underrepresentation of less-dominant 
environments (CERG, 2008). The oversaturation of the western literature on crisis 
management creates a one-dimensional image of the crises faced by the higher 
education institutions and the solutions that are proposed to resolve a crisis.  
 
Such evidence is not representative of the realities in a significant proportion of the 
world, and we need to address different types of crises and approaches to managing 
it. For example, the higher education systems of a number of countries in the Middle 
East, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and other parts of the developing world 
are facing challenges of political crises and full-fledged wars (Barakat & Milton, 
2015; Milton & Barakat, 2016; Milton, 2018), and the consequences suffered by the 
higher education systems in those countries vary significantly from those 
encountered in the moderately stable contexts. Against this background, it becomes 
relevant to investigate higher education systems affected by violent conflicts to offer 
an alternative view to crisis management, taking Ukraine as a case study. 
 
Given the frequent occurrences of the global conflicts and the adversity of the 
consequences crises entail for higher education, a vast body of research on this 
problem would be expected. Conversely, such research remains perversely scarce and 
provides little if no significance in studying the issue of crisis management from the 
perspective of higher education. For example, similar accounts of displaced 
universities in crisis environments exist, such as the displaced Belarusian university 
that was shut down due to its opposition to dictatorship or the Jamiya project, which 
assists Syrian displaced academics and students in receiving education through 
online learning platforms (Mikhailov, 2009; BBC News, 2013; Jamiya Project, n.d.). 
Mostly such cases either go unrecorded or exist in foreign languages making it 
challenging for researchers to narrow the academic and empirical gaps, and provide 
a useful comparative analysis of higher education systems in crisis around the world. 




Literature that deals with higher education in crisis is still in its infancy stage. For 
many years, the researchers have ignored the significance of studying crisis 
management and contingency planning of academic institutions (Beggan, 2011). A 
significant proportion of literature about the topic is non-empirical, serving mainly 
two purposes: informing about higher education systems in crisis and 
recommending action to address the issue with more priority. The informing 
literature mainly: 1) raises awareness about specific emergency response programs 
(Barakat and Milton, 2015; Hommel et al., 2015); 2) reviews trends concerning 
research on higher education and crisis topic (Tebbe, 2009; Thaler-Carter, 2009); 3) 
introduces emerging issues regarding, for example, collaboration of HEIs and 
industry, as a well as, e-learning during crisis events (Anderson, 2006; Kavacova and 
Vackova, 2014; Thayaparan et al., 2014). 
 
As mentioned before, the issue of higher education in crisis-affected contexts is not 
new by itself. The primary research gap lies in the lack of its instrumentality. The 
available literature mainly exits in the form of memoirs, chronicles, journals and 
book chapters which are descriptive accounts of history, and which fail to present 
any critical empirical evidence on crisis management and recovery of higher 
education systems in conflict-affected areas (Rudy, 1996; Storz, 2012; Irish, 2015; 
Mikhailov, 2009; Steinacher & Barmettler, 2013; Milton & Barakat, 2016). The 
existing literature lacks scientific rigor, being void of any theoretical or analytical 
approach or adequate scientific methodology (Krohn, 1993; Dounaev, 2007; Kryvoi, 
2011). The literature on the topic also provides a generic view of the challenges faced 
by the universities in crisis, with no specific emphasis given to the aspects of crisis 
prevention, sector resilience and crisis management (Mikhailov, 2009; Steinacher & 
Barmettler, 2013; Dounaev, 2007; Kryvoi, 2011; Krohn, 1993). Hence, a study such 
as this, which delves into these aspects of a crisis-affected Ukrainian higher 
education institutions, becomes essential. 
 
The emerging body of research usually emphasizes the crisis contexts in which basic 
education is operating and even suggests policy interventions to prevent the 
expansion of primary education in conflict-affected societies (Zdziarski et al., 2007; 
Burrell, 2009; UNESCO, 2010a; UNESCO, 2010b; Sigsgaard, 2011; Justino, 2014). 
The ramifications of the crisis on higher education are widely unacknowledged, let 
alone the importance of HEIs in the crisis management (Garcia, 2015; Rasheed and 
Munoz, 2016; Rasheed and Munoz, 2016; Milton, 2018). Such irresponsive analysis 
of the impact of the crisis on the higher education systems hinders the recovery of 
the sector and fails to contribute to its sustainable development. 
 
Some scholars have considered the reasons why higher education sector is often 
neglected both in peace and conflict research and crisis management field. Conflict 
and Education Research Group (2008) points out at the lack of sufficient and 
credible state-generated data regarding the impact of conflict and the conditions of 
the educations systems during a conflict. A widespread view is that higher education 
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during a severe national conflict is viewed as a luxury, and is not a priority for the 
national and supranational governments, international humanitarian organizations 
(Tebbe, 2009; Barakat and Milton, 2015; Milton, 2016; Milton, 2018). In the time of 
crisis, the priorities involve most pressing issues, namely human safety, shelter, food, 
health, transportation and basic education.  
 
The reasons for the limited study of crisis management in higher education, as 
pointed out by Garcia (2015) is because “major incidents are often studied as stand-
alone, distinctive events with lessons pulled for specific purposes” (p. 2). The 
evidence is available in an anecdotal form of the individual cases, the methodologies 
of which are replicated multiple times in the study of similar crises (Sutherland, 
2013). In addition, the crisis management framework and its use is practically non-
existent in the field of higher education research, as it is mainly studied in the prism 
of business management (Brown, 1993; Crandall & Menefee, 1993; Spillan & W. 
Crandall, 2001; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Bridgman & Davis, 2004; Drennan & 
McConnell, 2007; Drennan et al., 2015). There are few influential studies, regarding 
crisis management in higher education, mostly deriving from the US context. The 
works by Zdziarski (2001) Zdziarski et al. (2007), Burrell (2009), Muffet-Willett 
(2010), Burrell and Heiselt (2012), Sutherland (2013), Garcia (2015), Cowan (2014), 
Houston (2017), have shaped the field of crisis management offering a new higher 
education perspective.  
 
These studies have presented mostly the crisis management perspectives of 
individual universities during crisis of natural cause or of violent incidents. The 
literature regarding management of crisis by higher education institutions during 
violent armed conflict is practically unavailable. In her master’s thesis titled 
‘Responsiveness of Higher Education Institutions in eastern Ukraine’, Gladyushyna 
(2017) aimed at systematizing the crisis management practices utilized by leadership 
of two Ukrainian displaced universities. The research contributed significantly in 
filling in the gap regarding the crisis management process of the Ukrainian displaced 
universities, which I attempt to investigate. While her work adopts the crisis 
management perspective as well, the main focus is on the decision-making during 
crisis by the top leadership, and not on the impact of the conflict and the crisis 
management mechanisms per se.  
1.4. Research aims, research questions and significance 
 
The study aims explores the Ukrainian higher education institutions in the time of 
armed conflict, specifically, it looks at five displaced public higher education 
institutions which have been relocated from the occupied territories of Ukraine. 
Currently, almost all of them resumed their operation, struggling to survive on scarce 
resources. Little is known how the displaced universities are coping with the crisis 
and the constant disruptive changes brought by the conflict. Therefore, this research 
seeks to enhance the current body of literature and expand understanding of how 
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academic institutions can mitigate the destructive consequences of conflict, and 
crisis in general.   
 
The study will be guided by the central research question:  
 
❖ How the Ukrainian displaced higher education institutions have been 
impacted by and are coping with the crisis?   
 
Under this guiding inquiry, the following sub-questions will be addressed: 
 
• What have been the impacts of the armed conflict on the Ukrainian displaced 
higher education institutions? 
• Which crisis management mechanisms are being used by the Ukrainian higher 
education institutions to cope with the crisis brought by an armed conflict? 
 
The study adds additional perspective to the multi-disciplinary approach of crisis 
management. By applying a narrow lens of higher education on the study of crisis 
management, the research contributes to expanding of the literature on higher 
education in crisis and assists administrators in the academic field by systematizing a 
crisis management approach of five conflict-affected higher education institutions. 
This study can provide universities and policymakers with useful information for 
effective crisis planning and management in higher education. The study intends to 
contribute to reducing the literature and empirical gap, and further add to the 
development of the field of study by using the example of Ukrainian displaced 
universities, how institutions affected by crisis manage to adapt and stay resilient to 
disaster.  
 
The study applies a crisis management framework in the higher education field, 
which has been mainly used in the context of the business management field in the 
past. The study deems it appropriate to apply a crisis management framework from 
the business field, due to the fact that universities as any other organization, are 
systems, which interact with and are affected by their external environment. Thus, 
higher education institutions require similar mechanisms that help them to cope 
with crisis.  
 
The case of Ukraine makes for a unique study because there is hardly any nation that 
underwent a massive displacement of the higher education institutions. The study 
could have implications for the efforts of university managers and governments on 
formulating policies and strategies (both proactive and reactive), which could assist 
universities in better adjusting to disruptive continuous changes and future crises. 
Lastly, this study can be useful in reminding the practitioners, researchers, university 
administrators, policymakers about the unpredictability of crisis and the need to 
plan and prepare for management of any crisis event. 
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1.5. Structure of the thesis 
 
The study contains six chapters. The first chapter introduces the context of the study, 
research problem, identifies gaps in the literature, research aims, significance, and 
guiding questions posed by the researcher. The second chapter discusses the key 
concepts in crisis and crisis management literature. It reviews important studies in 
the field of crisis management, which contribute to the analytical framework 
discussed in the next chapter. It also describes the models of crisis management 
applied in corporate and public sectors. The third chapter presents crisis and crisis 
management in higher education. 
 
It analyses analytical tools and practice in crisis management in higher education. 
The studies discussed in this chapter address the analytical framework used to 
analyze the conflict-affected higher education institutions. It also provides a 
rationale for compiling an analytical framework based on insights from several 
theoretical and empirical studies. This section provides useful discussion about the 
impact of conflict in diverse geographical contexts, as well as reflects on the historical 
place of higher education during an armed conflict, war or other types of crisis.  The 
fourth chapter identifies the methodological strategy and tools used to conduct the 
research. Detailed information on data collection and analysis is provided. The 
section also highlights the methodological limitations and ethical considerations. The 
fifth chapter presents the data analysis and discusses key findings of the empirical 
analysis. It starts by describing the profiles of the five case universities and the 
timeline of their crisis processes. The proceeding sub-sections answer the research 
questions, namely the impact of crisis on higher education institutions and the crisis 
management approaches used to cope with the crisis. Finally, chapter six provides a 
summary of findings, makes concluding remarks and highlights implications for 


















“Effective planning is the best defensive strategy for mitigating the devastation and 
confusion caused by any disaster” (Beggan, 2011). 
Chapter II - Conceptual foundations 
 
This chapter introduces a synthesis of definitions and theories in the subject area of 
crisis management found in the corporate sector. Afterward, the analyses of available 
empirical and non-empirical literature regarding crisis management it completed. 
While it may be difficult to make sense of everything crisis entails, this section aims 
to have a better understanding of some of the analytical tools that are based on the 
causes, patterns, and consequences of the crisis. Some theoretical lenses will offer 
insights concerning crisis management and the barriers surrounding it. Theoretical 
perspectives will offer prescriptions for tackling the crisis discussed in this research. 
Furthermore, this section will provide a brief overview regarding the existing 
knowledge, trying to critically examine what themes have been studied, how it has 
been studied, and what contribution can be made to the thesis paper, an attempt to 
reduce the academic, empirical and theoretical gaps.  
2.1. Conceptualization of crisis 
 
The emerging subject area of crisis management is burgeoning, yet it is often 
challenging to appreciate it due to confusion concerning the concepts and meanings 
surrounding it. A vast amount of literature on crisis management fails to follow any 
general or publically agreed on definitions. Many authors perceive different 
definitions of crisis based on their professional and disciplinary backgrounds. 
Indeed, due to its complexity and ambiguity, the issue of crisis management has not 
received deserved attention.  
 
The term ‘crisis’ is difficult for understanding as complexity and obscurity often 
shadow it. Generally, any crisis can be characterized as “unwanted, unexpected, 
unprecedented, and almost unmanageable events that cause widespread disbelief 
and uncertainty” (Boin, 2004, p. 167). The term appeared as a conceptual framework 
in the 1980s in the context of organizational management, and as a response to 
global natural disasters (Spillan, 2003; Asimakopoulou, 2007). Some of the earlier 
definitions identified crisis through a narrow business management perspective, as 
events or activities which, if escalated, can interfere with the normal operation of the 
business and can have detrimental consequences for its existence (Fink, 1986; 
Williams and Treadaway, 1992).  
 
Kouzmin and Yarman (2004) point out that while crisis events feature similar 
characteristics, such as severe threat, destructive nature, and life-threatening 
environment, each crisis may differ in its level of threat. Kourzmin and Yarman 
(2004) and Christensen et al. (2016) pose an argument that one should always first 
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understand that crisis has a high degree of uncertainty and uniqueness, making it 
difficult to classify. Authors Drennan, McConnell and Stark (2015) agree with this 
argument, providing more dimensions to reconcile objective and subjectivity 
standpoints of the crisis definition. According to the authors, crisis can be 
understood by examining the following characteristics (Drennan et al., 2015):  
 
• the speed of arrival; 
• the degree of predictability; 
• the extent of preparedness; 
• the degree of intentionality to cause a crisis; 
• the degree of complexity; 
• the degree of politicization, and; 
• the degree of persistence after the acute stage. 
  
Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart (1989) defined crisis in broader terms that can be 
applied beyond the business management perspective. In their view crisis is an event 
in which there is a perceived threat to organizations core values and functions, and 
which requires an immediate response. The primary advantage of this definition is 
that it can be used to interpret various crises and types of disruption, depending on 
their circumstances. Drennan et al. (2015) argue that perceived circumstances of 
crisis can be both objective and subjective, and the perception often depends on the 
person evaluating the circumstances. However, the authors view threats which are 
attributed to the crisis as more objective. Such could be threats to life, infrastructure, 
policy, economy, political reputation, and finances. Based on a long line of 
arguments, the authors propose a comprehensive definition of crisis that reconciles 
the past and contemporary perspectives. The following definition will be used as a 
backdrop for this research:  
 
Crisis – a set of circumstances in which individuals, institutions or societies face 
threats beyond the norms of routine day-to-day functioning, but the significance and 
impact of these circumstances will vary according to individual perceptions (Drennan 
et al., 2015, p. 2). 
  
The justification for using this definition relies on the fact that it recognizes both the 
complexity of the term as a phenomenon and myriad of perceptions of the 
circumstances that cause a crisis. Moreover, despite a plethora of perspectives and 
definitions of crisis, it seems academically appropriate to understand crisis based on 
the interpretation of a specific context and the consequences. 
2.2. Classification of crisis 
 
A deeper understanding of crisis as a phenomenon can be achieved by exploring 
some of its boundaries and classifications. Spillan (2000) classifies crisis into five 
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categories – organizational, internal, external, natural and technological threats (see 
Table 1).  
 
Categories Definitions Crisis events 
1. Organizational These types of events have the 
potential to disrupt an organization’s 
day-to-day operations. 
Serious industrial accidents, product malfunctions, loss 
of key records due to fire, system breakdowns, or terrorist 
attacks 
2. Internal threats These crises often originate from 
operational crises and can result in 
negative public perceptions.  
These consist of corporate espionage, management 
corruption, embezzlement, and theft. Some examples are 
employee, and product recalls, and employee violence in 
the work place.  
3. External threats These events refer to wrongful acts 
committed by an individuals or 
organization 
Government investigation resulting in is an example. 
Miscommunication can create other problems. Consumer 
lawsuits, terrorist attacks, poor publicity about events 
such as boycotts, product sabotage, and negative media 
coverage can affect a company’s profitability.  
4. Natural disasters  These are caused by an act of God.  They include floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes.  
5. Technology threats These are events that have potential 
impact on the company’s technology 
system and operations.  
Computer systems breakdowns, invasion by hacker, virus 
or computer systems invasion by intruder.  
 
     Table 1. Classifications of definitions for the concept of crisis (Spillan, 2000) 
 
The classification since then has been modified by Mitroff (2004) and includes - 
economic, human resource, informational, reputational, crisis of physical and natural 
causes and terrorism-related crisis. Hough and Spillan (2005) crisis classification 
framework later expanded Mitroff’s by adding a dimension of the operational crisis. 
The context of higher education systems in crisis can be placed into the 
organizational or operational category as it deals with the events that interrupt 




• Hostile takeover 
• Product tampering  
• Vehicular fatality  
• Copyright infringement 
• Environment spill  
• Computer tampering 
• Executive kidnapping 
• Product/service boycott 
• Work-related homicide 
• Malicious rumors 
• Natural disaster that destroys organizational information base 
• Terrorist attack  
• Plant explosion 
• Sexual harassment 




The next classification should be addressed as a continuation of the previous, and 
together they create a roadmap for understanding tendencies in framing crisis types. 
Drennan et al. (2015) classify crisis as: 
 
● sudden – sudden arrival, any epicenter is possible, e.g. terrorism, massacre; 
● fast-burning – sudden arrival and low persistence after the acute stage, 
various epicenters can be affected, individual, institutional, societal, industrial, 
e.g. water contamination; 
● creeping – gradual arrival, high predictability and low preparedness, various 
epicenters may be involved, e.g. climate change, ageing population; 
● long-shadow – gradual arrival, high persistence after the acute stage, any 
epicenter may be affected, often societal, e.g. political demonstrations, riots, 
war; 
● agenda-setting – high politicization, and high persistence after the acute 
stage, mostly individual, policy, institutional, societal and industrial epicenters 
are affected: mass shootings, budget shortcuts and employee layoffs; 
● mismanaged – low preparedness and high politicization, any epicenter may be 
affected: poor management during crisis of an organization; 
● manufactured – high intent to cause crisis, epicenter is likely to be policy or 
institutional, e.g. man-inflated or created threatening situation; 
● policy fiascos/disasters – high predictability and high politicization, the 
epicenter mostly policy, but individual or institutional can be affected too, e.g. 
policy failure; 
● technological – high complexity, epicenter is technological and can spread to 
policy, institutional and societal or cross-societal, e.g. critical IT failure, 
hacked system, damaging virus; 
● transboundary -  high complexity, epicenter can be cross-societal and also 
affect other epicenters, policy, institutional, societal and technological, in 
particular, e.g. pandemics, global financial meltdown; 
● mega – high complexity and politicization, all epicenters affected, e.g. famine, 
genocide; 
● natural disasters – usually of sudden arrival, some degree of predictability 
and preparedness, geophysical epicenter that spreads to others, e.g. 
earthquake, tsunami; 
● accidents – little or no intention to cause failure, different degree of 
complexity, little or no predictability and preparedness, epicenters often 
involve technology, but can affect other epicenters, e.g. Chornobyl disaster; 
● emergencies – sudden arrival, high predictability and preparedness, often 
affects individual and institutional epicenters, e.g. gas leakage, fire. 
 
The typology offered by Pearson and Clair is useful as it offers a high level of 
scalability and measurement, and it can aid in the process of crisis identification and 
response. At the same time, it is viewed from the perspective of a somewhat stable 
system (i.e., the USA), where the crises are seen as stand-alone events like terrorist 
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attacks, corruption, natural disaster, kidnapping or bombings. While such events are 
devastating, they are also sudden and fast-burning and usually are resolved within a 
short period. Many systems around the world have been functioning under long-
shadow crisis (i.e., armed conflicts, riots and full-fledged wars), which tend to arrive 
gradually and persist for an extended period after an acute stage. Therefore, a 
different crisis management approach is required to long-shadow crisis 
 
Scholars emphasize that there is no one way of classifying a crisis because it can 
border across many categories (Spillan, 2001, Spillan, 2006; Coombs, 2012; Drennan 
et al., 2015). The mentioned typologies of crisis present only few views that offer 
some understanding into what threats any crisis might entail. This research with 
regard to the Ukrainian crisis-affected higher education institutions will focus on the 
long-shadow crisis, namely armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, it would be 
useful to look into the approaches that exist with regard to prolonged types of crisis, 
and the impacts such crisis causes.   
2.3. Impacts of crisis 
 
The nature of consequences of the crisis depends on the nature of a threat itself and a 
response to it. The mechanics of crisis is often erratic and spontaneous, and the 
epicenter of crisis can include almost anyone, individuals, organizations, economies, 
societies. However, there is usually someone or something responsible for generating 
a crisis, and someone having to endure the consequences (Smith and Toft, 1998). The 
consequences of crisis as regarded by Boin (2004) are often “dysfunctional, 
undesirable, if not evil” (p. 173). Unlike the ambiguity of the concept of crisis, the 
consequences of the crisis are evidence-based and empirical. Boin and McConnell 
(2007) suggest that people have a strong desire to deal with the consequences of 
crisis due to a hard-wired need for safety, stability, and comfort. Thus, the 
administrative actions from the management perspective are often designed around 
fulfilling the basic human needs.  
 
In Coombs’ (2007) understanding, a crisis can pose damage to organizations, 
stakeholders, industry and overall environment in three major ways: public safety 
threats, financial loss, and reputational loss. The consequences of the crisis for public 
safety are industrial accidents and natural disasters that may lead to injuries or 
death. Financial loss is another common consequence of crisis for organizations and 
individuals, as the crisis can tarnish infrastructure or, for example, halt the 
production of goods or services. Lastly, Coombs (2007) states that organizations’ 
reputation is often shaken by the crisis, and damaged reputation may also lead to a 
more financial loss. Therefore, these three consequences of crises are deeply 
interrelated. 
  
While the previous research regarding the impacts of crisis has mostly implications 
for the private sector, Drennan, McConnell & Stark (2015) provide a coherent 
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conceptualization of the adverse impacts of crisis for public organizations. Some 
elements of the analytical framework will be adapted for this study, when analyzing 
the impacts of the armed conflict on the displaced higher education institutions in 
Ukraine.  
 
Thus, the impacts of crisis constitute, but are not limited to, the following (Drennan 
et al., 2015): 
 
• human costs – deaths, injuries; 
• critical infrastructure costs – loss of buildings, loss of intellectual property 
access, library resources, classrooms, laboratories, office equipment; 
• policy costs – failed policies; 
• economic costs – job layoffs, revenue decline; 
• political-symbolic costs – damaged organizational/governmental 
legitimacy; and 
• personal costs – damaged reputation, physiological and psychological 
traumas. 
  
While crisis brings destruction, suffering, and losses, some researchers also argue 
that it may potentially open space for opportunities. For example, organizational 
management researchers as Korac-Kakabadse, Kouzmin, and Kakabadse (2002) and 
Boin and Lagadec (2000) acknowledge that when one organization faces a financial 
crisis, it may serve as an opening for another organization to introduce its product on 
the market. As well as, when the crisis is manageable and treatable, organizations 
that endured crisis can come out stronger from experience by learning from their 
mistakes and planning strategically for the future.   
  
On balance, researchers of crisis management in public sector see the crisis as an 
opportunity to open discussions about the broader safety problems, also introduce 
organizational change, improve planning and prevention efforts. Crisis can also 
transform policy frameworks, and review the institutional leadership to strive for 
effective and resilient leaders, managers, organizations, governments and societies 
(Drennan et al., 2015). 
  
While the definitions and impacts of crisis may still be somewhat ambiguous, the 
study of crisis management processes is more tangible and empirical and filled with 
multiple theoretical and analytical frameworks. However, the actual tasks of 
implementation of crisis management approaches may pose some challenges. The 
next section will use the above-noted knowledge of the definitions, classifications, 
impacts of crisis to establish a shared understanding of the many possibilities and 
tactics that exist in coping with any types of crisis. 




The database of recorded crisis events enables researchers to establish tools and 
tactics needed for tackling the insecurities of today’s world. However, due to an 
unpredictable and sudden nature of crisis, it is difficult to avoid or eliminate the 
impacts of crisis entirely. Practitioners and researchers have studied the 
management of the crisis for multiple decades. And researchers in various fields 
were able to dissect the crisis scenarios into different phases and sets of operations to 
construct comprehensive crisis management plans. 
 
Although crisis management activity is a more common phenomenon in a private 
sector, the research suggests that it is ignored for a variety of reasons (expenses, 
disbelief, unwillingness to plan) (Brown, 1993; Spillan, 2000; Spillan and Hough, 
2003; Boudreaux, 2005). Spillan and Hough (2003) examined perceived importance 
of crisis planning in a survey of 162 small businesses in the United States, identifying 
that the occurrence of crisis event mainly initiates a concern about crisis planning. 
Also, crisis concerns are mostly generated from the previous crisis experiences, and 
not from the presence of crisis managers. 
 
The concept of crisis management entails prediction, and elimination of destructive 
impacts of crisis that might pose threats to organization or individual’s life. Pearson 
and Clair (1998) suggest that the effective crisis management entails reducing these 
threats before the onset of crisis by involving cooperation between key stakeholders 
that share a common understanding of the notion of crisis, impacts of crisis, and 
management approaches and roles and responsibilities that need to be taken. Spillan 
and Hough (2003), Whitman and Mattord (2003), Smits and Ezzat (2003) also 
argue that for effective crisis management, an organization needs to be able to 
identify the crisis type and the degree of intervention needed to avoid the costs. 
 
In contrast, in Boin’s (2004) view an effective management plan is such, where 
managers prepare their organizations for the crisis through preventive measures, 
and by developing personnel resilience mechanisms. Resilience is “the capacity to 
cope with the unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, and learning 
to bounce back” (Boin, 2004). Resilience approach should be embedded in the 
organizational culture and cultivated from the start. Boin (2004) criticizes the fact 
that too much emphasis is given to prevention of ‘routine crises’ - those that occur 
frequently and organization know how to cope with them. However, the hidden 
manifestations of crisis are often unpredictable, for example the speed of arrival and 
their magnitude. Thus, organization need to focus on cultivating resilience, which 
precisely concerns with developing an internal capacity to deal with the unheard and 
unimagined types of crisis.  
 
As the world is getting more technologically sophisticated and environmentally 
challenging, the crisis threats are progressing.  While it is hard to think of and plan 
for the unthinkable, the viability of the systems depends on the versatile planning 
and response to the crisis. Therefore, crisis managers, need to learn to balance the 
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planning and prevention efforts with the development of organizational and 
individual resilience, which is often challenging. 
  
The field of crisis management has been concerned with the development of many 
models to address various types of crisis. These models sometimes contain sub-
phases or additional phases. For example, Fink (1986) proposed a four-stage model 
of a crisis life-cycle (see Figure 1 below): the prodromal crisis stage, the acute crisis 
stage, the chronic crisis stage and the resolution stage. The knowledge of crisis stages 
is important when crisis managers are considering a response, as each stage of crisis 
requires a different set of responses. In the first prodromal stage, the role of 
organizational managers and the governments is to proactively seek and identify any 
signs or symptoms of crisis. The acute stage is an evident sign or trigger which causes 
damage, and the consequences of this stage will depend on the effectiveness of the 
first stage. The chronic crisis stage refers to the lasting effects of a crisis that require 
immediate intervention. This stage involves plans and strategies to resolve the crisis. 
The final resolution stage of the Fink’s (1986) model is where steps are taken to end 
the crisis.  
 
 
Figure 1. Fink’s crisis life cycle (Source: Fink, 1986) 
 
The model has been widely used and modified in many studies as the bases of the 
crisis management life-cycle. However, it has also received criticism for ignoring the 
cyclical or reoccurring nature of the crisis, whereby crisis is an event that 
organizations need to continuously learn from and plan for future crisis again 
(Boudreaux, 2005).  
 
To Fink’s four-stage model has be complemented by Mitroff (1994), who introduced 
a five-stage crisis management model: signal detection, probing, and prevention, 
damage containment, recovery, and learning (see Figure 2 below). The first stage of 
signal detection is much like the Fink’s (1986) prodromal stage, where an assessment 
is made to elicit any signs of possible crisis. Probing and prevention is a second 
proactive stage in the Mitroff’s model, where organizations analyze the information 
about past crisis events and their prevention methods. Unlike the first stage, the 
second stage of the model is not addressed in the Fink’s model. The stages of damage 
containment and recovery are similar to Fink’s (1986) acute, chronic, and recovery 
stages, where the triggers of crisis are identified and an attempt to contain the 
damage is made, and end the crisis. The Mitroff’s (1994) learning stage supplements 
the Fink’s model by incorporating the recurrent feature of crisis and urges 
organizations to draw lessons from the crisis.  
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Figure 2. Mitroff’s five-stages of crisis management (Source: Mitroff, 1986) 
 
González-Herrero and Pratt (1995; 1996) support the Mitroff’s view of continuity of 
crisis by suggesting four phases of crisis: birth, growth, maturity, and decline. The 
model argues that crisis does not end at a decline, its effects can be lasting, leading to 
the birth of another crisis over the course of time. However, if the crisis management 
is enabled in crisis situations, organizations can change the longevity of an 
organization in the event of a disaster. Moreover, if the crisis management tools are 
deployed effectively, crisis life cycle may alter to the extent of being avoided entirely. 
  
Coombs (1999) points out that the models introduced by and Fink (1986) and Mitroff 
(1994) are one of the most influential approaches to studying crisis management. 
Due to their minor differentiation, a three-stage model was introduced to 
synchronize the models of the crisis management cycle. Hence, the primary system 
of crisis management is classified into three stages: pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis. The 
three-stage model is not attributed to any theorist.  
 
The first stage of the model encompasses preventive and planning features of crisis 
management. The crisis stage involves crisis recognition, communication and 
reputation management. The post-crisis takes places when the crisis has been 
resolved and the channels of communication with the stakeholders are being 
renewed, during this stage an organization also evaluates the crisis and the lessons 
that can be drawn from it. This stage is crucial as post-crisis learning can provide 
clues and improve crisis management of other organizations too (Fink, 1986; Mitroff 
and Pauchnant, 1991; Coombs, 1996).  
 
On balance, Hough and Spillan (2005) criticize that three-stage model of crisis 
management, emphasizing that it assumes that each crisis stage will include the 
processes of crisis analysis, crisis planning, and preparation, as well as evaluation of 
crisis after it occurred. The authors, therefore, propose a model that illustrates two 
possible scenarios when tackling crisis: reactive and proactive (see Figure 3 below). 
In the first scenario, the pre-planning step is avoided, and the decisions about 
planning are made on the spot. While in the proactive model some of the potential 
crisis consequences have been anticipated due to a pre-crisis stage involving 
vulnerability analysis. In the proactive model, the crisis is expected. Therefore, 
various responses are ready to be enacted for the crisis aversion. The author 
emphasizes that the last post-crisis management stage of evaluation of crisis plan 
and review of the risks need to be performed with attention and thoroughness so that 
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Figure 3. Crisis management process (Hough and Spillan, 2005) 
 
As well as Spillan and Hough, Jaques (2007) stresses the importance of the crisis 
prevention and crisis preparedness in the overall process of crisis management. 
Besides, the author states that the crisis and its management are a continuum of 
interrelated events, and “the elements [of crisis management] should be seen as 
‘clusters’ of related and integrated disciplines, not as ‘steps’ to be undertaken 
sequentially” (Jaques, 2007).  
 
The life-cycle model should be viewed as a general framework which enables 
understanding of a complex crisis management approach. While the life-cycle model 
offers proper guidelines and a general framework for behavior before and during the 
crisis, it mainly addresses crisis managers and overlooks the chance of management 
and leadership failure, or insufficient resources of most organizations for crisis 
prevention training and emergency simulations. Crandall, Parnell, and Spillan (2013) 
attempt to address some of these problems, namely by assessing the political, 
organizational, communication and business aspects of an organization during crisis 
management.  
 
According to Crandall et al. (2013), political problems may arise due to ideological 
differences, perceptions, and attitudes of various groups in the organization as to 
what a significant crisis is, what resources should be used available for its prevention. 
To address this problem, managers need to engage in negotiating, persuading and 
influencing employees regarding the importance of crisis preparedness and 
response. Organizational problems can be manifest through organizational culture. 
Organizations that do not introduce a culture of crisis prevention and management 
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through effective communication, face resistance and lack of acceptance of the crisis 
management efforts when the crisis is underway. Failing to appropriately address 
planning and communication strategies, discuss allocation of resources, staff, 
logistical support may lead to an escalation of the crisis. Crisis communication 
strategy should, therefore, be one of the strategic investments of organizations before 
and during the crisis. Organizational problems occur when organizations cease 
operating in the time of crisis. The authors suggest that organizations realize efforts 
to satisfy its clients (if possible) and stay ‘alive’ during the crisis to ensure viability in 
the future. The authors emphasize that the stages of preventing and preparing for a 
crisis, therefore, should be treated with priority to avoid escalation of crisis during 
response and recovery stages. Finally, Crandall et al. (2013) recognize that any 
response to crisis requires a lot of resources and coordinated efforts to develop 
necessary programs and competencies within an organization. However, ultimately 
each organization requires a crisis management procedure to prepare for potential 
crisis.  
 
In conclusion, the above-noted crisis conceptualization and crisis management 
approaches mentioned make for an important analytical foundation that can be used 
to understand the context of conflict-affected higher education institutions. While 
the discussion of the impacts of crisis and crisis management tools stems mainly 
from the business management perspective, some important conclusions can be 
drawn for the study of public organizations, in particular higher education 




















Chapter III - Crisis and crisis management in higher education: 
Towards an analytical framework  
 
The following chapter discusses the literature about the impact of crisis on higher 
education, with particular examples of impacts of armed conflicts on higher 
education institutions. The chapter presents literature thematically. First, the 
impacts of various types of crisis on the higher education institutions and their 
functions.  Second, the chapter analyzes the studies about the crisis management 
approaches in higher education and the role of governments in responding to crisis. 
Third, the chapter presents the context of the Ukrainian crisis and discusses the role 
of key stakeholders in responding to the impacts of conflict on the Ukrainian 
displaced higher education institutions. Lastly, the analytical framework is compiled 
based on the empirical, analytical and theoretical considerations discussed in this 
and in the previous chapter.    
 
Publications of mainly three types have been identified based on a thorough analysis 
of literature: historically-based, recommendation-based and empirically-based. The 
literature of historical or retrospective nature exists in the form of memoirs, 
chronicles, and book chapters, whereby its role is to describe the impact of war on 
higher education. The purpose of recommendation-based literature is mainly to 
inform about the importance of studying the issue of crisis management in the 
context of higher education, and recommend governments and higher education 
institutions to utilize crisis management approaches. The empirical literature on the 
topic is scarce and scientifically weak, lacking proper application of theoretical and 
analytical approaches or adequate scientific methodology. 
3.1. Impacts of crisis on higher education  
 
The higher education sector is without a doubt one the most severely affected areas 
during an armed conflict. The higher education’s openness and primary function to 
interact with the society makes easily target to threats and attacks. The next sections 
discuss examples in which the higher education systems, academic populations and 
specific academic establishments were affected by war, conflict, violent attacks, 
political pressure, intellectual persecution, and more.  
3.1.1. Historical overview  
 
History of the last century demonstrates severe impacts of war on higher education 
institutions. Knowledge has been under attack when used in opposition to prevailing 
ideologies or as a tool to advance political and technological agendas. When 
Germany began spreading its political indoctrination, liberal intellectuals and 
academics feared for their lives. The period of Hitler’s rule was characterized by the 
state suppression of liberal thinking of intellectuals, and most prominently, 
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persecution of Jewish academics. Over the next few years, there were around 12 
thousand intellectuals prohibited from academic life and participation in social and 
cultural events (Krohn, 1993). The country suffered the most significant ‘brain drain’ 
in its history, forcing many scholars to seek refuge in Great Britain, France, Canada 
and the United States. 
 
The book by Storz (2012) presents a perspective on the impact of war on higher 
education in Canada during the 1940s, stressing that the universities were “attuned 
to the vagaries and vicissitudes of off-campus turmoil” (p. 243). In the book, the 
author dwells on the topic of refugee professors during the anti-Semitic period and 
the humanitarian response that Canada provided during those times. The University 
of Toronto offered permanent positions to dozens of Jewish professors. The 
Canadian Society for the Protection of Science and Learning was established in that 
period to assist the persecuted Jewish academicians (Storz, 2012). However, the 
problem of displaced scholars was challenging to address entirely, due to the 
insecurities of the Canadian society, where the local intellectuals feared that refugee 
professors might intrude in the employment opportunities of the Canadians.  
  
Varied perspectives in academia were shared among the US universities professors 
too. An event, however, that entered into history as an example of true academic 
solidarity and support of knowledge was the ‘University in Exile’ (The New School, 
n.d.). The director of the New School for Social Research in New York opened this 
institution as a way to avoid a massive ‘brain waste’ and to protest against the Nazi 
barbarism and anti-Semitism. Around 184 refugee professors were brought to the US 
through this initiative. The University in Exile started as a graduate faculty offering 
doctoral programs in philosophy and social sciences at the New School (The New 
School, n.d.; Steinacher & Barmettler, 2013). 
 
In anticipation of grim consequences of the war for higher education, many nations 
took measures to mitigate the impacts of crisis. The former British Empire paid 
considerable attention to crisis planning. In the book ‘University at War, 1914-1925’, 
Irish (2015) mentions that the Committee for Imperial Defense developed a 
contingency plan in 1936 to mobilize the scientists and academics during the war. It 
was also commanded by the British government to create a central register of 
scientists, and the university leadership was to design a plan for mobilization of 
students in the case of war.  
 
Similar activities occured in the United States and France, where scientists and the 
governments realized that “defense research should be peacetime, not wartime, 
endeavor” (Irish, 2015, p. 11). For example, the US established the National Defense 
Committee in 1940 and France conducted communication between universities, 
researchers and the military which was administered by the National Centre for 
Applied Scientific Research. However, the wars not only dismantled universities and 
scattering academic communities around Europe and beyond, but they also did 
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much worse. The Wars changed the integrity of scholarly work, whereby academic 
knowledge was inappropriately used to destroy human lives. Brodhead (1992) in his 
book titled ‘Total War and Twentieth-Century Higher Learning’ states that 
universities in Germany, France, Great Britain and the US were involved in war-
related research, which was used to invent weapons of mass destruction. 
 
In his book ‘Colleges and Universities in World War II,’ Cardozier (1993) indicates 
that the universities in the US were able to survive and suffer fewer consequences 
during the war due to their elasticity and partnership with the government. For 
example, universities were creating training programs for the Army, Navy and Air 
Forces (Cardozie, 1993; Ponte, 2016).  
 
The World War II impacted the financial conditions of universities severely, as well 
as, the academic side of education, changing its aims and academic culture. The 
universities mainly suffered losses in students’ enrolment, which resulted in heavy 
budget cuts and staff depletion (Cardozie, 1993). At the time, many universities were 
unable to finance maintenance of facilities, the toll was made on the reduction of 
courses and extracurricular activities. During both Wars, there was a threat to 
academic freedom, mainly resulting in harassment incidents, racial hostility, and 
criticism of curricula. Universities also participated in propaganda and protests and 
political manifestations when the wars were waged (Rudy, 1996). 
3.1.2. Exploring the contemporary situation  
 
Existing research on higher education and crisis mainly exists within the discourse of 
fragility and education, education in emergencies and conflict (CERG, 2008; Tebbe, 
2009, Beggan, 2011; INEE, 2010; INEE, 2011; Justino, 2011; Eaker and Viars, 2014, 
Milton, 2017). While the literature on the crisis and higher education is 
predominantly scarce consisting of individual case studies, few influential reviews 
and bibliographies papers are available (Davies, 2008; Guskey, 2013; Garcia, 2015). 
Conflict and Education Research Group (CERG, 2008) conducted a desk literature 
review to map out the tendencies and the state-of-art research regarding the impact 
of fragile contexts on higher education and crisis. Other significant research 
primarily addresses the following areas:  
 
• Humanitarian crisis and response for higher education systems functioning in 
the conditions of crisis (Spink, 2005; Lall, 2007); 
•  “Two faces” of higher education: conflicts can cause inequalities or fuel the 
conflict; experience of conflict can contribute to peacemaking and national 
development (Rasheed and Munoz, 2016, Barakat and Milton, 2016, Milton, 
2017; Garrard and Lipsey, 2007); 
• The destructive impact of crises and conflict on higher education provision 
(access to quality education (Miller-Gradvaux, 2009; Justino, 2010; Beggan, 
2011; Milton, 2018); 
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• Importance of state in educational provision during the crisis (USAID, 2005; 
EFA-FTI, 2008). 
The literature reviews play a significant role in establishing the context of the 
research on education and conflict, emergency, instability, and crisis, leading to a 
conclusion that much has been done to enrich and develop with the field of education 
and crisis. Conversely, there is no such review regarding the topic of higher 
education and crisis management specifically.  
 
Crisis-affected environments differ by their nature and can be manifest in a range of 
impacts. The societies affected by armed conflicts leave the most painful and 
destructive footprint on the higher education systems. Several studies demonstrate 
physical and emotional damages to academic populations caused by armed conflicts 
(Miller-Grandvaux, 2009, Justino, 2010, UNESCO, 2010; Beggan, 2011; INEE, 2011; 
Brueck et al., 2013; Milton, 2018). Also, the consequences can be more tangible, such 
as destruction of institutional infrastructure, and indirect, such as displacement of 
population and ‘brain drain’ (Milton and Brakat, 2016). Regardless of location, many 
higher education systems share similarities with regard to impacts of conflict.  
 
Conflict as one of the embodiments of crisis can affect higher education in many 
ways, destruction of physical infrastructure, loss of lives, weak institutional capacity, 
damaged reputation. The study by UNESCO Institute for Statistics discusses the 
implications of conflicts on schools and universities, such as the destruction of 
educational infrastructure, restriction of financial resources, the targeting of students 
and teachers, the aggravation of educational inequalities. The author also mentions 
devastating effects the conflicts have on the student's future access to the job market, 
salaries and the health risks in their adulthood (UNESCO, 2010).  
 
The study of Justino (2011) provides a well-elaborated hierarchy of the conflict 
effects on the supply of primary and higher education. The author argues that, (1) 
violent types of crisis frequently result in “the destruction of infrastructure and 
resources to maintain functioning education systems”; (2) cause displacements of 
populations, communities, and families; (3) have distributional effects on education 
systems, having to do with inequalities that arise from certain population movement 
restrictions (Justino, 2011). The findings state that the destruction and restriction of 
education, as one of the consequences of conflict, have detrimental implications for 
the education of young people, particularly concerning the career prospects and 
economic returns. Therefore, if education systems in conflict-affected areas are 
safeguarded and maintained, education can be the catalyst for recovery, stability, and 
reliance on the society. 
  
The working paper of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies 
(INEE) highlights the need for more discourse and debate around conflicts’ impact 
on higher education and higher education’s role in conflict (INEE, 2011). The paper 
emphasizes that during conflict education as a whole is not the primary concern of 
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the governments, therefore, all levels of education may suffer from limited 
investment in education due to the funneling of economic resources into military 
operations or diverting of funds “to serve the personal interest of those in power” 
(INEE, 2011).  
  
Milton and Barakat (2016) point out that conflicts are also inherently different 
regarding various contextual factors, i.e., economic development, political regime, 
level of destruction and violence. The study also provides categorization that is based 
on works of Collier et al. (2003) and other works of Milton and Barakat (2015) that 
may be useful in learning more about direct costs of civil wars and their debilitating 
impact on higher education. They stress that higher education during violent conflict 
faces four main challenges: physical destruction, population displacement, war-
related conditions and low resilience of the sector. 
 
Destruction of physical infrastructure is a pronounced feature of armed conflict. For 
example, during the post-invasion period in Iraq, 84% of higher education 
institutions were shattered, and the campuses in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and 
Libya were turned into military bases (Milton and Barakat, 2016). Displacement of 
academics, recruitment of students by armies, staff and students’ casualties are 
societal costs of conflict in higher education. In Afghanistan over 20 thousand of 
experts and scholars lost their lives during more than a decade of conflict (Milton 
and Barakat, 2016).  
  
A Syrian case of massive population displacement is well-known to the world. As a 
result of the heavily armed conflict, there are over 200 thousand Syrian students who 
have been deprived of a right to study (Enab Baladi, 2016; Syria Deeply, 2017). There 
are projects designed to respond to the world’s education emergencies. The Institute 
of International Education (IIE) and the Catalyst Foundation for Universal 
Education designed the Platform for Education in Emergencies Response (PEER), 
which enables displaced and refugee students (mainly Syrian) to find ways to resume 
their education (PEER, n.d.). Another initiative worth mentioning is the Jamiya 
Project, which assists Syrian displaced academics and students in receiving 
education through blended online learning and providing in-person learning. The 
project aims to “create a replicable blueprint for future crises and for reconnecting 
displaced higher education networks, students, and academics in finding a solution 
to the gap in provision” (Jamiya Project, n.d.). The initiative works as a prototype of 
an exiled university, launching two significant projects. The first, Pilot SPOCS (Small 
Private Online Courses) in Jordan offers courses in Applied IT and Global Studies 
certified by the University of Gothenburg. The second, Jamiya VOCAPP, is a mobile 
application that assists Syrian refugee students with learning the academic language 
(Jamiya Project, n.d.; Webster, 2016). 
 
Internal or international displacement of people is a typical tragic cost of conflict for 
higher education, the displacement of whole institutions is, however, not a universal 
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phenomenon. One of such examples is the European Humanities University, which is 
a Belarusian private university that was shut down by its president due to its 
opposition, an attempt to safeguard their autonomy. The university enabled their 
students to receive education in distance-learning (DL) format at first (Mikhailov, 
2009; BBC News, 2013). The Belarusian authorities did not recognize the university's 
diploma, however, many western universities showed their solidarity with the EHU, 
by either recognizing their diplomas or allowing EHU students to do their Master's 
degrees in the European universities. Lithuania accepted the university. In 2005 the 
EHU was reopened and began its operation again in the following fall in Vilnius. The 
university received massive financial support from some major European and US 
donors. The funds enabled the university to receive teaching premises and cover its 
costs for BA and MA programs (Dounaev, 2007; Kryvoi, 2011).  
 
In addition, some of the hidden consequences of conflict on higher education are 
war-inflicted traumas, death, erosion of quality, as mentioned previously, redirection 
of funding from higher education to military and other humanitarian sectors, 
decrease in student enrollment, shut-down of universities, and more (Justino, 2010; 
Babury and Hayward, 2013; Milton and Barakat, 2016). In counties like East Timor, 
Nicaragua, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Iraq, due to the fragility and low 
capacity of the countries to maintain and develop higher education institutions, 
multiple unaccredited diploma-mills with low quality started operating without the 
state’s oversight (Bacevic, 2013; Milton and Barakat, 2016; Milton, 2018).  
 
Students, faculty, administration often become subjects to violent attacks. A recent 
study by Bradford and Wilson (2013) which analyzed the attacks on educational 
institutions between the 1980s and 2010 in various regions globally, found that 
universities were targeted the most (41.2%). The regions where universities were 
most affected by violence were South Asia, Middle East, North Africa, Southeast 
Asia. Milton (2018) provides many examples where higher education institutions 
have been continuously a subject of violence and crisis around the world (see Table 
2). The following table only presents a fraction of instances of higher education 
systems in conflict-affected environments, with the intention to remind about the 




Casualties of conflicts 
Cambodia, 1970s Killing of students and academics for any sings of foreign learning 
Burundi, 1972 Rebellion against educated ethnic group - 60 students killed 
Colombia, 1999 Kidnapping and killings of university academics 
Pakistan, 2004-2013 Attacks on universities 
Iraq, 2006 Kidnapping and killing of 79 academics  
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Yemen, 2011 Armed conflict - 73 students and faculty killed  
Syria, 2013 Bombing of University of Aleppo - 83 students and faculty  
Gaza, 2014  Israeli army assault on Gaza - 421 students killed 
Kenya, 2015 Attacks on university - 148 killed  
Pakistan, 2016  Attacks on university - 20 killed 
Nigeria ongoing Boko Haram attacks on the university - hundreds killed 
 
Table 2. Higher education systems in crisis. Location and number of casualties 
(Source: Milton, 2018)  
 
Lastly, the resilience of higher education to conflicts, in many countries, has proven 
to be quite weak. Some argue that it is due to low prioritization of the sector and 
over-reliance of the institution on the state’s funding and limited allocation to the 
sector thereof. Rose and Greeley, 2006 claim that higher education institutions 
require more complex aid during the time of crisis. In the case of Afghanistan and 
Sudan, the entire systems of higher education collapsed and ceased to operate for the 
time of conflict (IIEP, 2004; Babyesiza, 2013; Milton, 2018). The weak resilience and 
the reconstruction of the sector are not addressed by the international stakeholders 
as well. For example, the World Bank allocated only 12% of the total education loan 
budget to higher education systems affected by conflict (Buckland, 2005).  
 
On the other hand, Milton (2018), while recognizing the devastating impacts of 
conflict on higher education also warns about blaming conflict for all the negative 
features. Conflict plays a crucial role in aggravating various impacts higher education 
institutions face, but also the management of the crisis, the response to the crisis, 
and the resilience of an organization need to be considered.  
3.2. Crisis management approaches in higher education 
 
The literature indicates that scholars have a relatively similar perception of crisis 
management approaches although there is a lack of commonly accepted framework 
for crisis management in higher education (Drennan et al., 2007; Zdziarski et al., 
2007). The next sections will examine application of crisis management frameworks 
in the higher education context.  
3.2.1. Crisis management at higher education institutions  
 
The scarcity of literature that addresses crisis management in the higher education 
may suggest an inadequate attention given to this field. Unfortunately, the subject of 
higher education and crisis management and continuity management of higher 
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education institutions boasts only few case studies, which frequently adopt 
qualitative perspectives, and lack substantive evidence.   
 
There are few influential studies mostly deriving from the US context that engage the 
subject of crisis management in higher education. The works by Zdziarski (2001) 
Zdziarski et al. (2007), Burrell (2009), Beggan (2011), Sutherland (2013), Garcia 
(2015), have shaped the field of crisis management offering a new higher education 
perspective.   
 
The earliest dissertation by Zdziarski (2001) and a book ‘Campus Crisis 
Management: Comprehensive Guide to Planning, Prevention, Response, and 
Recovery’ by Zdziarski et al. (2007) certainly gave more importance to the study of 
crisis management of higher education institutions. The main contribution of this 
book is that it comprehensively evaluates crisis management in the higher education 
context and offers a domain-specific definition of crisis.   
 
A crisis is an event, which is often sudden and unexpected, that disrupts the normal 
operations of the institution on its educational mission and threaten the wellbeing of 
personnel, property, financial resources, and/or reputation of the institution 
(Zdziarski et al., 2007, p.5). 
 
The authors also introduce a useful analytical tool, namely the crisis matrix. The 
crisis matrix is a useful for assessing a crisis, identifying its impact on an academic 
institution and considering approaches to managing the crisis. The matrix comprises 
of three dimensions: levels of crisis (critical incident, campus emergency, disaster), 
types of crisis (environmental, facility, human), and intentionality of crisis 
(intentional, unintentional) (see Figure 4). Depending on these three dimensions 
universities are advised to design their crisis response. The matrix enables to 
determine types of issues that need to be addressed during the crisis and provide 
benchmarks for distributing tasks and allocating resources.   
 
 




The crisis matrix is used to assess the impact of the crisis and the areas in need of 
treatment. The authors suggest that after identifying the impacts areas of crisis, the 
academic institutions need to have appropriate processes and structures in place, for 
example, a contingency plan and a crisis management team to effectively respond to 
crisis (Zdziarski et al, 2007). The primary process of crisis management in 
universities resembles the approach of the private sector mentioned in Chapter 2, 
which is centered around the planning, prevention, response, recovery, and learning 
efforts of the institutions. The book also offers some practical guidelines for higher 
education institutions on how to plan for crisis. The higher education institutions are 
advised to comprise crisis teams, design crisis plans and protocols, crisis 
communication, and crisis training, and collaborate with outside agencies for better 
crisis response. The book emphasizes on the training for staff and students as the 
most effective preventive crisis response, as well as, collaboration with external 
stakeholders, which helps to distribute the responsibility and ease the burden of 
handling the crisis (Zdziarski et al., 2007).  
 
The available literature on crisis management action plan stresses the importance of 
crisis management teams (Khalilzad, 2006; CERD; 2008; Davies, 2008; Beggan, 
2011; Eaker and Viars, 2014; Gustafson, 2018). It is argued that a crisis management 
team should be assembled before crisis occurs in order to be able to respond 
effectively. Furthermore, the team needs to have precise knowledge regarding the 
roles during crisis and goals for each role. Organizations that form crisis teams are 
active during the prevention and response stages of the crisis, because each member 
has specific responsibilities and authority, and can work well under pressure. The 
literature mentions that a good crisis management team should possess the following 
skills to succeed: availability, knowledge of resources, team-player mindset, 
trainability, communication skills and assessment skills (Zdziarski et al, 2007; Eaker 
and Viars, 2014; Gustafson, 2018. When crisis team is unavailable or non-existent, it 
creates lack of understanding and limits crisis coordination. 
 
The transfer of information with high speed in critical moments is crucial during a 
crisis management response of crisis management teams. Poor communication 
strategy may result in significant losses for the institutions, such loss of credibility 
and confidence of the target audiences in the institution (Thaler-Carter, 2009; 
Yacobi, 2008; Beggan, 2011). The crisis communication process follows a basic 
scheme - identifying institutions’ target audiences, understanding their 
characteristics and channels of reaching them (Zdziarski et al., 2007). During a 
planning and prevention stage of the crisis, the crisis managers are in charge of 
designing a communication plan that can ensure a fast and consistent transfer of 
information to its audiences. Zdziarski et al. (2007) also points out the role of 
leadership in facilitating the efforts of crisis management. In his view, a good 
university leadership understands how to coordinate a crisis team, it recognizes the 
task, authorizes the use of resources and funding to resolve the crisis. However, it is 
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without a doubt that the university crisis can put the leadership under 
insurmountable pressure.  
 
In connection with previous findings by Zdziarski, a significant study of crisis 
management through the higher education focus has been conducted by Beggan 
(2011). The study examined how an academic institution responds to a disaster. 
While his research centers on the impact of such disaster, as Hurricane Ike on one 
case university in the USA, the perspective employed in the study fits within a 
broader continuity planning and management perspectives in the higher education 
sector. The result suggests that an adequate response to the crisis requires 
preparedness of academic institutions and continuity planning. Based on the 
findings, the author confirmed the crisis management approach listed above in the 
book by Zdziarski et al. (2007).  
 
Beggan (2011) identified five aspects that the case university prioritized to cope with 
a disaster: (1) prioritizing the recovery efforts; (2) addressing communication; (3) 
addressing financial concerns; (4) fostering administrative empowerment in the 
decision process; (5) devoting consideration to the development of alternative 
academic calendar. The study, therefore, is useful for this research as it can have 
useful implications for the management of crisis of the Ukrainian higher education 
institutions and their response efforts. 
 
Another contemporary study by Eaker and Viars (2014) examined crisis response in 
higher education through a set of informational interviews with crisis managers and 
university administrators. Both an apparent strength and weakness of the study is in 
the use of a fictional case study, which utilizes a somewhat weak methodological 
approach, but at the same time provides useful guidance for academic institutions by 
providing experiences of real university crisis response managers. An evident 
advantage is, however, in the utilization of a renowned theoretical framework of the 
crisis management cycle: planning, prevention, response, recovery, learning.  
 
Additionally, Borland (2017) argues that during crisis response, academic 
institutions understate the importance of human resilience. The author suggests that 
alongside institutional crisis, higher education institutions may face a personal crisis 
that entails grief, stress, and faith, which, if ignored, may lead to a failed response 
and recovery efforts of the institution. Similarly, the study by Gustafson (2018) 
acknowledges the importance of human factor during crisis management and 
addressing the issue of security and crisis management in much broader terms. The 
study examined the practices of sixteen security risk managers from Swedish 
universities. The findings show that the modeling of security needs to be addressed 
at the three levels of organizational culture, top management, faculty and student 
level. Borland (2017) and Gustafson (2018) suggest that faculty and staff need to 
engage in the planning process to form a culture of “security acceptance, awareness, 
and compliance” (p. 359).  
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3.2.2. The role of government in crisis management 
 
Higher education systems affected by some form of crisis, such as conflict, war, 
natural disaster, terrorist attacks, require protection and mechanisms that would 
contribute to their recovery. The governments in the time of crisis can address some 
of the sever impacts of crisis on higher education institutions. The role of 
government and the level of its involvement in responding to crisis can be depend on 
the relationship of the higher education institutions and the state, and the capacity it 
possesses to respond to crisis. During crisis, the governments can carry out different 
function regarding the management of crisis at higher education institution. The 
government can provide legislative support to ease or weaken the standards and 
requirements that burden the functioning of the academic institutions in crisis. The 
governments can also provide financial assistance to cover the financial, 
infrastructural, social problems that are incurred by the higher education institutions 
functioning in the conditions of crisis. Regardless, the government plays a crucial 
role during crisis response of higher education institutions, a role that can even 
determine institutional continuity and its future.  
 
However, the ability of government to effectively respond to crisis can be impaired by 
the severity of the environmental conditions in which the system is residing. 
Countries that find themselves in crisis situations, such as a prolonged armed 
conflict are regarded as ‘fragile states’. Fragile states are “those where there is limited 
capacity and will on the part of the state to provide basic services to its population” 
(OECD-DAC, 2008).  There are many conditions that interfere with the state’s 
provision of assistance for higher education in crisis. The states affected by fragility 
caused by armed conflict may inhibit the following characteristics - poor governance, 
weak institutional and financial capacity, corruption, inequality, slow responsiveness 
and action (Tebbe, 2009). These characteristics may effectively prevent governments 
from responding the needs of the conflict-affected higher education sector.   
 
When a state is in a fragile situation, its capacity is threatened, and so is the 
institutional capacity of educational establishments, due to the dependence of higher 
education on public funding (Rose and Greeley, 2006). One of the leading causes of 
the collapse of higher education during a crisis is low educational revenue, as well as 
low income from students’ fees. Also, higher education as a sector is given less 
priority during the crisis, as it requires more financial, logistical and technological 
support, in addition to competent management structure (Rose and Greeley, 2006; 
Milton, 2015; Rasheed and Munoz, 2016). A study by Beggan (2011) examined how 
public policies and institutions react and respond to crisis, and how they perceive 
their success or failure during crisis instances. The results concluded that “inept 
leadership, lack of financial and structural resources, considerable communication 
breakdowns, and a lack of adequate planning at multiple levels of government 
compounded failures during these disasters in higher education” (Beggan, 2011). 
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3.3. Ukrainian higher education in crisis 
 
The type of crisis referred to in this study is human-induced conflict. The word 
‘conflict’ refers to a violent armed conflict that has negative consequences for the 
society (World Bank, 2005). Armed conflict can be defined regarding parties 
involved (i.e., government vs. armed forces), and casualties incurred. The conflict 
discussed in the study is an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The armed conflict in 
Ukraine or as some refer the War in Donbass has affected the eastern region of 
Ukraine, namely Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. The conflict started with the protests 
that happened in the wake of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution commonly known as a 
‘Euromaidan revolution’ or ‘Revolution of dignity’. The demonstrations in eastern 
Ukraine happened after the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. 
The conflict started the protests in March 2014 by the anti-government groups and 
rebel groups. The pro-Russian protests taking place in the east soon escalated into an 
armed conflict between the separatists of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk 
National Republics (DNR and LNR), and the Ukrainian government (Kovalov, 2014). 
On April 14, the government of Ukraine officially announced the beginning of anti-
terrorist operations in the east after the administrative buildings in Kharkiv, 
Luhansk, and Donetsk were captured. In the following month of May, the pro-
Russian separatists held a referendum to declare the independence of DNR and LNR 
from Ukraine (CFR, 2018) 
 
While the Russian government denies its involvement in the conflict, Ukraine and 
NATO observations missions have reported illegal supply of weapons and the 
presence of Russian soldiers and Russian citizens among the separatists. Multiple 
failed attempts have been made to negotiate with the separatists the terms of the 
ceasefire (i.e., Minsk Agreement) and the exchange of prisoners (BBC, 2015). Since 
the beginning of the conflict, significant losses have been born by both sides. The 
Global Conflict Tracker estimates over 22 thousand injured, 10 thousand killed (both 
soldiers and civilians) and 1.6 million of internally displaced people as a result of the 
armed conflict in Donbass (CFR, 2018). Additionally, according to UN statistics over 
3.4 million people in Ukraine have been impacted by the humanitarian crisis and are 
in need of humanitarian aid (UNIAN, 2018).  
  
In 2014 a new concept had emerged in Ukrainian higher education system – 
‘displaced higher education institutions’. The conflict in eastern Ukraine - Donbass, 
apart from causing human deaths and massive infrastructural damage in cities, has 
caused displacement of millions of people, unemployment, economic recession, 
political tensions and more. However, in the eyes of state, some issues seem more 
significant than others during an armed conflict, such as fighting for territorial 
integrity and responding to the humanitarian crisis. Thus, responding to other 
concerns like schooling, higher education, healthcare becomes more challenging. 
Since the beginning of hostilities in the Donbass region, 11 scientific institutions and 
18 higher educational institutions have been displaced from the temporarily ceased 
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territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The displaced institutions managed to 
resume the educational process and now continue to educate over 40 thousand 
students and employ about 3 thousand research and teaching staff (Higher 
Education Portal, 2016). 
 
The higher education institutions that were evacuated in 2014 managed to survive 
due to several factors, one is the existence of their branch campuses or institutes that 
they could use as the starting point. More than half of the institutions transferred to 
their subunits, while others have acquired new infrastructure (e.g., Donetsk National 
University) or temporarily share the infrastructure with other universities (e.g., 
Luhansk National Agrarian University). While in most of the universities, the 
administrative and managerial units have moved to the controlled territory in 
Ukraine, still practically every institution has its double on the occupied territory. In 
some universities, more than 80% of staff and students remained on the occupied 
territory, and only about 10% moved (Dodonov, 2016). The displaced universities 
have been struggling with the same problems they faced at the beginning of their 
evacuation: insufficient provision of accommodation for students and staff, ‘brain 
drain’ of human resources, weak material and technical infrastructure, lack of 
funding, integration into local communities, and other bureaucratic concerns that 
hinder institutions’ development (Osvita.UA, 2017).  
3.3.1. Stakeholders in crisis management 
 
There are at least three significant stakeholders, which have been playing a key role 
in coordinating the crisis management response of the universities affected by the 
armed conflict in eastern Ukraine: Ministry of Education, Council of Rectors of 
Displaced Universities appointed by the Ministry, Coordination Center of Displaced 
Universities with the assistance of foreign donors. The latter two units emerged as a 
direct result of the evacuation of universities in the East. 
 
(a) Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 
 
The higher education in Ukraine is organized in the form of hierarchical or top-down 
approach, where the Ministry of Education and Science embodies the top. The MESU 
controls the licensing, accreditation, admissions process, issue of diplomas, and 
funding of the universities. The new ‘Higher Education Law’ enacted in 2014 that 
grants a so-called autonomy to institutions of higher education is merely a formality 
due to the excessive centralization of higher education for many decades (Dodonov, 
2016). In the time of emergency, universities expected clear directions and orders 
from the Ministry regarding their displacement, and most importantly they expected 
immediate legislative, social and financial support.  
 
While the Ministry has handled some concerns about creating favorable legislative 
conditions for the universities, some university leaders criticize their approach as 
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reactive, overdue and lacking full understanding of the impact the armed conflict has 
had on the HEIs in eastern Ukraine. The legal framework in Ukraine was not ideally 
suited to deal with an armed conflict in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government has 
failed to create a national emergency plan. Therefore, the Ministry was incapable of 
preventing some of the harsh consequences the universities suffered as a result of 
displacement, such as loss of human resources, infrastructure and more. 
 
Indeed, actions were employed by the government and the Ministry after the conflict 
broke out, aiming to preserve the higher education system of Donbass and help 
higher education institutions to recover from the crisis. The following are the 
primary legal provision that were adopted to assist conflict-affected higher education 
institutions in eastern Ukraine1: 
2014 Amendment: ‘Regarding the organization of the 2014/15 academic year in 
educational institutions located in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts’: 
• Guarantees reinstatement of scholarships for students who renew their study 
at displaced universities  
• Coordinates with displaced universities the data of the beginning of 2014/15 of 
the academic year 
• Allows displaced universities to independently determine the conditions and 
procedure for admission process of applicants who live in the Donbass region 
• Allows students from the Donbass region to temporarily enroll in other 
institutions in Ukraine and receive records of their education 
 
2015 Amendment: ‘Concerning the Use of Illegal Documents of Terrorist 
Organizations for Studies in Higher Educational Institutions of Ukraine’: 
• Informs the administration of higher educational institutions that admission 
of illegal documents issued or certified by the self-proclaimed ‘authority’ in 
Crimea and the occupied territory of Donbass region is contradictory to the 
legislation of Ukraine 
 
2016 Order: ‘On the formation of the Council of Rectors of Higher Educational 
Institutions temporarily transferred from the area of the anti-terrorist operation 
• Forms a temporary consultative and advisory body of the Ministry of Education 
and Science of Ukraine - the Council of Rectors of Displaced higher education 
institutions 
 
2016 Law: ‘On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Activities of 
Higher Educational Institutions, Scientific Institutions Displaced From Occupied 
Territories’: 
                                                 
1 For comprehensive table of key legislative provisions on functioning of displaced higher education 
institutions see Appendix 3.  
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• Legally defines the displaced institutions as institutions of higher education,  
• Prolongs and validates the accreditation certificates for temporarily displaced 
higher education institutions for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation, 
but not more than five years 
• Allows the temporary displaced higher education institutions to retain a 
national status 
• Regulates the work load of the scientific and pedagogical faculty in displaced 
higher educational institutions  
 
2017 Amendment: ‘On the formation of the commission on monitoring activities 
displaced higher education institutions’:  
• Encourages displaced universities to develop a strategy for development and 
reintegration  
• Encourages to create of network consortia of displaced higher education 
institutions 
• Urges to conduct monitoring of housing and public or communal property 
infrastructure that can be used for the needs of displaced higher education 
institutions 
• Urges to create conditions for housing for faculty of displaced higher 
education institutions  
• Urges to facilitate the updating of the material and technical base of the 
displaced higher education institutions 
 
The above-stated legal provisions enable more stable functioning of the displaced 
higher education institutions, particularly the recommendations of the government 
to facilitate assistance to the displaced higher education institutions in providing 
housing and social benefits. However, most of these amendments have 
recommendatory functions and do not have verification mechanisms that would 
ensure the implementation of these legal provisions.  
 (b) Council of Rectors of Displaced Universities 
 
The government of Ukraine approved a temporary advisory body, the Council of 
Rectors of Displaced Universities on January 26, 2016. The primary responsibilities 
of which were to protect the rights of the education process, while considering the 
complicated humanitarian, political and socio-economic situation that unveiled on 
the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea regions occupied by territories 
(Osvita.UA, 2016). One of the primary objectives of the Council is to coordinate the 
activities of the displaced higher education institutions of Luhansk, Donetsk and 
Crimea regions of Ukraine, organize their functioning, education and research 
activities, and provide educational training and humanitarian aid. The Council of 
Rectors includes rectors of 18 displaced universities. 
  




• define the status of the displaced universities;  
• set standards for the number of students and scientific researchers enrolled in 
these universities;  
• obtain and upgrade university property by obtaining additional funding; 
• extend legitimacy of accreditation of educational programs; and 
• determine contractual obligations and performance of the temporary 
displaced universities (Donetsk Law Institute of MFA, 2016). 
  
By establishing the Council, the displaced universities have an opportunity to initiate 
discussions on the problems they are facing with representatives of public authorities 
and local governments, and study issues and disseminate good practices of 
organization of higher education process under strain conditions. The Council has 
been particularly effective with regard to amending proposals of the Ministry of 
Education and Science of Ukraine on the improvement of education and research 
activities of displaced universities and streamlining material and technical resources 
of the displaced universities. The issues that Council has not be able to address to this 
day are mechanisms of social protection of faculty and students of the displaced 
universities (Ministry of Education and Science, 2016). 
 
 
(c) Coordination Center of Displaced Universities 
 
The Coordination Center of Displaced Universities is a public organization, which, as 
it states, aims to unite the efforts of the displaced universities for joint solutions 
(CISID, n.d.). The Center addresses the following priorities. It targets the issues of 
logistics by helping the displaced universities with acquiring buildings, dormitories, 
adequately equipped libraries, computer labs, laboratory equipment to create an 
appropriate learning environment. 
 
The Center also addresses regulatory and legal framework concerning the displaced 
universities. It advocates for more lenient legal framework to make it possible for the 
acquisition of necessary resources or even funds by the displaced universities. 
Besides, the Center attempts to gather public information on the activities of the 
displaced universities, their problems, and achievements to address the low 
enrollment rate in these universities. Recently, the Center conducted a study of use 
of distance and online learning practice in the displaced universities. The study 
aimed to improve the practices of distance and blended learning, information and 
communication technologies in the education process and research activity of these 
universities. The research aimed to also improve the quality of higher education and 
provide greater access to education for citizens from temporarily occupied territories 




The organization is also working with students of the displaced universities. It 
advocates for their rights with respect to scholarships, travel documents and more. 
Lastly, the Center works with research staff and students, who remained on the 
occupied territories due to various personal reasons to reintegrate them in the 
education activities of these universities.  
 
The center managed to raise awareness on the issue of the Ukrainian displaced 
universities by organizing a documentary movie project – ‘Displaced Universities’. 
The documentary movies demonstrate struggles of at that time fourteen universities, 
which were relocated as a result of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine (Displaced 
Universities, 2016). 
 
Also, by engaging in the legal framework of Ukraine, the organization has promoted 
the introduction of new admissions criteria for the students of the displaced 
universities. As a result, during the last admission campaign, more than 1000 young 
people have enrolled in Ukrainian displaced universities, due to two laws that were 
passed by the Ukrainian parliament. The law 4350 enables Ukrainian students from 
the occupied areas to enroll in the universities on the Donbass territory and the 
displaced universities around Ukraine by internal examination without the external 
independent testing certificates (Verkhovna Rada, 2016). Another law 4718, “On 
amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the activities of the 
displaced universities…”, attempts to address logistical issues, provide dormitories 
and housing for internally displaced academic staff and students, providing social 
and economic benefits to employees of the displaced universities and review legal 
documents to streamline the reporting procedures for licensing and accreditation of 
displaced universities (Verkhovna Rada, 2016). 
3.5. The analytical framework: A roadmap to empirical analysis 
 
Public higher education institutions, namely universities, may face considerable 
challenges when faced with crisis. Partly it is due to their dependence on the state, 
lack of administrative, academic and financial autonomy, and bureaucratic and 
collegial nature. It is not unusual for universities to rely on or wait for directions 
from the state when a viable decision needs to be implemented. Such dependence 
makes it problematic for universities to pull resources when necessary, thus delaying 
the response to a problem. Additionally, public universities usually operate with tight 
physical and human resources hindering crisis preparedness and response.  
 
When discussing crisis and crisis management it is important to understand that, as 
argued by Weick (1976), Stam and Baldridge (1971) and Sporn (1996), there are 
distinctive features that make academic institutions different from business 
organizations. Foremost, it is the ambivalence of their goals, lack of agreeable 
standards for achieving results, and ambiguous decision-making process. Secondly, 
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universities comprise of a set of diverse processes that are performed by a myriad of 
stakeholders with different goals, making a management process of universities a 
challenging task. The governing and management process of the universities may be 
also challenged by the autonomous structures, which can cause a conflict of 
expertise. Last, universities unlike corporate organizations are more susceptible to 
the changes in the environment, political, social or technological changes. 
 
Therefore, institutional culture of universities differs from that of business 
organizations, where the crisis management issue is addressed more frequently. 
Corporate organizations, unlike universities, have more specific goals and objectives, 
their primary focus is on the profit, and their task and routines are mundane and 
well-orchestrated, and the decision-making process usually involves a limited 
number of managers and administrators (Baldridge, 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Sporn, 
1996). These characteristics force business organizations to be more alert to any 
danger and make them more adapted to respond to the crisis more effectively. 
 
Despite the distinctions made above, it is also reasonable to argue that the approach 
to crisis and crisis management significantly shares common features in both higher 
education institutions and business organizations. Some of these similarities relate to 
addressing the issues of planning and prevention, response, recovery, and learning 
steps that help business organizations and academic institutions to avert crisis or 
minimize the impacts. The similarity also extends to the efforts of higher education 
institutions and business organizations to ensure the continuity of operations and 
functions they fulfill. Based on the commonality identified in the literature review 
this study has adapted the crisis management framework that has been developed in 
the field of management and later applied in empirical studies that were set in the 
context of higher education (see section 2.4.) 
  
However, when considering the impacts of crisis on higher education, it becomes 
necessary to also consider their fundamental and distinctive functions. The functions 
of higher education institutions can be impacted by any crisis within the external 
environment in which such higher education institution operates. The functions of 
higher education institutions that may come under the pressure can be defined as 
follows: 
 
Carnegie Commission, 1973:  
 
1) education of the student and provision of conducive environment: - general 
education, specialized academic and occupational preparation, academic 
socialization, campus environment, personal support, holding operation;  
2) advancing human capability in society: research, service, sorting talent, training in 
vocational, pre-professional and professional skills;  
3) education justice for the post-secondary age group: lifelong learning education, 
development of appropriate special programs, financial support;  
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4) pure learning: support of personnel with facilities for advancement of learning 
and scholarship;  
5) provision of freedom, opportunities, reasonable rules of conduct. 
 
Ivan Pacheco, 2013: 
 
1) knowledge: production, transmission, preservation (research, teaching, storage 
and recovery);  
2) social change (social mobility, economic development, providing a space for social 
criticism, sorting talent);  
3) development (economic, cultural, political: developing human capital, applied 
research, preservation of knowledge, training and selecting of future leaders);  
4) service (outreach, non-formal education). 
 
However, in the context of this study, and as a widely conceived interpretation 
among researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in higher education, the 
functions of higher education institutions are broadly categorized into three: 
teaching and learning, research, and societal engagement. These functions provide 
the lens through which the impacts of crisis in the displaced Ukrainian higher 
education institutions is empirically analyzed.  
 
To determine the impact of the crisis and consider the mechanisms of responding to 
the crisis at the displaced universities in Ukraine, this study compiled an analytical 
framework based on an extensive review off literature. To explore the first research 
question posed by the researcher: What are the impacts of the armed conflict on the 
displaced universities in Ukraine? The following impact areas were identified from 
the literature review as follows: 
 
• Smith and Tombs (2000): crisis of management, crisis of communication, 
operational crisis, crisis of legitimation; 
• Sutherland (2013): human resources and personal costs, critical 
infrastructure, teaching and research; 
• Drennan et al. (2015): human costs, infrastructural costs, policy costs, 
operational costs, economic costs, political-symbolic costs, personal costs; 
• Barakat and Milton (2015), Milton and Barakat (2016) and Milton (2018): 
human capacity, physical destruction, research infrastructure, war-related 
(erosion of quality, decreasing enrollment, shutdown of institutions), low-
resilience of sector (poor financial support of HEIs), psycho-social damage; 
• Gladyushyna (2017): human resources, students, infrastructure, 





After careful consideration of the various impact areas suggested in the literature, 
this research, therefore, adopts the following impact areas that hinder institutions’ 
primary functions and decision-making power.  
 
Impact of conflict on higher education institutions’ primary functions (teaching, 
learning, research, social service): 
 
• Impact on human resources  
• Impact on infrastructure 
• Impact on operations 
• Impact on legitimacy  
 
Impact on human resources: This impact area regards the displacement of academic 
populations, enrollment and retention of students and faculty, as well as physical, 
psychological and social damage incurred by the students and employees of the five 
case displaced institutions. 
 
Impact on infrastructure: This impact area is concerned with losses of material, 
facility, information and communication infrastructure incurred by the displaced 
higher education institutions as a result of conflict. For example, loss of campus 
buildings, educational and research infrastructure, student housing, etc.  
 
Impact on operations: This impact area concerns specifically the teaching and 
learning and research functions of the university. For example, organization of study 
process, facilitation of research activities, training of staff, student activities, 
structural reorganization, etc.  
 
Impact on legitimacy: This impact area is related to the ability of higher education 
institutions to attract students, partnerships, and maintain quality of services. 
 
The next two impact areas related to the decision-making power of the displaced 
higher education institutions in crisis. Smith and Tombs (2000) state that the 
response of institutions to crisis may be hindered by the quality and availability of 
good decisions, as the conditions of crisis may impact their decision-making power 
and disrupt communication. In her thesis Gladyushyna (2017) also mentions the 
crisis of leadership and communication of the state of crisis to students and 
employees. This provides reasons to include the following dimensions as the indirect 
impact of conflict on the higher education institutions. However, due to their 
interconnectedness with the crisis management phases, these impact areas will be 
analyzed as part of the overall crisis management efforts by the displaced higher 
education institutions.  
 
• Crisis of leadership and management 




Crisis of leadership and management: This area is concerned with the conflict’s 
impact on the decision-making power of the university administration and 
management, their ability to take initiative and fulfill their roles and responsibilities. 
Crisis of communication:  This area concerns with the impact of crisis on the ability 
of university leadership and management to notify the target academic groups about 
the conflict, the state of university and how the university is answering the needs of 
the target groups. Communication breakdowns and other communication 
irregularities, such as miscommunication, communication sabotage will be 
monitored. 
 
To answer the second research question: What mechanisms were deployed by the 
displaced Ukrainian universities to recover from the crisis? The following crisis 
evaluation frameworks were considered. The following works have been widely cited 
and applied in other studies to mainly investigate the crisis management of public 
organizations and higher education institutions (Burrell, 2009; Sutherland, 2013; 
Garcia, 2015).  
 
- Fink’s (1986) four stage model: the prodromal crisis stage, the acute crisis 
stage, the chronic stage, the resolution stage; 
- Mitroff’s (1994) five stage model: signal detection, probing and prevention, 
damage containment, recovery, learning; 
- Spillan (2000), Hough and Spillan’s (2005) crisis model: 1) reactive: no crisis 
planning efforts, crisis reaction and planning to prevent crisis, pay costs 
incurred, restructure, review decision-making, make personnel changes, brace 
for potential failure; 2) proactive: vulnerability analysis, crisis planning and 
preparation, crisis minimized or avoided, evaluate crisis plan effectiveness, 
review vulnerabilities, adapt plan as needed, maintain vigilance for future 
crises; 
- Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc. (2007) crisis matrix: planning, prevention, 
response, and recovery, learning;  
- Drennan et al. (2015) crisis management framework: prevention, preparation, 
response, recovery, learning.  
 
Therefore, by combining the crisis management approaches from higher education 
and business organizations, this study compiles a crisis management framework for 
empirically analyzing the impact areas of the case displaced universities. The 
framework is composed of three phases of crisis management. A short description of 
these phases is presented as follows: 
 
a) Planning. This process usually entails designing of contingency plans, 
guidelines that explain the types of crises and possible responses, as well as, roles 
and responsibilities of those directly involved in responding to the crisis. 
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University leadership, administration, faculty, staff, and students need to be 
informed through various media about the existence of such plan. 
b) Prevention.  The process involves actions that need to be taken by the 
university administration or those in the roles responsible for reducing the 
likelihood of crisis or the consequences of the crisis when it occurred. 
Universities identify resources that can be utilized for such event. 
c) Response. If contingency plans are in place, this step involves a review of such 
plans, training of staff how to respond to the crisis, as well as educating students 
how to act in the situation of crisis. During the response, universities enact 
emergency systems (if available), operationally deploy resources, and use 
communication systems to notify those affected by the crisis. Communication 
effort operational deployment of resources, communications. 
 
Although a comprehensive crisis management, as the literature indicates, also 
includes the steps of recovery and learning2, this study excludes these steps from its 
empirical analysis since the crisis under investigation is ongoing, and sufficient data 
on these two phases is currently unavailable, making a meaningful analysis a 
challenge. In addition, in the Gladyushyna’s (2017) study demonstrated a weak 
preparedness of two displaced universities to crisis and the non-existence of any 
intentional crisis management processes and structures before the crisis had 
occurred. Hence, this research will mainly consider the response stage of the crisis 
where key decisions are implemented to minimize the crisis.  
 
Other two stages that will not be considered in this study are recovery and learning. 
The literature suggests that the recovery phase broadly covers the period in which 
organizations focus on returning to a state of normalcy.  During this phase, efforts 
are streamlined to renew the operation process of an institution, purchasing 
equipment, searching for donors. The learning phase, on the other hand, is the last 
phase where organizations review their pre-crisis policies and response measures to 
learn what functioned well and what failed, update existing plans and debrief crisis 
responders, which constitutes a critical piece of the crisis response process. 
 
The table below is a summary of analytical framework that guided the development 
of interview questions and enabled better understanding of the conflict through 
multiple dimensions.  While the framework certainly offers direction to pursue, other 
themes identified by the interviews, which are not noted in the framework, will be 






Human resources  
Enrolled staff and student   
                                                 
2 See Appendix 4 
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Psychological & physical trauma 
Infrastructure 
Campus building (s) 
Classrooms 












Crisis of management 
Governance 
University safety policies 
Crisis management teams 
  
Crisis of communication 
Institutional communication strategy 
Informing students and faculty 
  
 





















Chapter IV - Research design and methodology 
 
This research intends to investigate the conflict-affected higher education in Ukraine, 
specifically the research focuses on the impact of the armed conflict on the 
functioning of higher education institutions and management tools that have been 
adopted by the universities to cope with the consequences of the armed conflict in 
eastern Ukraine.  This chapter encapsulates the methods used by the researcher to 
answer two research questions it posited: Question 1: What have been the impacts of 
the armed conflict on the Ukrainian higher education? and Question 2: What 
mechanisms have been used by the displaced Ukrainian universities to cope with the 
crisis? The literature review indicated that the topic of conflict-affected higher 
education, as well as the study of crisis management through the higher education 
prism, have been receiving more spotlight worldwide, yet remain in an infancy stage. 
These studies remain mostly descriptive and single-case, lacking scientific rigor, 
more substantial representation and more thorough analysis of problems higher 
education institutions face when affected by crisis and in particular, by armed 
conflict. The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine forced 18 universities to relocate to 
safer territories. This presented an opportunity to record a unique phenomenon of a 
massive institutional displacement and obstacles that arise along the process. 
Therefore, by studying the experience of five public higher education institutions and 
obtaining the multiple-stakeholder views, the study ought to significantly contribute 
to the research of higher education affected by crisis and possibly help reevaluate the 
safety and security management at the institutional and national levels.   
 
This Chapter four outlines the research strategy, provides the research tools used to 
collect data, describes site and sample selection process, and data analysis process. 
Additionally, the researcher elicits some limitations, mainly discussing the issues of 
reliability, validity, and generalizability, as well as ethical considerations. 
4.1. Research strategy  
 
The research intends to use a qualitative research methods design. According to 
Creswell (2005) and Silverman and Marvasti (2008), the qualitative design is 
appropriate, as it provides an appropriate method to analyze in-depth information 
on the process, its nature and implications. Also, the qualitative study design relies 
on the viewpoints of participants, asking open-ended questions, collecting verbal 
data, describing and analyzing themes, and conducting the analysis of documents 
(Babbie, 1999; Balnaves & Caputi, 2001; Walliman, 2011; Neuman 2007). The reason 
for using this particular approach in studying the conflict-affected higher education 
institutions in eastern Ukraine is due to its complex and multidimensional nature 
that can be elicited via interaction with a university environment, and the 
stakeholders, such as the university administration, middle management, staff and 
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students who have been involved in the management of the consequences of the 
armed conflict and/or impacted by the armed conflict. 
 
Creswell (2005) and Mertens (1998) consider philosophical views that researcher 
uses to interpret their understanding of the world: positivist, critical and 
interpretive/constructivist. The study will use interpretive/constructivist perspective 
as it relies on the social interaction to understand the phenomenon and the context 
in which it is positioned. This belief is based on “the ontological assumption 
associated with interpretative/constructivism that multiple realities exist that are 
time and context-dependent, they will choose to carry out the study using qualitative 
methods so that they can gain an understanding of the constructions held by the 
people in that context” (Mertens, 1998, p. 161). Thus, the perception of various 
university stakeholders will be considered in the process of establishing the impact of 
the armed conflict on higher education institutions and the management tools that 
were utilized to cope with the crisis.  
  
This study uses a qualitative case study strategy to explore this phenomenon in-
depth. The case study according to Creswell (2009) is an appropriate strategy when: 
“the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more 
individuals.” Besides, according to Yin (2003), a case study investigates “a 
contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context, and it addresses a description of 
the case and the themes that emerge from studying it.”  Thus, this strategy allows 
consolidating the experiences of the Ukrainian universities impacted by the armed 
conflict to understand and provide some emerging characteristics of higher 
education systems in crisis and establish patterns, if such are found, regarding the 
management tools utilized by the universities in crisis situations. The perspectives of 
diverse stakeholders and the compilation and examination of data from different 
sources was gathered to understand the problem comprehensively. Studying the 
higher education systems in crisis involves a diverse experience, attitudes, and 
perceptions of the displaced population of students, staff, and administrators, for 
who the experience has been traumatizing and confusing, therefore, the research 
requires more personal approach and qualitative method allows for that (Creswell, 
2009).   
4.2. Data collection: site and sample selection 
 
Purposive sampling was used to select the universities for the multiple case study. 
This method is “a non-probability sample that is selected based on characteristics of 
a population and the objective of the study” (ThoughtCo., 2018). It is a purposive 
sampling because only the universities that were relocated as a result of the armed 
conflict were considered for this research. All eighteen universities were contacted 
and invited to participate in this research. The administration of six universities 
contacted the researcher expressing their interest in the study. The researcher would 
also like to acknowledge the use of informal communication methods in contacting 
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the participants. The use of social network, such as Facebook was particularly 
effective in establishing effective communication with the participants. The sample 
size of five displaced universities was considered appropriate, manageable and one 
that would ensure fair representation of the displaced universities and allow for 
generalizability, as well as help avoid oversaturation of data. Universities of different 
types, of different sizes and from different regions were selected to “gain greater 
insights into a phenomenon by looking at it from all angles” and to ensure maximum 
variation in the purposive sampling, (CIRT, n.d.). The sixth university was 
eliminated due to the similar characteristics with another university regarding its 
profile and size. The research uses five case universities from a total of 18 displaced 
public universities in the country3. The following universities were selected for the 
site visit and data collection: 
 
• V. Stus Donetsk National University located in Vinnytsia 
• V. Dahl East-Ukrainian National University located in Severodonetsk 
• Luhansk National Agrarian University located in Kharkiv 
• Donbass National Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture located in 
Kramatorsk 
• Donetsk National Technical University located in Pokrovsk 
 
In this study, case institutions are public entities owned by the government. The five 
case institutions belong to the category of national universities4. Specific profile, size, 
as well as critical figures (i.e., the number of staff, number of students, number of 
faculties) of the institutions will be provided in the following chapter. The study 
relies on two data collection methods: interviews and secondary data (e.g., Ministry 
Decree, University Statements). Interviews are an appropriate method in this 
qualitative research because they allow for collecting in-depth information and 
obtain insights into complex phenomena (Biggam, 2011). The interviews allow both 
verbal and non-verbal information to be collected, which adds more integrity and 
authenticity to the data that is being collected. This research used semi-structured 
interviews, which were audiotaped and transcribed at the participants’ permission. 
The semi-structured interviews provide some structure for the interviewee and a 
direction to pursue, however, they also allow for clarification, expansion or 
narrowing of the questions discussed as need be. The questions of the interviews are 
structured based on the research questions: impact of the armed conflict and crisis 
management tools. This method, however, has few limitations, for instance, the 
account of information can be filtered through interviewees’ lens, and therefore 
could be affected by personal abilities and perceptions, which could hinder 
researcher’s attempts to grasp the phenomenon.  
 
                                                 
3 For complete list of all 18 displaced higher education institutions see Appendix 2.  
4 National higher education institution - a status that is granted to an institution for its distinguished 
achievements of the national development. 
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This thesis adopts a triangulation method which entails the use of one or more 
methods of data collection to “explain more fully the richness and complexity of 
human behavior by studying it from more than one standpoint” (Cohen and Manion, 
1995, p.106). The collection of secondary data was performed through analyses of 
higher education proclamations, national higher education policies, strategic plans, 
performance reports, institutional plans, meeting minutes, legislative documents, 
statistical reports and other relevant documents. The limitation of such approach is 
that some of the relevant documents may not be publicly accessible. The study is 
complemented by the use of non-participant/complete observation to verify the 
consistency of obtained information through interviews and focus groups. As 
mentioned previously, five displaced universities were selected for this research 
through the purposeful sampling technique.  
 
This research employed a combination of convenience, expert sampling, and 
snowball sampling to select the interviewees. The data of the study was collected in 
April-May of 2018. This included 25 in-person interviews lasting 30-45 minutes, 
which were conducted with the top management, faculty and students from the 
displaced universities. The Chart 1 provides detailed statistics on the number of 
interviewees and their variability. 
 
 
   
Chart 1. Interview statistics at five displaced universities  
 
 An interview protocol was used to ask questions and record answers during the 
interviews. The protocol contained instructions for the interview to follow to use 
consistent procedures at all interviews5. The questions consisting of beginning warm-
up questions and followed by content-specific ones. A thank-you statement was 
issued to all the participants of the research to acknowledge their time and effort. 
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The researcher used a field log to record the agenda of each site visit and the 
proceedings of the day. Details regarding the researcher’s observations were also 
recorded in a field diary chronologically, including descriptive and reflective 
observation).  
4.3. Data analysis procedures   
 
The data analysis involves interpretations and sense-making out of text, audio, or 
image. The objective of the data analysis is to understand the data in-depth and to be 
able to interpret it and represent it verbally and graphically. Some researchers like 
Creswell (2009) and Schatzman and Strauss (1973) believe that proper qualitative 
research involves classification and organization of ideas for better understanding. 
Researchers use codes and indexes to explain and interpret the information they 
gather. 
 
This study analyzed data based on 25 semi-structured interviews, site observations 
and document analysis. The interviews were audiotapes and transcribed. In addition, 
a conceptual framework was used to generate categories, themes and help in the 
process of coding the data and making interpretation. Creswell (2009) suggests 
researchers approach data by first looking at the specific ideas or issues to the 
general understanding of the problem. He suggests a hierarchical approach, 
constructing meaning from the bottom to the top. The research used the following 
analysis framework as a guiding process in data analysis of this qualitative research. 
  
The following steps need to be followed for a thorough analysis: 
 
a) Organize and prepare. This step involves doing the groundwork that is 
necessary to start the data analysis. In this research after collecting the 
interviews, the researcher will transcribe them, scan them for any 
irregularities and clarifications, type the site visit notes, observations and 
arrange the data into different categories and types. 
 
b) Read through the data. This step is necessary to understand the value of data 
and start the process of organization of ideas and themes. The researcher will 
identify the ideas that are reoccurring. An overall depth and credibility of 
information can also be spotted at this stage. 
 
c) Begin coding. The step of coding is a crucial step in idea organization and 
attaching meaning to data, and labeling it appropriately, and in line with the 
framework. Since the studied issue is relatively new, the conceptual 
framework may also have some limitations in covering all aspects of the issue. 
Therefore, when designing codes, the researcher will also allow for the codes 
to emerge organically. Creswell (2009) suggests in the case of novelty of the 
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subject a new codebook be developed by a researcher during the data analysis. 
Various coding platforms are offered to assist in data coding. 
 
d) Making interpretations. In this step, the researcher will attempt to elicit 
meaning after coding the data. The meaning will be derived based on the 
interviews, focus group discussions, and using conceptual framework and 
literature review. 
 
Before visiting a site, the researcher informed the university and other stakeholders 
about the recording of the observational data. It is advised by Creswell (2009) to use 
observational protocol to record additional information. The author also suggests 
using dividing the observational information into descriptive account (which can be a 
description of physical setting, portraits of participants), and reflective information 
(which are the researcher’s feelings, perceptions, ideas based on the tone and 
intonation and more). The above-mentioned technique was used in this research. 
Also, demographic information was collected, such as the time, place and date of the 
site visit.  
4.4. Limitations and potential challenges 
 
It is without a doubt that the validity and reliability are paramount in conducting any 
research, without a proof of its validity and reliability the work can be widely 
discredited and thrown to no use. It is quite difficult to proof both in social science, 
but only with an accurate and unbiased description of reality, can an author earn a 
reader's trust. The validity of one's work can be only measured by the validity of the 
information available. However, if such information proves to be distorted and 
biased, it is, therefore, the author's responsibility to account for the use of the 
discredited sources. Hence, this study will strive to provide an honest, unbiased, 
objective portrayal of Ukrainian displaced universities to the extent possible. While 
designing the interview questions, the author took into account the core principles of 
research design, to extract the most truthful answers from its respondents. To do so, 
the questions were designed in clear, fair, objective, and sensitive manner. 
 
The reliability of the paper can be ensured by incorporating the variety of research 
techniques, interviews, document analysis, observations.  The research used prior 
review of documents as a supporting tool for cross-checking the data gathered 
through interviews and contributing to research validity and reliability. The 
reliability can also be enhanced by careful guidance of the author’s supervisors, who 
possess professional knowledge in the matter. Gibbs (2007), for example, also 
suggests thoroughly checking the transcripts of the interviews for any mistakes, as 
well as, making sure there are no problems with the coding of the interviews. 
 
There could be some potential limitations to the study. The main limitation is that 
the study is only representative of 18 displaced universities in Ukraine, and therefore 
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cannot be a generalization of crisis management and organizational recovery 
mechanisms in Europe or beyond. In addition, the institutions that have been 
evacuated by the government are public universities, the information on the private 
universities is unavailable. Another limitation which was also described in the gap is 
the lack of available literature in dealing with public organizations, specifically in 
dealing with HEIs, however useful insights can be drawn from the analysis of crisis 
management strategies in the private sector. Lastly, due to the fact that most 
countries, where higher education systems are engulfed in armed conflict, are not 
English speaking, it is difficult to be absolutely confident that the study of similar 
nature has not been conducted prior. 
4.5. Ethical considerations  
 
When conducting research, it is essential to respect the participants and the site for 
research. There are often ethical issues that arise when collecting data and analyzing 
it. It is essential for a researcher to appreciate the opportunity one is given by 
avoiding putting vulnerable populations at risk and discomfort. Researching the 
displaced universities is challenging, because the issue is sensitive for the 
participants. The researcher bears the responsibility to make sure that the research 
answers all ethical norms. Before the researcher’s site visit, an informed consent 
form sent to participants to sign before they are engaged in the research. The form 
informed the interviewees about the purpose of research and its benefits, 
emphasizing on the fact that the participants’ rights would be protected during the 
data collection and analysis processes. All participant names remained anonymous in 




















Chapter V - Data analysis and findings 
 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis of the primary and secondary data 
gathered from the site visit, and presents and discusses the main findings. The 
objective of this chapter is to answer the research questions posed at the outset of the 
study. The chapter begins with a brief description of the profiles of the five case 
universities. The main section of the chapter is dedicated to analyzing the findings of 
the empirical analysis with respect to the impacts of the armed conflict in eastern 
Ukraine on these five displaced universities and what crisis management 
mechanisms they used to respond to the crisis instigated by the armed conflict. The 
findings from this chapter provide the basis for drawing conclusion and implications 
of the study.  
5.1. Brief profiles of the case displaced universities  
 
In this section, the study presents brief descriptive account of the general profiles of 
the five case universities. This background information is crucial for understanding 
the specific context in which the empirical analysis of each university is conducted.  
5.1.1. Case university 1: Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University 
 
Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University (DonNU) is a comprehensive state higher 
education institution established in 1937 in Donetsk. The structure of the university 
currently includes: 9 faculties, 2 educational and consulting centers, the department 
of international education of foreign students. The university provides programs 41 
bachelor’s and 52 master’s degree programs in natural sciences, humanities, and 
economics and finance (DonNU official website, 2018). The university used to be one 
of the largest Ukrainian universities in total enrolment of students. Due to the 
military conflict in eastern Ukraine the university was temporarily evacuated to 
Vinnytsia in central region of Ukraine. Before the university was evacuated, the 
student population amounted more than 15.000 students and about a thousand 
faculty members. After the relocation, the current student demographic is about 
5.000, and 500 teaching and professorial faculty (Osvita.UA, n.d.).  
 
Before relocation DonNU had a robust material and technical infrastructure to carry 
out educational activities. It included campuses for students and scientific and 
pedagogical staff, laboratories and specialized offices, technical and computer 
support. In Donetsk, the university had 11 teaching and laboratory buildings. The 
university possessed 5 sports halls and a swimming pool, and each university 
building had a buffet or a dining hall (DonNU official website, 2018). In September 
2014, DonNU educational infrastructure in Donetsk were seized by the terrorist 
groups of DNR. After relocation, the university was deprived of its own 
accommodation and educational and research facilities. The university actively 
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engages partners to rebuild its infrastructure, and has plans to construct a full-
fledged university campus with accommodation for students and teachers in 
Vinnytsia (Education in Ukraine, n.d.). With the help of humanitarian assistance, the 
university received computers, sports equipment, equipment for hard sciences, 
introduced cloud technologies for work and distance learning.  
 
Timeline Evacuation events  
End of August 
2014 University temporarily stopped the educational process 
Beginning of 
September 2014 
Illegal Ministry of DNR ordered re-subordination of the university, a new 
pro-Russian rector appointed 
Mid-September 
2014 
Evacuation process started after the university infrastructure captured by 
the rebel group 
September 2014 
University initiative group conducted negotiations with the Ministry of 
Education and Science of Ukraine in secret 
End of 
September 2014 Ministry ordered displacement and operation of DonNU in Vinnytsia 
October 2014 DonNU started the process of displacement 
Beginning of 
November 2014 University started the educational process in a new location 
5.1.2. Case university 2: Luhansk National Agrarian University  
 
Luhansk National Agrarian University (LNAU) is a specialized state higher 
educational institution, established in 1921 in Luhansk. The university offers study 
programs of narrow specialization, such as agronomy, mechanical engineering, 
veterinary and other. Before the evacuation of the university to Kharkiv, the 
university enrolled over 20 thousand students and 400 faculty members. Currently 
the population of students is around 3 thousand and 100 teaching and professorial 
staff (LNAU official website, 2018). The structure of the university included 10 
faculties before evacuation, and the university now has 8 functioning faculties. The 
university was unable to recover any facility from the occupied territories 
(Osvita.UA, n.d.). The university’s infrastructure currently comprises of five units 
located in the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. However, it mainly carries 
out its educational and research activities on basis of three agricultural universities 
of Kharkiv. The research is also carried out on the basis of research institutions, 
laboratories, and veterinary clinics of Kharkiv region. In 2016 the university became 
a full member of Kharkiv university consortium, which enabled LNAU to get a free 
access to scientific libraries, as well as, scientific and methodological resources of 
scientists and leading researchers from Kharkiv universities (LNAU official website, 
2018).  
 
Timeline Evacuation events 
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Mid-May 2014 University temporarily stopped the educational process 




University infrastructure captured by the rebel group  
Mid-October 
2014 
University initiative group conducted negotiations with the Ministry of 
Education and Science of Ukraine in secret 
Mid-October 
2014 
Ministry of Agricultural Policy of Ukraine ordered displacement and 
operation of LNAU in Kharkiv 
Beginning of 
November 2014 
University started the educational process in a new location 
2015 University is re-subordinated from the Ministry of Agricultural Policy 
under the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 
July 2015 Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine decided to deprive the 
university of public funding – decision repealed 
End of February 
2018 
Luhansk governor proposes gradual transfer of the university to the 
Luhansk region 
5.1.3. Case university 3: Volodymyr Dal East-Ukrainian National 
University  
 
Volodymyr Dal East-Ukrainian National University (V. Dal EUNU) is a 
comprehensive state higher educational institution of Ukraine, established in 1920 in 
Luhansk. In the past, the university specialized in machine-building. Currently, the 
university provides training in 92 bachelors’ and 93 master’s degree programs in 
natural sciences, hard sciences, humanities, and economics (V. Dal EUNU official 
website, 2018). Before the displacement the total number of students enrolled at 
EUNU was over 13 thousand, and around a thousand of faculty members. After the 
evacuation, the university enrolls some 7 thousand students and provides working 
place for over 600 teaching and professorial staff. The structure of the university 
included 13 faculties before evacuation, and currently there are 7 functioning 
faculties (Education in Ukraine, n.d.). The infrastructure of the EUNU before 
displacement consisted 110 branch offices, 40 research laboratories, a scientific 
library, 18 educational complexes, 6 dormitories, a publishing house, a business 
center, and other structural units (V. Dal EUNU official website, 2018). In September 
2014, the university was temporarily transferred to the city of Severodonetsk, where 
the educational process was restored on the basis of its separate structural 
subdivision (i.e., Severodonetsk Technological Institute). The evacuation of higher 
education to Severodonetsk intensified the further development of distance 
education.  
 
Timeline Evacuation events 
End of May 




June 2014 University infrastructure captured by the rebel group 
Mid-July 2014 Some university staff still conduct the admissions campaign in Luhansk 
August 2014 University admission shuts down and employees flee from Luhansk 
End of August 
2014 
University administration conducts an emergency council where it was 
decided to continue the admissions process in the branch campus in 
Severodonetsk and conduct educational process in remote mode 
Beginning of 
October 2014 
Ministry ordered displacement and operation of V. Dahl EUNU in 
Severodonetsk 
Beginning of 
October 2014 University started the educational process in a new location 
5.1.4. Case university 4: Donbass National Academy of Civil 
Engineering and Architecture   
 
Donbass National Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture is a specialized 
public higher education institutions that was established in 1947 in Makiivka 
(periphery of Donetsk) (DonNACEA official website, 2018). It prepares specialists in 
construction and architecture. The academy offers bachelor’s and master’s degree 
programs in architecture, urban planning, industrial and civil construction, urban 
management, construction of roads and airfields, economy and management for 
construction (Osvita.UA, n.d.). Before the academy’s evacuation, it enrolled around 5 
thousand students and 800 faculty members. The academy’s student enrollment 
after relocation dropped to some 400 students and 60 teaching and professorial 
staff. The organizational structure of the academy comprised of 7 faculties, which 
decreased to 5 after evacuation. The academy was the last one evacuated during the 
military conflict in the East due to leaderships’ position to support the illegal 
authorities. In December 2014, the DonNACEA was evacuated to Kramatosk. The 
academy was unable to retrieve any infrastructure.  
 
Timeline Evacuation events 
End of August 2014 




University administration decided to start the educational process 
despite the Ministry’s order not to commence 
Mid-October 2014 
University initiative group conducted negotiations with the Ministry of 
Education and Science of Ukraine in secret 
November 2014 




Ministry ordered displacement and operation of DonNACEA in 
Kramatorsk 
Beginning of 
February 2015 University started the educational process in a new location 
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5.1.5. Case university 5: Donetsk National Technical University  
 
Donetsk National Technical University (DonNTU) is a public technical higher 
education institutions established in 1921 in Donetsk (DonNTU official website, 
2018). DonNTU provides training in 28 bachelors and 47 master's degree programs 
(Higher education, n.d.). Before the evacuation, the university enrolled around 18 
thousand students and 2 thousand faculty members. Currently, the university’s 
student population is 4 thousand students and 400 teaching and professorial staff. 
The structure of the university before evacuation included 9 faculties, currently is 
comprises of 5 faculties, and 2 technical schools. In 2014, DonNTU was transferred 
to Krasnoarmeysk (now Pokrovsk) to its structural unit - the industrial institute. The 
University conducts the educational and scientific activities utilizing the 
infrastructure of its structural subunit.  
 
Timeline Evacuation events 
End of May 2014 
University rector notified students and staff the university was not 
shutting down but operating in remote mode 
Mid-August 2014 
Projectile fired into the office of the vice-rector who got injured, 
university driver killed in the courtyard of the University 
End of August 2014 University temporarily stopped the educational process 
September 2014 
University started the education process in Donetsk while negotiating its 
transfer to their branch in Krasnoarmiysk (now Pokrovsk)  
Beginning of 
October 2014 
Ministry ordered displacement and operation of DonNTU in 
Krasnoarmiysk (now Pokrovsk) 
Beginning of 
November 2014 University started the educational process in a new location 
5.2. Impact of armed conflict on displaced higher education institutions  
 
The impact of crisis on higher education depends on the threat an educational 
institution is exposed to. With regard to impact of the armed conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, it disrupted the mission of more than dozens of higher education 
institutions, and threatened the wellbeing of people, financial resources and 
institutional legitimacy. The data that has been collected as a result of twenty-five in-
person interviews identified the following areas of crisis impact on conflict-affected 
higher education in Ukraine: human resources, infrastructure, operation and 
legitimacy. The financial impact has been also identified as a common concern 
among the displaced universities.     
5.2.1. Impact on human resources  
 
The crisis of human resources is one of the most pressing issues for displaced 
universities. The issues of human resources had a drastic impact on the functioning 
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of displaced universities. The above-reported challenges faced by university 
employees and students, from physical threats to domestic and social problems have 
created conditions for effective ‘brain drain’. On the one hand, majority of displaced 
universities reported retrieving over two-thirds of population of faculty and students. 
On the other hand, a significant portion the population began disintegrating due to 
unfavorable working, study and living conditions. As evidence the interviewees stated 
the following:  
 
Our university has a very strong corporate culture and, as a result, many students and 
teachers have moved with the university to Vinnitsa. Originally 7,000 students 
moved, but then around two thousand left or were dismissed during the initial period. 
Many students and teachers found opportunities somewhere else in Ukraine (Director 
of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
The professorial staff started leaving. We must understand that they are strong 
personalities and respect that. Here, they think, they have less opportunity to develop 
(Deputy director, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
At first two-thirds of teachers came here, but because people had little or no personal 
finances, many teachers went to other universities, where they found better 
conditions (Dean, DonNTU, 20/04/2018).  
 
On average, the displaced universities retrieved two-thirds of the students and staff 
(see Chart 1). In the universities where the enrollment was lower, has been caused by 
delayed evacuation or sabotage from the efforts by the university administration that 
stayed on the occupied territories. As one of the interviewees from DonNACEA 
explained: 
 
Very few moved to Kramatork from Makiyivka, about 10% of teachers and 5% of 
students. Now we have about 55 teachers and 600 students. Then in our university we 
had 5000 students and about 450 teachers. We have representatives of many 
departments now (Top management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018).  
 
And there were not even employees. Only 92 employees moved from Lugansk, and 
the first year we had about 1000 students. The students in Lugansk were not allowed 
to leave. We trained only the studies from Luhansk, because it will late to open an 
admissions campaign (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018). 
 
About 4000 students and over 300 employees confirmed the desire to continue their 
education and work in DonNTU through online registration (Top management, 





Chart 2. Retention of staff and students at five displaced universities (Source: Displaced 
Universities, 2017) 
 
Furthermore, the armed conflict in the East took its toll on students and faculties’ 
physical, psychological, social and domestic state. In the conditions of illegal 
occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk, exile of the Ukrainian administrative and 
security structures, and support by many university leaders of the pro-Russian side, 
no one could guarantee and protect the safety of the employees and students in the 
prime of conflict. Staff and students from the selected universities, frequently 
mentioned being exposed to physical threats prior and in the process of the 
displacement. It was dangerous to announce one’s position publically in support of 
evacuation, in fear of being thrown to jail or into the basement6. For example, the 
interviewee from DonNU described the situation as such: 
 
The university staff volunteered to help out the employees and staff who were captured 
by the DNR terrorists. Some people were blacklisted by the DNR people and could not 
take their personal documents from the city (Top management, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
LNR created a situation in which it did not support even basic rights, not to mention 
the right to education. We were denied the right to life, the right to privacy, private 
property (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
In June and July when anti-terrorist battles intensified and more military and 
civilians’ casualties were reported daily, university employees and students started 
fleeing the cities. However, even that experience was challenging due to constant 
                                                 
6 To be thrown into the basement - a practice administered during the interrogations by the LNR and 
DNR rebel groups on the occupied land. Victims reported being physically assaulted and literally kept 
in the basement for many days as a form of punishment.   
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shelling and bombing on the front line. The interviewee from Dal East-Ukrainian 
National University reflected on the situation as follows:  
 
I traveled along the line of the front where the shelling was taking place and I was 
worried about my life. I was able to take the laptop and the University seal with me, 
although it was unclear whether I would be allowed to cross the border with it (Dean, 
V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
Those who for personal reasons were unable to leave, hid in the home basements 
trying to survive the bombing. A faculty member from Luhansk National University 
stated the situation was further complicated by water and electricity shortage and a 
ban imposed by the LNR and DNR people to forbid men aged 17-45 to leave the cities 
(Faculty, LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
A student who studied at my faculty and went out of the basement where they were 
hiding from the shelling and told me that he did not do his assignments. I told him to 
forget about the task and hide in a basement.  I was very scared for his life (Dean, V. 
Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
Having acquired a status of internally displaced persons (IDP) after the universities 
were evacuated, the employees and students required moral and psychological 
support. Students left their homes with nothing but enough money to get them to the 
location of evacuated institutions.   
 
At first, the most important thing was to meet our students, hug them and feed them. 
They came with nothing, no documents or clothes. Later, to deal with such 
psychological traumas, we established a Center for Social-Psychological 
Rehabilitation of the IDPs (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
The increase of internally displaced individuals in Ukraine led to establishment of 
certain social protection systems which caused a lot of social changes and created 
challenges for displaced students and university employees. For example, a middle 
management interviewee reflected on the following social issues:  
 
We have many social problems, for example, social workers constantly check us and 
our place of residence. We also do not have right as internal refugees to participate in 
local city elects and claim private property for our university. Also, we face 
discrimination and prejudice in the community we transferred to. It is not uncommon 
to hear some call you a ‘separatist’ (Dean, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
In addition to social constraints created by the conflict, the determining factor in the 
well-being and safety of people is the security of the domestic resources. Domestic 
issues, such as void of personal finances, problems with finding affordable or any 
housing for displaced individuals have prevented them from effectively developing 
and integrating in the local communities and educational activities of university. 
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Domestic and financial problems faced by staff and students one of the leading 
causes for “brain drain” experienced by most of the displaced institutions.   
 
We have a leakage of personnel, a lot of talented scientists and teacher leave for other 
universities, because they are no longer able to rent an apartment, pay extra money 
for moving, and in addition, support their relatives. The conditions were not created 
for people to function normally in a crisis situation. Almost 40-50% of our salary goes 
to housing, food and clothes. Some faculty share housing together with students. And 
there are no clear prospects for the future. It certainly reduces the enthusiasm with 
which people work (Director of institute, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
The most difficult was the organization of domestic life. Some people could not decide 
to come, because when there is a huge demand for housing in the city, the prices 
increase, and not everyone can afford it. As a consequence, we have a reduction of 
staff, and it affects the quality of education and the regional significance of the 
university too. The teaching staff we lost, were substituted with local teachers (Deputy 
director, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
These social and domestic problems, in my opinion, still drag us and they prevent 
people to fully develop. There is a constant turnover of staff, because people struggle 
financially. If offered good conditions, people would stay to work here. Because of 
domestic problems it is hard to engage in real science (Dean, DonNTU, 20/04/2018). 
 
Concurrently, the need to constantly react to psychological, social and domestic 
problems has contributed to constitution of personal resilience. Multiple interviewees 
alluded to personal growth and increased adaptability to critical situations:  
 
We have overcome a lot, and we have received the greatest experience of management 
of crisis. Everyone at his own place reconstructed everything from scratch.  The skills of 
crisis management will be useful to us in our new life, because now we are prepared to 
work out new mechanisms, build new relationships and resolving conflicts (Director of 
center, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
Overall, the impact of conflict on human resources of the displaced universities has 
resulted in poor enrollment of students and shortage of qualified personnel. Having 
perceived physical, psychological and social challenges, students and employees 
could not cope with the unfair increase of rental prices and low living conditions. The 
Ukrainian government and the universities were unable to secure proper living 
conditions, thus, leaving no choice to seek opportunities elsewhere.  
5.2.2. Impact on infrastructure 
 
The seizing of infrastructure has been considered the first major impact of conflict on 
viability of higher education institutions in eastern Ukraine. The armed groups have 
captured the main study and laboratory buildings, as well as, student dormitories. 
The classrooms and housing became makeshift outposts, storage, accommodation or 
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headquarters for pro-Russian rebel groups. The interviewees from three universities 
reported a similar situation: 
 
On September 16, 2014, the infrastructure of the DonNU has been seized by the rebel 
groups, including two dormitories which were used for terrorists as a housing 21 
university cars captured by DNR people (Top management, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
There was a takeover of buildings and dormitories by armed people (Top management, 
LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
The University was occupied by the military people because it was situated very 
conveniently not far away from the building of the Security Service of Ukraine. We also 
had a five-story building and in the end of May armed people came to the door and told 
our students empty the building in 30 minutes (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
Two out of five universities under study were able to effectively evacuate to their 
branch campuses or functional units on the Ukraine-controlled territory (i.e. V. Dahl 
EUNU and DonNTU). Since universities in the first years of the evacuation reduced 
by more than half in size, the infrastructure available in the branch campuses was 
sufficient for certain educational activities and basic research, however, as the 
universities started expanding more resources were required at some. The 
interviewees from the above-mentioned universities reported on the impact of 
conflict on the infrastructure in the following way: 
 
We were lucky, because we had an institute branch here in Severodonetsk and there 
were already faculties that were preparing and educating students in the same 
disciplines we did in Luhansk, so they only needed to expand their size and the rest 
was duplicated. However, there are not enough laboratories, and auditoriums to carry 
out educational activities. We do not have enough scientific equipment. This is 
something we cannot solve yet and try to use the infrastructure of our partners. The 
humanitarian faculties also struggle with limited facility, especially in terms of library 
resources (Top management, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
We evacuated to our subunit - an industrial institute, because there was a material 
base and other training infrastructure. This equipment, which remained in Donetsk, 
was old and out of date and was not widely used. In Pokrovsk we acquired new 
modern equipment. This equipment is used for students and faculty for research and 
education. Overall, we have three buildings with a yard and the two dormitories for 
students and staff as well (Dean, DonNTU, 20/04/2018). 
 
Other three universities were tasked to find available infrastructure for rental or 
purchase. For example, the LNAU was evacuated to Khrarkiv, where they shared the 
infrastructure with three local agrarian universities. The robust infrastructure has 
helped the institution to provide educational training and conduct research activities, 
however, lack of own infrastructure has limited the institution’s opportunities for 




If we had our own building, we could be eligible for international support. I have been 
fighting for our own infrastructure for three years, but there are legislative issues that 
forbid us to obtain such ownership rights. Currently, we don’t have money to pay the 
service fees and do the renovations in the building. We have an agreement with three 
rectors of agrarian universities, who allowed us to use their equipment. We are now 
using their material and technical resources. We pay for auditorium rentals though. I 
agreed that our University would be included in the Kharkiv University Consortium, 
so that we could use the library resources as well (Top management, LNAU, 
17/04/2017). 
 
The two universities acquired infrastructure that has not been used for educational 
purposes before, DonNU acquired a former crystal factory and DonNACEA - a 
warehouse. The infrastructure needed major renovations and capital investments to 
obtain necessary facility, to comply with the standards of education and research in 
the country. One of causes for inability to improve the facility initially after 
displacement was the ban issued by the government, forbidding state organizations 
to purchase any infrastructure and furniture in the time of war. All universities have 
partially restored the material and technical infrastructure with the help of 
humanitarian assistance. However, the major issue still remains, neither of the 
institutions own a student housing, which hurts their enrollment prospects.  
 
We were able to restore material and technical infrastructure at about 10-15%. This is 
solely due to humanitarian assistance. Here in Vinnitsa our laboratory facilities are 
restored only for training of first and second year students, but not more. The money 
we get from self-paying students is all spent on covering infrastructure we rent 
(Director of institute, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
Now we have five functional faculties equipped with necessary office supplies. The 
students received new and modern equipment. For the educational and scientific 
process. But there still a lack of laboratory equipment, but sometimes the absence it 
forces our students to master theory better (Dean, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018). 
 
Accommodation become a “stumbling block” for most displaced universities with 
regard to students and employees organizing their domestic lives.  Some universities, 
namely DonNU and LNAU to this have not obtained student housing. While smaller 
higher education institutions, such as DonNACEA whose number of students is less 
than a thousand received a housing infrastructure from the government this year. 
The remaining two universities, V. Dahl EUNU and DonNTU have been using the 
housing infrastructure of their branch campuses. The following are the reports of 
interviewees from five universities about the impact of conflict on accommodation:  
 
We were faced with the problem of providing student housing. Our students live in the 
dormitories of other local universities. They were provided practically with nothing, we 
had to buy beds for our students and bed linen in order to ensure they have basic living 
conditions. This situation is still dragging on, it has not been solved yet. I do not 
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understand why we cannot use, for example, empty hotels that are available in the city 
(Director of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
About 534 students and 37 teachers live in six hostels of six universities in Kharkiv. 
Students do not live free of charge and pay the same amount as non-displaced 
students. The biggest problem with these hostels is that they are not in good conditions 
(Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
We moved to Severodonetsk, because there was our branch and two dormitories with 
available rooms. Of course, this is not comparable to what accommodation we had in 
Lugansk (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018) 
 
We had a problem with the student dormitories. This year the Ministry handed over to 
us a dormitory, which we need to renovate (Top management, DonNACEA, 
19/04/2018) 
 
We were helped by various companies to rent their hostels for discounted price. Our 
affiliate institute had additional two dormitories which we share (Head of department, 
DonNTU, 20/04/2018). 
  
Limited or non-existent educational, administrative, technical equipment compelled 
university employees to donate and share the facilities that were retrieved from the 
former campuses or homes. Some interviewees recall the situation as follows:  
 
We came here when there was nothing. It was very hard, because we did not have 
basic working supplies, such as computers, tables, chairs. We restored it ourselves at 
first (Director of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
All faculty sat in one room. We did not have any equipment and we used our own 
computers at work (Top management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018). 
 
Initially, we brought printers, laptops and other technology from home to organize 
working conditions (Dean, DonNTU, 20/04/2018).  
 
The process of displacement, as mentioned previously was more reactive and 
spontaneous, than planned and proactive. The lack of a systematic evacuation plan, 
uncoordinated and unorganized actions of many universities resulted in tight 
possibilities of the universities for retrieval of any scientific and methodical 
documentation, financial and statistical reports, archives or personal records of 
students. The process of restoring the legal, organizational, statistical, regulatory and 
other critical documentation became a complex, protracted bureaucratic process. The 
interviewee from LNAU stated that the lack of documentation still complicates the 
functioning of the university: 
 
In order to coordinate actions with the State Treasury, approve a staff list, estimate the 
income and expenditure, amend the Statute, it was necessary to provide numerous 
documents, such as statements on the opening of accounts, documents with samples of 
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signatures and seals, and various certificates, copies of copies, which we did not have. 
The transfer of the university was carried out without the transfer of documents, 
personal files, or archives of documents. We did not even have documents on study 
curricula or training load. I corresponded with all the officials and asked for help to 
provide us with some kind of material support, but they refused (Top management, 
LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
The loss of documentation was, however, less significant at three universities. The V. 
Dahl EUNU and DonNU were actively using online platforms, where critical 
communicational, operational and legislative data were achieved. 
 
The fact that many of our processes were automated and actively used the electronic 
cloud system to store information played a big role. We saved a lot of documentation. 
Later the access to our database was blocked by those who stayed on the territory of 
Donetsk (Director of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
When we arrived here, we began to restore the documentation. Some people left 
Luhansk and removed hard disks with information. Also for ten years we have been 
developing online learning platform, so many study documents were stored there 
(Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
In some situations, the employees risked lives and in secret transferred 
documentation before the information about official evacuation was announced. In 
secret and under a lot of scrutiny some faculty managed to retrieve university 
documentation. The evacuation of documentation was dangerous, since the illegal 
authorities ordered to detain the “unfaithful” faculty members and conduct checks 
on them. For evidence, the staff of DonNU and DonNTU reported the following:  
 
There was a dean who pretended that he was throwing away garbage from his office. 
Later that evening he collected the documents in the garbage chute, so that later he 
could transfer them to Vinnitsa. He brought this documentation home, scanned and 
then placed it back at his office. And until the dean had enough documentation, he 
did not leave. As soon as he had what he needed, he took it all away and transferred 
to Vinnitsa (Executive staff, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
It was not safe to take out anything, because they checked bags. We sat in the evening 
and made scanned copies of our curriculum, educational documentation which we 
sealed and downloaded the entire database and evacuated it. We really arrived 
prepared (Dean, DonNTU, 20/04/2018).  
5.2.3. Impact on operations  
 
The operational crisis is a frequently mentioned area of impact. Operational crisis 
threatens core values and vital functions of an educational institutions, and it 
interrupts the day-to-day operations. The conflict in the East caused operational 
crisis to 18 public universities, which as a result of the evacuation needed to restore 
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the educational and research activities. The impact of conflict on the operations of 
institutions is intertwined with the infrastructural damaged that prevented the 
displaced universities to run the operations within a short time. The chronology of 
the start of operational crisis of five displaced universities under this study varies. 
Some continued functioning throughout the summer despite the terrorist activities 
taking place nearby, but most shut down the universities hastily to protect students’ 
safety and release them from studies in advance.        
 
Back then the university was partially operating, we organized the enrolment 
campaign in summer. In the end of August, the university was not operating, 
although the Ukrainian flag had been hanging on the university’s main building, later 
the flag has been taken down. From September 15, we have not left for work. On 
November 3, we re-opened the educational process in a new location (Director of 
institute, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
In June, the university was still functioning. As of November 3, we had already 
started to work on the new location (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
In the end of May, the decision has been made by our administration to stop the 
education process of the University, because it needed to guarantee students and 
teachers safety to pursue education, and there was no such opportunity. I was 
responsible for the enrollment campaign. We held the campaign in July, and soon it 
became too dangerous to continue. I called head our branch unit in Severodonetsk 
and we agreed to continue admissions there (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
The interviewees from DonNU and V. Dal EUNU noted that the availability of 
distance education7 and online learning tools8 as an alternative to traditional 
classroom learning during crisis has become a significant factor in restoring the 
operations of the university. When the conflict occurred, these institutions were able 
to retrieve educational material, initiate academic continuity, and retain students 
and employees, due to existing distance learning platforms that were in active use 
before the conflict took broke out.  
 
It became a big advantage for us that the university has been trying to introduce the 
distance learning and online learning in practice. We even tried to accreditate and 
obtain licenses for some of our courses to become a number one institution in 
Ukraine that provides distance education. We had that practice in place to better 
perform the communication with some of the university’s branches. Besides, it 
became a tremendous advantage for us during the evacuation, because we could 
actually retrieve the documents. We were able to collect a lot of information from our 
own computers and other people’s and renew a lot of information after the 
                                                 
7 Distance education - “delivery of education through the use of mail correspondence, CD-ROMS, or 
video-taped lectures” (Houston, 2017).  
8 Online learning tools - educational software that are supported by the Internet and “act as platforms 
for online education courses to be delivered to students anywhere, anytime using various 
means...computers, smartphones, etc.” (Houston, 2017).  
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displacement (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
In 2014 and 2015 the educational process was conducted in a remote mode. We 
determined the rules of work and I was responsible for distance learning. We worked 
with the platform Moodle. We saved a lot of information, and it allowed us to retain 
students and teachers, because we could quickly restore the educational process 
(Director of institute, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
To retain the students and faculty, the universities were allowed to extend the 
recruitment. The process of restoring operational continuity included renewing the 
students’ study place, restoring students’ documentation, conducting promotion 
campaign and enrolling new students. The interviewed university representatives 
reported that in the first year of the evacuation, the institutions had to undergo 
numerous formal procedures to verify students’ identity, reinstate the staff, renew 
study plans, and create working schedule to launch the educational process. 
Therefore, the university provided flexible schedules for students and teachers, until 
everything was reinstated and back to normal. During the first academic term, many 
universities organized a so-called “rotation mode”, where teaching faculty and 
students traveled to displaced universities periodically, and conducted lectures and 
seminars with students for two weeks. This solution also became practical because of 
shortage of faculty the universities experienced in the beginning. One interviewee 
stated the following: 
 
First semester we organized training for teachers and students in a “rotation mode”. 
Students from one faculty came and teaching faculty worked with them for two or 
three weeks. It was convenient to have such process at first, as we had a limited 
number of seats in the student dormitories and auditoriums, and the availability of 
teachers, who had to teach in many specialties, was sparse. We compiled a list of 
hours for faculties and for one semester, students came two times for two weeks, and 
then we held examination (Dean, DonNTU, 20/04/2018). 
 
The “rotation study mode” was a necessity in the condition of war, where students 
and staff had to travel long distances and drive through checkpoints in order to get to 
the university. However, some staff reported study mode having problems with 
regard to security. Certain students and faculty were manipulating the scheme by 
attending both the evacuated university and a “twin” occupied university. For 
example, in the first year after displacement, the DonNU’s security service conducted 
ongoing monitoring and invited staff and students for questioning. The student 
interviewee remembers the events as such: 
 
At first it was difficult to understand who was transferring from Donetsk to 
Vinnytsia, because there were students who even studied for few semesters here and 
there. Students tried to manipulate and resort to lies, but now it's settled because the 
university administration requires students to be present during academic year 




The number of staff and students the displaced institutions were able to retain was 
reflected in the number of faculties and departments the universities reinstated. The 
inevitable process of reorganization of numerous institutional structures took place.  
Due to the fact the number of reinstated representatives from the faculties and 
departments was uneven, the universities needed to merge some departments and 
faculties, and re-assign staff, where there was a shortage of qualified personnel. The 
interviewee from V. Dahl EUNU reports on the organizational accordingly:  
 
There was reorganization of both departments and units due to a shortage of staff 
and a decrease in faculties. Because we moved to our branch campus, there was a 
duplication of departments, and those were merged.  The study unit was faced with 
challenges because they didn’t know how to handle representative from not 2 but 9 
faculties after displacement. The Institute of Economics and Institute of Marketing, 
as well as the Department of Finance and the Department of Banking were merged 
(Director of institute, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
On average, the universities retrieved more than half of faculties. Although, the 
number varies significantly as some universities (see Chart 2).  
 
Chart 3. Number of faculties at the displaced universities before/after (Source: Interview 
transcript, 2018) 
The process of reorganization and merging was necessary survival strategy by the 
displaced universities to fill the vacuum of knowledge and qualified personnel that 
emerged as a result of conflict. To ensure academic and scientific continuity in the 
shortest time, the universities promoted the faculty and staff, who lacked prior 
administrative and managerial experience. Such decision, although understandable, 
delayed the reinstatement of educational process owing to problems with staff 
incompetence, miscommunication, weak organizational dynamics and more.  
 
A lot of staff who had administrative and managerial experience stayed in Donetsk. 
There I worked as a deputy dean, and when I moved to Vinnytsia I became a dean. I 
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was the only one who responded to the offer. I did not have much managerial 
experience, although I did have communications with most colleagues. Honestly, I 
was overwhelmed with bureaucratic issues. The weakness of our faculty was that all 
the key administration remained in Donetsk, including the dean.  And the faculties 
that moved with the deans had easier transition period, because they had good 
relationships and common beliefs (Dean, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
All the people who evacuated never held leading positions, and it was a disaster when 
they needed to take over the supervisory duties. They could not even clearly articulate 
their thoughts and propose some specific tasks for the university and its development. 
They used to be ordinary teachers in Luhansk, but here the situation allowed to 
promote them to deans or deputy deans and it turns out it was not a good idea (Top 
management, LNAU, 17/04/2018). 
 
We did not have a single dean who was previously a dean or deputy dean, and not a 
single rector or vice-rector. Everyone knew the work from the other side. As a teacher 
who became a dean I need to know where to get the information from to comprise the 
curriculum, for example. We traveled to other universities to learn the experience, 
look at how they organize educational process and structure the curricula. Surely, at 
first we made many mistakes. But eventually we rebuilt the educational process (Top 
management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018). 
 
On the other hand, the interviewees reported the eventual promotion of many faculty 
provided an opportunity for young scientists and teaching staff to grow and open the 
potential of the faculty, that would have been overlooked otherwise. Furthermore, 
the interviewees agreed that the knowledge vacuum cleaned the universities from the 
Soviet past and updated the universities with progressive and open-minded ideas.  
 
There was a good cleaning of staff, because many who had Soviet views remained 
there, and progressive minds - moved here (Dean, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
Our University in Lugansk was always Soviet and slightly old in opinion, and they had 
some strange connections. I tried to break everything here and rebuild according to 
the trends of today and according to the students' need (Top management, LNAU, 
17/04/2018). 
 
Qualitatively those teachers who worked in science and were good teachers, almost all 
of them came here. The makeup of the university here is clearly progressive and 
forward-looking (Head of department, DNTU, 20/04/2018).  
 
The interviewees reported that due to a “cleansing of human resources”, the 
universities changed their organizational culture, where more attention is paid to 
issues, such as the innovative forms of study process, scientific research and 
international activity.  
 
Our university has changed because there are many new teachers, learning has 
become more interactive, interesting new approaches appeared. Our department is 
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trying to stimulate students to such methods that are innovative and European 
(Student representative, DNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
For us, it is also clear that this conflict has a great potential for opportunities for us. 
We have changed the curricula and approaches to learning, because the skills that the 
student needs are changing, and the university cannot stay the same. Now, a lot of 
attention has been paid to various organizations in this region and there are a lot of 
opportunities for both teachers and students. (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
Ironically, the conflict has also opened new opportunities for student development. 
The student interviewees from five universities noticed that the crisis has stimulated 
them for self-mobilization and activism. In addition, the government has allocated 
social quotas for the students from the displaced universities with regard to student 
programs, seminars, conferences, internships and more opportunities.    
5.3.4. Impact on legitimacy 
 
The reputation of a public organization is probably the least thought of consequence 
of crisis, yet one that causes the most harm to organizations’ viability over prolonged 
period. The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that scattered 18 public universities 
across Ukraine away from the reliable and sufficient infrastructure, shattered their 
reputation that has been challenging to recover. The conflict and evacuation have had 
severe impact on the universities’ enrollment prospects, quality and quantity of 
entrants, partnerships opportunities, and created unfair conditions for competition 
in the regional higher education arena. Additionally, the protracted nature of the war 
has paused the reintegration question, and in turn, launched a process of 
institutional assimilation and loss of the regional significance and strategic 
importance.    
 
The government tried to respond to the enrollment problem by: (1) allowing students 
from the uncontrolled territory of Donbass to enter the displaced universities without 
a national external examination; (2) assigning a fixed volume (quota) of government 
stipend places in all specialties and educational levels to displaced public higher 
education institutions. Nevertheless, the participant universities reported that the 
acquired displacement status created more stigma and prejudice against these 
institutions, particularly that of conflict, unsafety, separatism, and deteriorating 
quality and “brain drain”. The government legislative and financial preferences not 
only failed to resolve the problem of enrollment quantity-wise, but in fact, helped to 
do the opposite - attract students from regions with lower scores, as the students with 
high scores are effectively recruited by prestigious big universities in Ukraine or 
abroad. The interviewees described the issues as follows:  
 
Unfortunately, the composition of students desires better, because students have very 
low preparation. In Donetsk, we had formed a public image, where we had different 
generations of students studying at our universities. But here for this region we are 
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new, and if we raised the bar for admissions, we would be effectively knocked down 
by local competition. Of course, we need quality, and not quantity. But the best 
students do not come here. One more problem is the quality of students has not been 
the priority for our government, the Ministry transfers money for how many students 
you study and hours you teach. If we teach less students, this could mean laying off 
the teachers (Dean, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
There is a problem with the quality of students, because the best students are legally 
attracting9 the best universities and good students they do not always want to stay in 
Severodonetsk. This system is on the one hand justifiable, and on the other hand it 
makes the outflow of students, because they concentrate in big cities and there is no 
regional development. The student composition at our university is also affected by 
the fact that the territory of the Luhansk region, is largely agricultural and rural, and 
the quality of school education is also lower, so because of that our university may not 
receive students with a highest knowledge (Deputy director, V. Dahl EUNU, 
18/04/2018).  
 
There is a big problem with enrollment of students. The students come here either 
because of the fixed stipend coefficient or because they failed to enter a more 
competitive university because of lower scores. It’s usually local students too. It is 
very difficult to attract students from nearby regions, because we have tough 
competition with powerful universities from Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipro (Head of 
department, DNTU, 20/04/2018).  
 
The universities employed efforts to counter the problem of enrollment by changing 
their usual approach to admissions and introducing more proactive methods to 
attract students. For instances, V. Dahl EUNU created representative offices in the 
neighboring regions to establish communication with potential students and 
advertise the university. They report 10% of students are recruited via those offices 
and consulting centers. Since many embassies retracted the foreign students from 
conflict-affected universities, the EUNU plans to open a branch in Kyiv to recruit 
foreign students again. The LNAU has diversified their admissions approach by using 
marketing means more effectively and working with media to promote the university. 
In order to improve the quality of recruited students, DonNU plans to conduct 
tutoring sessions for struggling students.   
 
The war also affected the partnership opportunities of the displaced universities, 
which have not been fully recovered to this day. Some universities mention that the 
partnerships exist at the expense of the opposite parties, due to financial incapacity to 
support them. It was also time-consuming and demanding to restore the 
communication between the international and local partners, as the universities split 
as a result of conflict. The government assisted displaced institutions by issuing a 
letter to embassies and existing international project partners clarifying the 
                                                 
9 Voucher systems – ‘money follows student’, s a new scheme introduced by the government to 
provide funding to those public universities that attract the highest achieving students.   
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legitimacy issue. Overall, the displaced universities have been proactively searching 
for and reinstating cooperation with international and local organization. 
5.3. Crisis management approaches 
 
The displaced institutions of higher education have lost almost everything: premises, 
documentation, libraries, equipment, laboratories. Among the main causes of such a 
loss are the lack of decisive actions and decisions on organized departure from the 
state, the betrayal of the former leadership and the transition to the self-proclaimed 
Ministry of Education of the DPR, the seizure of buildings by militants, opposition 
from the teachers remaining in the temporarily occupied territory. The lack of 
sufficient communication regarding the activities of the internally displaced 
universities also exhausted the trust of the students and scientific and pedagogical 
staff, who left universities looking for better opportunities.  
5.3.1. Failure of crisis planning and prevention  
 
There is a fresh memory of both the war and displacement or evacuation of higher 
education institutions in the relatively recent history of Ukraine. Since a significant 
portion of Ukraine served as a battlefield during the Second World War, there was a 
serious risk that the German troops could progress in the direction of Moscow. 
Therefore, the Soviet government commanded to evacuate enterprises and 
educational institutions to the far east of Russia in the 1940s to avoid potential 
threats in case the front line moved. For many recently displaced institutions in 
eastern Ukraine it is, therefore, their second evacuation (i.e., Donetsk National 
University, V. Dahl East-Ukrainian National University, Donetsk National Technical 
University). The process of transfer of higher education institutions was poorly 
facilitated, there was a shortage of facilities and accommodation and some of the 
institutions suspended their activities after evacuation, and new higher education 
institutions were rebuilt with the same names after the War (Dodonov, 2016). As 
interviewees confirmed: 
 
This is generally a second evacuation of the university. The first evacuation was 
during the Second World War and our University was evacuated to the city of Kungur 
is the Perm region beyond the Urals in Russia. In fact, four years the university was in 
evacuation and did not carry out the educational process. The history of our 
university in the first evacuation remained a white spot – it is still unknown what 
happened to it. I raised this question many times. It is necessary to track this down, 
because this experience would have been useful to us (Director of center, DonNU, 
16/4/2018).  
 
During the World War II (1941-1945), the HEI was evacuated to Omsk. It became the 
basis for the present Omsk Technical University in Russia. After returning to 
Luhansk, the HEI was renewed almost from scratch. By 1960, it had been reorganized 
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several times by joining other educational institutions, enlarging and renaming, and 
that year it received the pre-war name Luhansk Machine-Building Institute (V. Dahl 
EUNU Website, 2017). 
 
While the 1940s evacuations were unsuccessful, it would have been valuable to learn 
from mistakes of the past nonetheless. A record of a crisis memory is essential in 
preparing and preventing crisis as whole and/or mitigating some of its volatile 
consequences. Burrell and Heiselt (2012) point out that learning from the 
experiences of the past crisis can prevent future crisis. However, a failure to design 
even a basic action plan for crisis can create confusion, lack of clarity in how the 
university manages the crisis (Zdziarski et al., 2007). Unfortunately, the knowledge 
of previous evacuation was never recorded in a systematic way and exists as a mere 
statement of fact. Therefore, none of the institutions that have been displaced in 2014 
had an existing crisis management plan. A view shared by all interviewees supports 
the claims in the literature:  
 
There was no prior evacuation plan in place. Universities were confused, they didn’t 
know how to act (Top management, LNAU, 17/4/2018). 
 
Additionally, due to the rare incidence of crisis and high expenses for the emergency-
prevention schemes, the government neglects to prioritize public security (Drennan 
et al., 2015). The interviewees frequently mentioned that the government failed to 
proactively facilitate the process of evacuation due to lack of preparation and 
planning.   
 
There was no state policy that would be clear and understandable. And since all this 
time such program has not been developed, many processes fell apart. (Director of 
institute, management, DonNU, 16/4/2018). 
 
While none of the universities mentioned being informed about a university 
emergency plan or have been participating in safety drills before the crisis occurred. 
In one article about the history of evacuation of Luhansk National Agrarian 
University, an event resembling planning and prevention stage of crisis management 
took place. The university management conducted a meeting with the university staff 
regarding the safety measures in time of war.  
 
On May 20, 2014, the last staff meeting of LNAU took place. We were told about the 
history of war and the preparation of bomb shelters on our campus. The student group 
supervisors were instructed to inform students about the evacuation procedure in case 
the bombing begins (Article, LNAU, 2018).  
 
The more severe the crisis is, the more actors get involved in the response to the 
situation on campus. Emergency personnel outside of the university premises, such 
as the city police or other local or regional emergency groups can play a key role 
during the crisis prevention and response (Zdziarski et al., 2007). Except if these 
  
72 
security structures cannot perform their duties due to destabilization as a result of 
the internal armed conflict occurring in the East.  
5.3.2. Crisis of national security and administrative structures  
 
The events that preceded evacuation of universities were marked by blood and 
violence. Between April - May 2014 the terrorist groups entered the cities of Donetsk 
and Luhansk, and the Ukrainian government was unable to prevent and respond to 
the initial threat. In May 2014 when the Security Service buildings in Luhansk and 
Donetsk were captured, the armed rebels carried out multiple attacks to seize other 
governmental infrastructure so as to establish their authority. The pro-Russian rebels 
hung their flags over the Ukrainian state universities and governmental building to 
emphasize on a newly established authority. The entrance of rebel groups into the 
cities and the capture of regional administration in Donetsk and Luhansk, marks the 
beginning of crisis for higher education institutions in the East, as the following 
statement suggests: 
 
After the Girkin’s gang was allowed to enter Donetsk and after the Russian forces 
together with mercenaries entered Donetsk and no-one did anything to stop them, it 
was clear we will need to be evacuated (Top management, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
On May 8, 2014, I went to work and noticed there was a DNR flag hanging over the 
university…these events unfolded too quickly, but we still did not understand that it 
was already the territory of the DNR, there were still illusions that it would be possible 
to work in the Ukrainian university and on the Ukrainian territory (Middle 
management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018).  
 
Meanwhile the self-proclaimed republics of LNR and DNR commenced the process of 
consolidation of their power - fighting off the Ukrainian military.  The end of May 
and all months of summer 2014 caused severe casualties in the Ukrainian 
independent history. The major battles for Donetsk airport, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, 
Debaltseve and Illovaysk left many terrified and resulted in massive humanitarian 
crisis, forcing millions to flee the Donbass region (Tuzhden News, 2017).  
 
For some universities, this chaos and horror resulted in a pre-term shutdown of 
educational activities and escape of thousands of students and university staff to safer 
locations during the summer 2014. For others, it resulted in illegal seize of the 
university property (e.g. campuses, dormitories) and a forced evacuation of students. 
In a normal emergency scenario, the university administration could resort to local or 
regional emergency personnel. However, in the case of internal conflict and a hybrid 
war where the national security structures have been compromised, the universities 
had two options, to partner with the occupying authorities or realize the lack of 
reliable local security structures and look for the state emergency coordination. For 




The local authorities supported the aggressor and it caused a big problem, because if it 
were an attack on the university, then one could turn to the police, the security service 
or the government's leadership in order to support and explain how to act. But in this 
case, this link of the regional level authority was absent, therefore, it was necessary to 
rely directly on the Ministry. Alas the Ministry also did not know how to act, therefore, 
indeed, the actions were spontaneous and reactive (Top management, V. Dahl EUNU, 
18/04/2018). 
 
In addition to dealing with crisis of security structures, the universities also 
experienced a crisis of governance bodies. After LNR and DNR proclaimed their 
secession from Ukraine in August, they established new governance bodies, for 
example establishment of Supreme Council, Supreme Court and ministries. The self-
proclaimed Ministry of Education of DNR and LNR in September ordered all 
educational establishments in Luhansk and Donetsk to comply with the new 
authority. The document has been provided by one of the interviewees from DonNU, 
it reads as follows: 
 
Order on re-subordination of educational institutions: In order to ensure the full 
functioning of the system of education and science of the Donetsk People's Republic, I 
order from September 1, 2014 to re-subordinate the institution of education and 
science of all levels, types and forms of property located on the territory of the Donetsk 
People's Republic (Minister of Education and Science of DNR, Kostenok, 2014). 
 
To effectively influence the educational institutions and ensure their compliance, the 
self-proclaimed Ministries of DNR and LNR appointed pro-Russian leadership and 
management in the universities where they felt resistance and refusal to cooperate. 
For instance, the interviewees described the following situations unveil in the 
universities: 
 
Two days before the seizure of the university, my former dean of the faculty released 
an appeal on our official website that he was quitting and that he was leaving Donetsk, 
because he was under pressure from DNR (Student, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
All members of the Academic Council were invited to an emergency meeting in 
August. I remember that the representatives of the DNR came with the armed people. 
The representatives of the so-called Ministry also came. They notified us who was 
appointed as a new Minister. A former teacher of the department of Political Science, 
who was fired from our university for corruption was appointed as a new rector. He 
reported that the university was moving to the Russian standards of education (Top 
management, DonNU, 16/07/2018).  
 
In addition, there was a parallel academic council in Luhansk, which appointed a new 





Furthermore, most of the interviewees reported being indoctrinated, pressured, 
intimidated and exposed to daily propaganda, which effectively contributed to the 
forthcoming institutional cleavage. The divide along the political and moral lines 
instigated daily arguments between faculty and students, creating unhealthy 
organizational environment in which academic continuity was no longer possible. A 
number of interviewees shared such statements as a proof:  
 
People had different views and it turned out that our team split in half, some decided to 
leave their job and some decided to remain (Top management, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
We saw that the policy undertaken by the DNR authority was that of terror and force. 
They came to educational institutions and forced faculty and students to sign a 
statement that they supported the DNR government (Dean, DonNTU, 20/04/2018). 
 
Direct involvement of educational establishments in the armed conflict and series of 
attacks on university leaders and faculty, encouraged those who refused to tolerate 
the new leadership to act. As a result, self-organized initiative groups emerged as a 
countering force, comprising of the university leadership, faculty and/or students. 
The initiative groups, in secret, notified the Ministry of Education and Science of 
Ukraine about the situation in Donbass and demanded a response. In September 
2014, the Ministry discontinued funding for the state universities that remained on 
the occupied territories and publicly disowned them. In the following months, the 
university initiative groups in coordination with the Ministry organized displacement 
of the state higher education institutions to the territories with a functioning legal 
framework of Ukraine. The process of transfer became the ‘last straw’ that finalized 
the institutional divide. With each transferred university grew the number of 
duplicate (twin) universities on the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk.  
 
To this day it is unclear how these institutions finance themselves and in which 
manner they operate. Some claim the illegal universities have established 
cooperation with the Russian universities, allowing their students to receive dual 
diplomas, which can be recognized by Russian authorities. However, the majority of 
the interviewees stated that the diploma and the DNR and LNR educational 
establishments are not recognized by any country, including Russia: 
 
Now everyone gets a diploma from the DNR and I do not know where they go with 
these diplomas, because they are not recognized anywhere. Russia did not recognize 
these republics formally (Director of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
In addition to the university’s infrastructure, the organizational culture underwent 
transformation. It separated the faculty and students on supporters of the illegitimate 
pro-Russian authority and supporters of the evacuation of the universities by the 
Ukrainian government. The political position of the university leadership was 
particularly important during the crisis management process.  
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5.3.3. Crisis of the university leadership and management 
 
In the process of displacement, the university leadership was directly threatened and 
exiled from the university if their politics was not reflective of the pro-Russian 
regime. On the other hand, in some universities, the leadership bluntly supported the 
rebel groups. In two of five universities, the rectors supported the pro-Russian side 
(i.e., Luhansk National Agrarian University and Donbass National Academy of Civil 
Engineering and Architecture). These decisions were detrimental to the institutional 
integrity and facilitation of the evacuation process. At both universities, the 
leadership’s support of terrorists resulted in a delayed evacuation - two-three months 
later than other universities. Furthermore, the position of the leadership made it 
challenging for the crisis management teams to influence the faculty and students’ 
opinion regarding the evacuation. The leadership infiltrated the organizational 
culture with the false claims and promises. As a result, after their displacement, LNU 
and DonNACEA retrieved less than one-third of their teaching staff and students, in 
comparison with that of half in other three universities.   
 
There was no prior evacuation of the university, because the rector sided with 
the LNR authorities and categorically banned students and teachers to leave 
this higher educational institution (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018). 
 
The leadership in Makiivka took the side of the DNR, the rector of the university 
turned out to be a traitor. Our university was the last to be displaced and this is 
precisely because the leadership was against Ukraine. I think that the decisive 
factor why so few students and teachers moved with us was the leadership’s 
position. The rector who served in his post for 25 years had a high degree of 
trust among everyone (Top management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018). 
 
In the displaced universities where the rectors stayed loyal to the Ukrainian position, 
most of the vice-rectors and other administrative and managerial staff stayed on the 
occupied territories. The decisions made by the higher authorities resulted in similar 
decisions made by employees, who required coordination in the process.  
 
In some universities, the university rectors who moved to Ukraine-controlled 
territory declared their incapability of facilitating the crisis management processes 
due to health problems or senior age10. Support of pro-Russian side by many 
university administrators and managers, self-removal of some university leaders 
from the crisis management responsibilities, delayed the crisis response. The crash of 
leadership and managerial structures led to crash of roles and responsibilities. Since 
there was no authority to execute orders necessary in crisis response, the staff and 
faculty who were evacuating individually decided their own degree of responsibility. 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that in Ukrainian higher education for long time there has been a tradition of the 
‘everlasting rectors’ who had a right to be re-elected for a number of consecutive terms. This tradition has been 
gradually disappearing with the introduction of the new Higher Education Law, introduced in 2014, which 
allows rectors to be re-elected twice for a period of five years. 
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One interviewee mentioned that his former leadership transferred the responsibility 
to him in a critical moment: 
 
When something exploded in the building in front of the campus, we decided to close 
the admissions office. The former vice-rector gave me all the seals and left Luhansk. 
He told me that I somehow saw what to do. He said that everyone had left. I was the 
head of the admissions committee and he transferred the responsibilities to me? 
Everyone understood they had their own level of responsibility and there was no 
desire to assume responsibility that you do not own and force a person to do 
something that he refuses to do. There were no orders to do anything, everyone 
decided for himself (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
In a state of violent conflict and university crisis, employees were absolved of their 
primary responsibilities, everyone was at liberty to decide their actions. As the 
interviewed university representatives stated, dire urge to take action created self-
organized initiative groups that took on the responsibilities as temporary crisis 
managers with a self-appointed temporary leadership. The interviewee from 
DonNTU noted that “it was a shame to take on all the work that the pro-rector had to 
do initially, but it needed to be done, nevertheless (Faculty, DonNTU, 20/04/2018). 
5.3.4. Self-organized initiative groups (response phase)  
 
The Ukrainian displacement process is characterized by many actors as rather 
‘chaotic’, ‘unorganized’, ‘confusing’ and ‘uncoordinated’. A number interviewees 
stated that the displacement processes was rather reactive and self-organized by 
separate individuals and the crisis management teams were formed in the process 
and not before the crisis.   
 
Displacement was a self-organized process, we waited for some reaction from the 
Ministry. It was more chaotic and the process was hardly manageable; the university 
administration decided in the month of August 2014 that it was necessary to move 
somewhere (Director of institute, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
We had a group of like-minded people and I knew who to rely on. The conversations 
went not open, there were no appeals, we just approached the people and asked who 
supported evacuation (Top management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018). 
 
In many universities, there were initiative groups who acted simultaneously without 
each other knowing about it. The crisis teams were usually small, consisting of 5 to 10 
people initially, and gradually expanding after certain mechanisms were established. 
The crisis teams were represented in some cases by the university leadership only, in 
other, by the management of the university, faculty and students. For example, at 
DonNU, some students and faculty were negotiating the crisis management plan in 




An initiative group was joined by students and teachers who collegially decided that the 
university should be transferred and suggested to create an online registration form for 
those who supported the transfer. Then it turned out that our rector was negotiating 
with the Ministry in Kyiv together with a group of initiative students, regarding which 
city to choose for the university evacuation (Director of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
Students’ role during the crisis is often acknowledged as one of the driving forces that 
actively promoted the displacement of universities. The students’ representative 
reminisced about his involvement in numerous undertakings: 
 
On September 24, we planned a rally with the journalists' union. They helped to make a 
letter that we distributed to all media outlets. On September 23rd, we sat in a 
dormitory painting posters and then phoned the Minister of Education to dissuade us 
from the rally. The rally did not take place, but then everything happened quickly 
enough, so the rector informed us that we will be displaced to Vinnytsia (Student 
representative, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
We [students] wrote a letter to the Ministry, the Cabinet of Ministers, Prime Minister 
about the transfer of our university to a safe environment, where a study process can be 
conducted peacefully. We spread it around and needed it signed by as many people as 
possible (Students representative, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
5.3.5. Crisis management action plan (response phase) 
 
To reiterate, there was no consecutive plan regarding the action of universities in case 
of institutional divide and armed conflict. For the displaced universities, the 
processes that took place were largely spontaneous and unpredictable.  
 
The situation was very unorganized, because nobody could imagine what could happen 
and no one could understand how to act in such a situation. We were not ready and I 
think that in the future there should be an algorithm for such actions in the event of an 
armed conflict or some kind of terrorist acts. The team and leadership of any university 
should understand how to act (Top management, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
However, the initiative groups that emerged demonstrated an ability of universities 
to mobilize their actions within a short period of time. Since all public universities are 
owned and governed by the State, its actions needed to be negotiated and agreed with 
the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine or other responsible Ministries. All 
universities on the occupied territories in August 2014 received an order from the 
Ministry not to start the educational process. While this decision was ignored by the 
administration that sided with the pro-Russian self-proclaimed authority, the coming 
months of Autumn 2014 were determining the future of these universities as a whole. 
The initiative groups contacted the Ministries responsible for coordination of these 
universities. As the government, itself was not prepared to deal with such a form of 
crisis, and there was no national evacuation plan to follow, the initial reaction of the 
Ministries was delayed and inconsistent. Lack of response from the Ukrainian 
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authorities propelled universities to facilitate the process. In line with a strong 
sentiment regarding inaction of the authorities, the interviewees expressed the 
following thoughts: 
 
There were no clear plans for the transfer of the university. In order for the letter 
[order on displacement] to appear, it was necessary for the students to be in Kyiv and 
threaten to protest against the inaction of the Ministry of Education. The state 
withdrew from this process and presented this initiative to a group of people to 
engage in the evacuation process on their own (Top management, DonNU, 
16/04/2018).  
 
In the Ministry tried to move away from the topic of the universities in crisis, because 
this is an unpleasant topic, and because something needs to be done. But this kind of 
noise in the media made them accelerate their actions (Student representative, 
DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
There was no state policy that would be clear and understandable. It was necessary to 
pursue a specific policy concerning the displacement of universities in advance, and 
they [Ministry] overslept this moment. Our past evacuation experience and the 
European experience of displaced universities should have used to build on that 
experience and create some kind of mechanism or algorithms that would pull us out 
of the crisis in the summer (Director of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
In some universities, the leadership organized academic councils before negotiating 
with the Ministry, so as to intensive the decision-making process and prepare a plan 
that would be put forward for Ministry’s approval later. In fact, in East-Ukrainian V. 
Dahl EUNU, the evacuation of the institution occurred prior to the official statement 
from the Ministry.  
 
At the end of August 2014, we had an academic council. Since the Ministry could not 
say anything, we agreed to conduct educational process in distance mode and move 
the university administration to Severodonetsk. Then we wrote several appeals to the 
Minister, who supported our proposal to some extent and an order was issued to 
transfer the University officially to Severodonetsk (Top management, V. Dahl EUNU, 
18/04/2018).  
 
After the first few universities were successfully evacuated (i.e., DonNU and V. Dahl 
EUNU) a model was created according to which other universities’ displacement was 
conducted. The scheme was borrowed by other Ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Agrarian Policy who had a few universities under 
subordination.    
 
On October 20, 2014, we conducted a meeting in Kyiv with the Ministry of Agrarian 
Policy to negotiate the displacement university to a safe area in Kharkiv, were we 
could guarantee a conducive environment for students and teachers to continue their 
work. We created a working group that worked around the clock. Only three people 
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started restoring initially on restoring the educational process (Top management, 
LNU, 17/04/2018).  
 
After finalizing the process of displacement, universities at a new location had to 
respond to a number of organizational and legislative issues. Before running the 
educational process, universities needed to create new documentation, make changes 
to the university legislation, register their location, open accounts at a State’s 
Treasury and more. Since the Ministry blocked the flow of salaries and stipends 
during the illegal capture of the universities, most of the faculty and students have 
been deprived of a financial support from two to three months or even up to half a 
year.  
 
During the process of displacement, we did not receive salary for 2-3 months. Same 
thing happened with the students, they did not get scholarships. We didn’t have 
money to build the university in the new conditions. Only for the New Year we were 
paid wages, but summer and part of autumn wages were not refunded to us (Dean, 
DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
It was just a catastrophe. We told people to come to a new location, but they did not 
get paid their salaries for so many months. We were not paid, because the official date 
set by the Ministry was November 3. We could not receive salary in October, for 
example, because this it was considered a non-working month. Although everything 
was done in October (Top management, DonNTU, 20/04/2018).  
 
Although, the situation was not equal across all five displaced universities. An 
interviewee from eastern-Ukrainian V. Dahl EUNU reported no major delays:  
 
In our university, there were no problems with the delay of the scholarship for our 
students or salary for the faculty. On September 1, everything was paid and we also 
received refunds for the holiday months of summer. Delay in paying was only for half 
a month or a month (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
In addition to personal financial struggles that made it challenging for people to 
execute their working tasks, some universities were sued for not returning pre-war 
debts or expenses that have been made by the twin universities on the occupied 
territory. As one interviewee stated:   
 
We had to repay all pre-war debts to Naftogaz of Ukraine, to easing companies, to 
security firms. We were blamed for a debt of 6 million dollars and the Ukrainian 
courts have ordered us to pay them. But we do not have many self-paying students 
and we do not conduct any corporate activity to repay it all. In Lugansk, we had a 
huge farm and a huge amount of land that was being rented. Now it's hard to buy 
something for the university and we are even grateful for the printing paper (Top 




Dealing with financial constraints affected the process of retrieving staff and 
students. In some occasions, there were no more than five people to facilitate the 
organizational process. The universities started forming lists to assess prior students 
and staff enrollment. Communicating the decision on universities’ displacement and 
their locations were the key tasks for the crisis management teams for the next few 
months. 
5.2.6. Crisis communication (response phase) 
 
As mentioned previously, the displaced universities and the government were 
unprepared to deal with the consequences of the armed conflict, hence, no crisis 
communication plan was initiated.  
 
The biggest problem is the lack of any systematic plan regarding communication. 
Some universities reaction was faster, others more delayed, because some 
universities were displaced in August and some in December. There was no proper 
communication channel and the lack of clear announcements from university leaders 
before and in the process of displacement (Student representative, V. Dahl EUNU, 
18/04/2018).  
 
The most unfortunate situation happened in July, no one could understand what to 
do with the university students. From August to October, I had two phones and I 
received 3800 calls. Every week I wrote operative information from where the person 
called me. What he is looking for and who he is looking for. I established connection 
with some university rectors and passed on the information to them (Top 
management, LNAU, 17/04/2018). 
 
Somewhat delayed and unsystematic flow of information is tied to countless factors 
taking place simultaneously - unpreparedness and lack of available plans, self-
removal of administrators and managers from the coordinating responsibilities, lack 
of trained staff and faculty to handle the communication process, poor guidance by 
the government, and wrong assumptions that the university targeted audiences were 
informed by the media and other social networks.  
 
Informing of students was conducted in very strange way. On a page in VKontakte 
(Russian social network) some faculty posted that the university is being displaced. 
This information has not been confirmed by anyone, nobody was informed officially. 
In fact, it was not clear what was happening, the university was moving to 
Severodonetsk but we were told that we will study remotely (Student representative, 
V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
Crisis notification system could have been better. I learned the information about the 
displacement from my supervisor, but maybe someone did not receive such 
information. There was no cohesive communication. Word of mouth played a bigger 





Since evacuation process was poorly communicated and valid information was not 
reaching people quickly enough, some universities’ targeted audiences 
disenfranchised, and went to study or work elsewhere. The inconsistent information 
received by the students and staff only increased anxiety and undermined credibility 
of the institutions.  
 
Our university lost a lot of specialists, professors and teaching staff, and students who 
left because they didn’t know what to expect (Student representative, DonNTU, 
20/04/2018). 
 
All things considered, basic communication channels were gradually installed. Since 
targeted audiences differ in terms of their expertise, cultural norms, educational 
level, age, and background experience, specific messages needed to be designed to 
reach and resonate with each of these groups. Universities prioritized the largest 
audiences first (e.g. students) and smallest - last (e.g. partners, donors). Initially, the 
communication of students was unorganized and sporadic, some contacted them via 
personal contact or through social networks, but mostly the informing of students 
happened via phone mode.  
 
In the phone mode, we called each student. The government besides providing a 
registration form on the website for those who wanted to move to Vinnytsia, provided 
nothing (Director of institute, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
In August, we began to ask what to do and where to go, but no one knew and did not 
understand what was happening. In September, a registration was opened so that 
people could register and confirm the move to Vinnitsa. Students say they waited for 
three months to be contacted and told what to do. Instructors and other staff were 
responsible for contacting the students to find out if they were coming back (Student 
representative, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
The students didn’t have the information where the displaced university was located, 
we tried to inform students in September that the university is functioning in 
Severodonetsk. The students were informed by the heads of departments, group 
monitors. We communicated the information every possible way, through phones, 
emails... We collected information about the location of students and possible ways to 
communicate with them too (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).   
 
Although, some universities who were able to retrieve their website domains from the 
occupied territories posted information on the universities’ websites about their 
displacement. For example, the faculty interviewees from Donetsk National Technical 
University stated that most of the employees in addition to being informed 
personally, received official confirmation on the displacement via the University’s 
website. Some students remember reading the information in the news. Many media 
outlets cooperated with universities and became active in informing targeted 




There was a campaign organized by students and then supported by media: “Save 
Alma Mater”- this initiative was organized to help the university find the campus they 
could be displaced to (Director of Institute, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
Due to close cooperation with Kharkiv media information about the new location of 
the university began to spread throughout Ukraine and abroad (Top management, 
LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
Some universities in crisis were aided by an additional and effective communication 
channel. Exiled regional administration structures, such as the Department of 
Education and Science of Luhansk region enabled a toll-free hotline for targeted 
university audiences containing operative information regarding the status of 
Luhansk and Donetsk displaced Universities. One such former Department employee 
who now occupies a top management post at the Luhansk National Agrarian 
University, explained how she promoted a facilitation of a national hotline:  
 
When I worked in Lugansk, I was in charge of all higher institutions and universities, 
then I came here to Kharkov and received information from my leadership, which also 
was hiding somewhere in the Luhansk region. I was instructed to collect information 
about the universities and coordinate their displacement.  We set up two hot-lines for 
students from the occupied regions. I worked with three ministries because each 
university was subordinate to its own ministry. Most of the calls came from students 
of the agricultural university because they were transferred later. Due to the lack of 
electricity and active hostilities in the East, students and teachers, and parents were in 
the most difficult psychological state of confusion. Thus, they needed the safest and 
the most reliable information (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
Numerous circumstances impeded crisis communication in the most unpredictable 
ways. Interviewees reports having difficulty informing students and staff, and 
coordinating their actions with their superiors initially due to problems with 
electricity, transportation and mobile connection.  
 
The rector called from Kyiv and said that we needed to prepare a letter, we sent it 
until the light was cut off, there was no possibility to connect via the Internet, no 
mobile communication and no communication channels worked in Luhansk (Dean, V. 
Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
It was more challenging to organize official communication in cases where the 
university leadership supported the pro-Russian authority, since in these universities 
most of the staff and students supported and respected the decisions of the 
leadership. For example, at Donbass Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture 
stated that they communicated the information about displacement in secret: 
 
We found out that we will move a little before December 1, I came to work and 
notified the students who I thought in person. We were the last university that got 
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displaced. The difficulty was that many universities were transferred with their rector, 
our case was different. Therefore, we could not officially inform people and we did 
everything in secret. We relied on our own contacts and informed students via 
personal encounters (Top management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018).  
 
Additionally, the process of communication was delayed and challenged by the 
universities that remained on the occupied territories.  Interviewees mentioned being 
exposed to instances of propaganda, false claims, miscommunication, distortion of 
information, sabotage of displacement by the faculty from the separatist territories. 
As a result of many actions taken by the initiative crisis management groups were 
hindered by the fallible information provided to the students. In some instances, the 
universities who have not stopped their operation in Donetsk and Luhansk were 
made to believe that the legitimate university stayed and was not displaced anywhere.  
 
I went to Lugansk to collect my documents. They started telling me that the university 
in Severodonetsk is a false university, that the legitimate university works in Lugansk 
and was never transferred. It was a tense situation when everyone was divided, we did 
not understand the situation, many conflicts began arising on a personal level with 
friends and colleagues (Assistant staff, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
The university faculty who stayed in Donetsk called us before the beginning of the 
educational process to let us know that the displacement of the University is a fake 
(Student representative, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
Being stormed by propaganda and allegations, the universities were compelled to 
inform students the relocation of their institutions and dismiss and refute the invalid 
information. To defend their legitimacy and establish credibility and trust with their 
target audiences, universities started clarifying what displacement meant legally.  
 
When we contacted students, we tried to be quite effective, but also tolerant and 
correct, paying more attention not to politics, but to what kind of institution remained 
on the occupied territory, what kind of diploma students will receive. We needed to be 
very tolerant in order not to provoke conflicts, because we knew that credibility of our 
University was at stake (Assistant staff, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
For displaced universities the primary audiences, like students, staff and faculty, was 
prioritized in the communication process. Albeit the communication attempts were 
frequently undermined as a result of subversive actions undertaken by the pro-
Russian universities, and many students became hostages of uninformed illusive 
situations.  
5.3.7. Role of government in crisis management (response phase) 
 
The government as whole was struck by the conflict in the East, and failed to prepare 
for and prevent crisis from happening. As the anti-terrorist actions commenced in the 
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East, the government’s emergency funding was diverted to this cause. The 
universities that required urgent financial, logistical and technological support were 
deprioritized and put on hold. The Ukrainian government that has been frequently 
marked by corruption, inept governance and limited human and fiscal resources 
failed to adequately plan and respond timely to the university crisis in eastern 
Ukraine. As a former employee of Department of Education and Science under the 
Ministry of Education of Ukraine remarked: 
 
The Ministry should have summoned an interdepartmental commission that would 
have constructed an evacuation plan for universities from Donbass at the state level. 
They should have notified the universities of the follow-up actions not in October or 
August, but in May. We were all helpless, all Ministries did not know what to do and 
our University mentality was also to sit and wait for a top-down instruction. Nobody 
wanted to make any decisions (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018).  
 
One interviewee humored that the foreign governments took action to protect their 
citizens studying in Ukraine before the Ukrainian state realized that there was a 
problem that needed an initiating response.  
 
Embassies of the countries representing our [foreign] students were very disturbed 
and tried to retract their citizens to avoid possible risks. The university could and 
responded to these letters and instructions as a public institution after letters from 
the Ministry came to release international students and finalize their examination in 
advance (Dean, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
Before the displacement of universities, leadership and faculty attempted to 
communicate their constant exposure to considerable threats and life-endangering 
situations. Their complaints and concerns were often ignored or layed off. In some 
extreme cases, during shelling and capture of infrastructure the universities had 
communication breakdowns due to power cutoffs and direct assaults.  
 
The Ministry did not understand the difficulty of the situation and failed to establish 
hotlines. They did not understand that there was no connection in Luhansk and that 
the students did not understand where to go. I called the Ministry of Education and 
told them that only “Kyivstar” [sim provider] can reach Luhansk, thus they need to 
urgently enter the hotline with this provider. They laughed at me and told me to file 
my complaint via fax. It was absolutely unprofessional. Many of those people have 
already been dismissed. But I found support in the media and reported the 
importance of this issue and then the Ministry introduced the hotline, because I made 
this problem public (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018). 
 
Combination of communication breakdowns, limited personnel and financial 
resources and over regulated bureaucratic procedures made the Ministry inflexible, 
insensitive and unable to perceive the risks the university employees were exposed 
while performing their duties. Here is an example of a faculty interviewee describing 




According to the Ministry the conditions for admissions campaign could not be 
violated and we were required to start the process on July 12. We appealed to the 
Ministry that we were threatened by armed people who demanded that we accepted 
the documents from July 1. The Ministries reiterated their position, that we could not 
violate the current legislation, so we had to start from July 12. The Ministry did not 
understand the seriousness of the situation and did not make any clear decisions. The 
institution that was supposed to be strong - was not strong at all (Dean, V. Dahl 
EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
Everything was moving very slowly. It was necessary to change the accreditation to a 
new address. Therefore, we needed to make an amendment to the statute of our 
university and send it to the Ministry for signing. They have been signing it for 1 year 
and 8 months! For the Ministry, such procedures are a routine, but for us it was 
urgent, because without a new accreditation, we could not receive foreign investment. 
The Ministry really could not perceive the risks it was putting us in (Top 
management, DonNACEA, 19/04/2018).   
 
Due to high degree of dependence on the state of the public higher education 
institutions in Ukraine, universities expected crisis management efforts to be 
coordinated by, agreed with and initiated by the state. The first such instructions 
appeared in late August 2014, when the decision has been made to halt the start of 
the academic year for institutions located in the occupied region. When the first 
displacement of universities took place, a resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers was 
passed to transfer all organizations and state enterprises to safe territory. 
 
Since the displacement was a new phenomenon in the Ukrainian independent 
history, legal framework needed to be crafted. To ensure operation of the displaced 
universities, numerous legislative changes were required, starting from the 
displacement procedure itself. Meanwhile the displacement issue was being 
considered, the Ministry of Education and Science implemented two important yet 
conflicting decisions that managed to respond to the universities in crisis, and later 
harmed them. One of such decisions was an order issued by the Ministry on August 
31, 2014 that allowed students from the occupied territories to temporarily enroll in 
other conflict-free Ukrainian universities. It allowed students to transfer, while 
preserving their study level, specialty, and a state stipend. As the students began 
enrolling, many problems appeared: students struggled to receive accommodation, 
study programs differed in content, accepting universities were ill-informed, thus, 
exhibited resistance. And since there was a limitation of student places at each 
university, displaced students had to undergo rounds of refusals.  
 
Another crucial decision ordered by the government was a ban for public 
organizations to use public spending for purchasing any facility, such as office 
supplies. The ban was initiated to prevent the outflow of public money, meanwhile 
the displacement issue has been negotiated. Alas, the repeal of the ban was delayed 
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and the displaced universities could not purchase any supplies needed for creating a 
working environment and educational activities in a new place after displacement.  
 
They could not buy anything, because the state decree came out, stating that due to 
war in the East, there is a saving of budgetary funds and all universities, depending on 
the situation, must not purchase material means, like furniture (Dean, DonNU, 
16/04/2018). 
 
Aside from finding a location for displacement and making infrastructure conducive 
for education process, the institutions required legislative support regarding a study 
process, namely retrieval of students, admissions of new entrants, student 
accommodation, accreditation procedures and other domestic issues. As countless 
interviewees stated, one of the most important legislations that allowed universities 
to survive was a permission to enroll first year students without a national 
examination certificate.  Since many displaced students fled their regions without any 
documents, having no opportunity to prepare and take the national exams, based on 
this Ministry order such students could enroll at displaced universities based on their 
school certificates and internal university exams. 
 
The violent conflict developed with great speed, making people evacuate in the times 
least expected. As the armed men captured the university’s infrastructure, thousands 
of students that managed to flee the occupied territories often had difficulty 
retrieving their belongings and study documents. When this information was 
communicated to the Ministry, after some negotiations with the universities, certain 
documents, as little as a passport or other ID and a confirmation11 from the Ministry 
that a student was enrolled in the past, allowed students to be re-established at same 
level of study. 
 
To resolve the accommodation problem, which has been not been fully resolved till 
today, the Ministry issued a recommendation that 10% of total fund of places in state 
dormitories should be allocated to displaced students, allowing them to reside in 
these locations free of charge. The interviewees across all institutions point out that 
the recommendation is not a law that is ‘set in stone,’ there is no punishment for 
failure to comply with the recommendation. And so many students in most of cases 
are required to pay for their accommodation.  
 
The letter has a recommendatory form. Well, you understand the difference between a 
recommendation and some kind of contractual relationship. It was not a formalized 
process with some agreement that obliges to assist the displaced individuals. Instead, 
                                                 
11 EDEBO (Unified State Electronic Education Database) - collects documents and information about 
educational institutions in Ukraine. The database serves as a tool for preservation, protection and 
verification of personal data, in accordance with the requirements of the current legislation. Study 
documents of internally displaced students were retrieved from this platform and were used to renew 




the letter had an advisory tone. And when we began to accommodate our students, it 
turned out that in reality it was 10%, but, for example, 3% or no places at all that were 
allocated for internally displaced students (Director of center, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
Most of the displaced universities were unable to retrieve most of their infrastructure, 
and currently are using much smaller rented or borrowed property, such facility 
conditions would have been deemed inappropriate for educational process and would 
deprive any institutions of public funding.  However, in the conditions of war the 
Ministry passed a Law 4718 exempted the displaced universities from any licensing 
and accreditation procedures until the conflict in the East has been resolved. 
 
Licenses and accreditation certificates of the temporarily displaced higher educational 
establishments for their implementation of educational activities in the field of higher 
education continue to operate until the return of the temporarily occupied territory to 
the general jurisdiction of Ukraine or [until] the date of completion of the 
antiterrorist operation (Verkhovna Rada, Law №4718, 2016). 
 
Most of the above-mention initiatives had not been established for a significant time, 
as everyone hoped that universities will be returned to their territories in a matter of 
few months. When it became clear that the conflict in the East is attributing features 
of a frozen conflict, the leadership of the displaced universities decided to unite their 
efforts in demanding more active measures by the government. As a result, a Council 
of Rectors of Displaced Universities was established on January 26, 2016.  
 
Only a after the transfer the rectors decided to meet in Kiev and understand what they 
need to do and then it was decided to establish a Council of Rectors of Displaced 
Universities. There was no cohesion between rectors, everyone shouted their 
problems. The process of uniting the efforts of displaced universities took a year to 
implement (Top management, LNAU, 17/04/2018). 
 
We appealed to the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) and Lilia Grinevich 
(Minister of Education) to host a round table with rectors of displaced universities. It 
was voiced that universities financial support and organizational support. A lot 
needed to be done at the legislative level. The first year of functioning of displaced 
universities was very complicated, many aspects were not regulated by law, and the 
regulatory authorities demanded from us, at the same time, that we must comply with 
the legislation. Then, after a year, the council of rectors was already organized and it 
has taken actions to initiate the adoption of a law that regulated the activities of the 
displaced universities and in accordance with this law, it was already possible to act 
most systematically and together (Top management, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018).  
 
The Council is an advisory body of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. 
The Council was created to establish better communication between displaced 
universities and the Ministry, and lobby urgent issues faced by the universities. Due 
to their strong lobby a number of laws were amended and created more favorable 
conditions for these institutions. For example, the Council of Rectors helped to 
  
88 
implement the Law #4718 “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding 
the Activities of Higher Educational Institutions, Scientific Institutions Displaced 
From Occupied Territories…”, which: (1) legally defines the displaced institutions; (2) 
regulates the validity of accreditation certificates; (3) sets the norms of the number of 
persons studying on one position of research and teaching faculty as coefficient of 
0.8. The Law #6116 “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education” 
“on ensuring the right to higher education of persons whose place of residence is the 
temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine””, which: (1) allows students from occupied 
territories to enroll in higher education institutions from specific regions of Ukraine 
(other than displaced institutions) based on the internal entrance examination; (2) 
provides study of Ukrainian language by persons whose place of residence is the 
temporarily occupied territory and who are admitted to study at one of the higher 
educational establishments located in the territories. 
 
While these legislations have improved the conditions of functioning for the 
displaced universities, allowing them to benefit from the state allocation of funds, the 
money has not been sufficient to cover the major losses. The conditions under which 
these universities operate have only deteriorated after their relocation, as each of the 
institutions require much greater financial support to rebuild the physical 
infrastructure and restore their delivery capacity. An inadequate and uneven funding 
of a struggling higher education sector does not permit the displaced institutions to 
function fully, and provide its academics and students with appropriate facilities for 
teaching and research. The interviewees confirmed a deteriorating financial situation 
at displaced universities by describing the following:  
 
I remind once again and the Ministry has pulled back from the solution of the 
problem of displaced universities and we have not received support here. Initially, we 
complained, wrote letters to the Ministry, because there was not enough money to 
organized educational activities (Director of institute, DonNU, 16/04/2018).  
 
The ministry did not allocate any money to maintain and improve the state of 
dormitories (Top management, V. Dahl EUNU, 18/04/2018). 
 
The Ministry did not give out a “penny” for our displacement. There was no water for 
several months in Pokrovsk and the first salary we received only on December 28 
(Top management, DonNTU, 20/04/2018).  
 
On balance, some interviewees mentioned the availability of financial assistance from 
the government. A monthly social stipend was provided in a form of 442 UAH (~ 15 
EUR) to all internally displaced persons, which is approximately 10% of an average 
month salary in Ukraine. However, many problems existed in the way of obtaining a 
social support package from the state, which a number of interviewees regard as 




As displaced persons, we are required to be checked once every six months, that we 
reside where we have registered, to receive the stipend.  The inspectors come to your 
home without a notification. Sometimes they come during the working hours, when 
all staff and students are at the university. We have a lot of problems with that 
(Executive staff, DonNU, 16/04/2018). 
 
The interviewees mentioned that in the initial stages of transfer, the infrastructural 
needs and purchases were crucial for their survival, therefore, some universities tried 



































Chapter VI - Conclusions 
6.1. Summary of major findings  
 
The Ukrainian higher education in the time of political and economic tensions and a 
full-fledged war in the Donbass region has suffered inevitable losses. The direct 
consequence of hostilities taking place in the East resulted in the evacuation of 18 
public and two private universities, and 11 research institutes from the rebel-held 
territories. Additionally, some 40 thousand students and over 3 thousand of research 
and teaching faculty fled the occupied territories, adding to more than one million 
internally displaced persons around the country. Limited and non-empirical 
information on the experience of universities in crisis in Ukraine and worldwide, 
inspired this research. The study investigated the impact of conflict on higher 
education in Ukraine and identified crisis management tools that allowed displaced 
universities to survive and respond to the ongoing crisis. The study answered two 
primary research questions. A summary of the discussion is presented as follows:  
 
❖ What have been the impacts of the armed conflict on the displaced Ukrainian 
HEIs? 
 
The findings of the study about the first question revealed that five displaced 
universities that participated in this study were impacted by the armed conflict in the 
following areas: human resources, infrastructure, operations, and legitimacy. 
Concerning human resources, the sampled universities emphasized on the problem 
of staff and student retention, due to the unfavorable living and working conditions. 
On average the universities were able to retain less than two-thirds of academic staff 
and students. The regular propaganda, intimidation and physical assaults by the pro-
Russian military groups have led to the physical and psychological distress of 
students and employees. The poor social conditions and low financial support of the 
internally displaced students and employees have led many to pursue opportunities 
in other cities of Ukraine or abroad.  
 
The conflict had a crucial impact on the infrastructure of the displaced universities. 
The armed rebels have seized university campuses, dormitories, sports halls and 
used them for strategic military or personal purposes. All infrastructure, including 
educational and research facility, has remained on the occupied territory and the 
displaced universities were unable to retrieve it. Some universities evacuated to 
branch campuses or carried out their educational activities using the infrastructure 
of other universities.  Those universities who had no option were offered to rent 
buildings that had no educational and research infrastructure. The main challenges 
pertaining to infrastructure were lack of adequate facilities essential for academic 
functions, such as the library, information and computer technology, laboratories, 
sports facilities, dormitories, lecture halls and other. Additionally, during the 
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transition period, the universities were in critical need of essential office and 
material supplies, necessary for routine operation.  
 
The other area impacted by the conflict is related to vital operations of the displaced 
universities.  The conflict delayed the start of the educational process by few months 
and interrupted the routine university operations, such as student recruitment, 
teaching and learning and research activities. The active use of distance education 
and online learning tools of some universities before the conflict enabled more 
efficient and less disruptive transition and allowed these institutions to retrieve 
educational material to ensure quicker academic continuity after displacement. Due 
to the critical shortage of teaching faculty, some universities established a “rotation 
mode of study” in which students were provided lectures and seminars for two weeks 
twice in an academic semester. As a consequence of a decreased number of staff and 
students, all five displaced universities underwent a reorganization of institutional 
structures, by revising educational structures and re-allocating staff. The population 
displacement and humanitarian crisis created a severe vacuum of administrative and 
managerial knowledge and experience, to which the displaced universities responded 
by promoting less knowledgeable and experienced personnel. Such practices also 
made it possible for young staff to fill in those positions, which allowed for novelty 
and unconventional ideas to come forward, in contrast to the previously dominant 
Soviet style of administration of the academic organizations.  
 
The last area analyzed in this study is the legitimacy of the public displaced 
universities. The findings indicate the conflict negatively impacted the universities’ 
enrollment, quality of applicants, partnerships opportunities, and created 
imbalanced competition. Interviewees also stated the universities are subject to 
social stigma associated with concerns for stability and security, quality, and 
opportunities at displaced universities. Finally, the conflict has displaced universities 
from their local communities into a new environment, to which the universities had 
to adapt. The interviewees reported the detachment from the home base and the 
community they used to serve, led to the assimilation process, causing universities to 
gradually lose their regional significance and the function they carried out on the 
former territories. In turn, it could pose challenges for the reintegration of these 
institutions to their home territories in the future.  
 
❖ Which crisis management mechanisms are being deployed by the Ukrainian 
universities to cope with the crisis? 
 
Answering the second research question, the study revealed the limitations and 
effective crisis management mechanisms utilized in the case universities. All case 
universities reported unavailability of crisis planning and prevention efforts. The 
universities were evacuated in the Second World War; however, the evacuations were 
not recorded, which made it impossible for universities to extract any experience for 
future learning. The case universities had no available crisis management plans to 
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facilitate the response efforts, resulting in inconsistent, unsystematic, uncoordinated 
and ambiguous actions taken by the different stakeholder groups. The findings also 
revealed the absence of a national evacuation plan and negligence by the Ukrainian 
government to prioritize security of universities and take preventive actions.  
 
The efforts of the universities to respond to the crisis were subverted by the 
illegitimate self-proclaimed pro-Russian authorities, who occupied the national 
security and governing structures, which effectively eliminated any opportunity for 
the universities in crisis to acquire assistance. The study also found that most of the 
university leadership and management sided with the pro-Russian authority and it, 
sabotaged the evacuation efforts by those who acted in disagreement. Findings 
revealed that the pro-Russian position of the top leadership delayed the process of 
evacuation and decreased the number of employees and students the case 
universities were able to retain. Additionally, the respondents reported that during 
the time of crisis, many administrators and managers self-removed themselves from 
their positions and transferred the responsibilities to less experienced staff. On the 
other hand, the study showed the crisis management response at the case 
universities mainly comprised of the establishment of the informal crisis 
management teams, the successive decision-making by the universities and the 
government, enactment of crisis communication and the coming-in of humanitarian 
assistance. According to the findings, the self-organized crisis management teams 
negotiated with the government the displacement of universities and responded to 
numerous legislative and organizational challenges in the process, the most 
significant of which was retention of staff and students. The case universities also 
reported the lack of a clear and consistent crisis communication plan. Some of the 
frequently used communication mechanisms to coordinate the transfer of staff and 
students were the establishment of the national online registration forms and toll-
free hotlines. Lastly, the displaced universities reported the effectiveness of informal 
communication channels, such as social media and news outlets in coordinating the 
actions and informing the target university audiences.  
6.2. Concluding remarks 
 
The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine affected the core missions and operations of 
the higher education institutions. The conflict-affected universities suffered 
significant loss of human resources, destruction of infrastructure, disruption of daily 
activities, and loss of legitimacy and reputation. While in many ways these challenges 
emerged as a result of the conflict, they were also aggravated by the lack of planning 
and prevention efforts of the government and the higher education institutions 
themselves.  
 
Although the literature on crisis management emphasizes the need for crisis 
planning and prevention, crisis response, crisis learning, and recovery, to adequately 
respond to the crisis, the study concluded that the crisis management activities were 
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not prioritized appropriately at the displaced universities and by the Ukrainian 
government. Limited information on emergency planning and prevention and a lack 
of a written emergency policy led to poor crisis management procedures and 
uncoordinated response of the displaced universities (Mitroff, 2006). This, in turn, 
caused massive displacement of staff and faculty, drained the institutional resource 
capacity, deterred the education and research processes, and negatively impacted the 
quality of higher education.  
 
While the case universities emphasized on their role to serve, protect and respond to 
the needs of the faculty, students and the university community, there was a 
significant lack of awareness how to protect these groups. The universities were 
unable to effectively communicate the information regarding the status of the 
displaced institutions and how the needs of the target audiences were addressed. On 
the other hand, the study concluded the importance of informal communication 
channels in informing the academic groups about the crisis. The use of informal 
communication channels enabled the students and faculty to exchange information 
quicker when official communication channels were unavailable or unsecured. The 
importance of information communication channels is consistent with the 
arguments noted by Ramadan (2017) and Houston (2017).  
 
The crisis response in the time of conflict has been carried out by the self-organized 
crisis management teams, consisting of the university leadership, faculty, and/or 
students, who undertook the responsibility as a temporary decision-making body in 
the time of crisis. The emergence of such initiative groups emphasizes the 
importance and ability of the temporarily empowered administrators, faculty and 
students to mobilize themselves in a short time and cause effective change. However, 
lack of clearly assigned roles and responsibilities often led to miscommunication and 
unsystematic actions by the team members. The self-appointed crisis management 
teams have not been trained in crisis management response. Thus, the lack of 
knowledge, competence and prior experience constrained the speed of response and 
the quality of decision-making. Nevertheless, the proactiveness of these groups 
proved that the individuals when empowered could take initiatives, create activities 
and interventions that contribute to the crisis management effort.  
 
However, many processes crisis responses were also performed by single individuals, 
and not as part of the group activities. The persons without any coordination in 
crucial times took decisive action, such as to demand the government to evacuate the 
universities, to launch the toll-free hotlines, to find safe ways to ensure continuity of 
the recruitment process or to even initiate the distance learning as a temporary study 
mode during the time of crisis. The individual proactive partly appeared as a lack of 
strong leadership. Therefore, the role of leadership in the crisis management 
response should be reinforced (Jenkins, 2008; Zdziarski et al., 2007; Seo et al., 




The study also revealed good practices that determined the ability of some displaced 
universities to mitigate the consequences of the conflict on the displaced universities.  
Diverse practices have been observed among the interviewees of the displaced 
universities, which depended on the conditions and resources available to them. The 
study revealed that ability of universities to preserve important documentation, 
operational and academic information during a crisis is determined by the extent to 
which the universities integrated the use of the information and communication 
platforms in their day-to-day operations before evacuation. The use of distance 
education and online learning tools by the faculty and staff was equally crucial due to 
the shortage of physical resources that were crucial for launching the study process. 
Therefore, the institutional use of the ICT could be considered an alternative 
mechanism of providing education and training, conducting internal 
communication, and storing data.  Another useful strategy identified by a case 
university was the establishment of the university consortiums and sharing of the 
library, academic and laboratory infrastructure. In this regard, the higher education 
institution was able to compensate for the loss of infrastructure necessary to carry 
out its primary functions, such as teaching, learning, and research. Therefore, 
analyzing the infrastructural deficit of the higher education institutions in crisis is 
very important.  
 
A consequence of conflict that is often left unaddressed during the crisis is a 
psychological trauma of students and faculty. At one case university, however, a 
social rehabilitation center has been created to address the personal traumas and 
help social adaptation of the victims of the conflict. Such practices as this need to be 
supported by the national government (e.g., through national health systems) and 
addressed in the general framework of crisis response. Psychological and physical 
traumas experienced by the students and faculty also require diligent efforts to 
address these issues on campus. Additionally, higher education institutions that 
underwent a traumatic experience need significant time to recover from the 
experience and return to normal operations. A comprehensive crisis management 
approach also needs to adequately address psychological traumas of people and 
organizations affected by any crisis.  
 
It is argued that the role of the state in managing of crisis should be that of a 
supervisor, external management force, that has the power to reorganize, merge or 
liquidate universities if they are struggling to survive on scarce resources (Bobyleva 
and Sidorova, 2015). During any crisis, it is vital for governments to use their 
resources strategically, especially at the time of an armed conflict or war.  
 
The crisis management advisory structures were created in the absence of a legal 
framework that could address the issues of the displaced universities. The 
Coordinating Center for Displaced Universities enabled institutions to unite the 
efforts of the displaced universities to discuss common issues. The Center supported 
the development of the displaced universities by providing them with funding 
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opportunities and conducting an assessment of their needs. However, its lack of 
decision-making power limited the extent to which the Center could influence the 
implementation of critical legal decisions by the Ministry regarding the operation of 
these institutions. Also, to coordinate the activities of the displaced universities the 
Ministry of Education and Science has approved the establishment of the Council of 
Rectors of Displaced Universities. The Council has successfully lobbied the laws, 
which provided certain privileges for the students and faculty of the displaced 
universities. However, these laws still fail to address the issue of quality of these 
universities and clarify the mechanism for the provision of the state assistance about 
educational and research infrastructure of these institutions. Despite the limitations 
mentioned above, the practice of establishing national-level intermediary units can 
be seen as a useful approach in coordinating and supporting higher education 
institutions to cope with different types of crisis. This approach may also be useful in 
higher education systems characterized by tight government control and those that 
grant considerable autonomy to higher education institutions.  
 
The conflict also created a broader concern of the university reintegration to its home 
territories. Some institutions that were relocated to their affiliates within the same 
area continue serving the community needs and fulfilling their strategic goals. 
However, for those institutions that have been displaced to more distant territories, 
the integration into a new context and social and cultural environment created many 
challenges. In a few years, the institutions that were detached from their community 
risk losing their regional identity and assimilating due to the enrollment of mainly 
local students. The absence of the displaced students from these universities will 
create a problem for the preservation of their regional self-determination.  
6.3. Implications for policy and practice 
 
Proper and adequate support of higher education in conflict-affected can ensure 
sustainable development and recovery from the trauma of the conflict-torn higher 
education institutions. A strategic legislative, administrative, technical, and financial 
support at the national level has been undermined by the efforts to counter terrorist 
in the East of Ukraine.  
 
The higher education in the East was ignored by the government and the opportunity 
to streamline universities’ resources by merging and re-organizing some institutions 
overlooked. In regard to the role of government in mitigating and responding to the 
consequences of crisis, it is highly essential to understand the need for providing not 
only financial but all-rounded support, including technical and expert assistance, 
legislative support, coordination, providing protection, and support in recovery, and 
reintegration of the universities in crisis. The governments need to understand that 
the universities in crisis have special needs, in contrast to those operating in normal 
conditions, and need to work to address these needs actively. This may also involve 
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in some circumstance prioritizing the needs of higher education institutions affected 
by the crisis, for instance in allocating financial resources.  
 
Due to the lack of a national awareness about the consequences of conflict for higher 
education in Ukraine and the lack of appropriate response, the response to the crisis 
by the government was poorly facilitated. Therefore, the governments need to 
monitor the impacts of conflict on higher education institutions actively and collect 
sufficient and reliable data, based on the experience of the higher education 
institutions in crisis, and effectively seek evidence-based solutions to the crisis.  
 
Based on the informed analysis of problematic areas of the crisis-affected academic 
institutions and awareness about effective responses initiated, the state should create 
a national evacuation plan to prevent and respond to a variety of risks and crises in 
the future.  In addition to proactively planning the response to any emergency, the 
policy-makers should address all stages of crisis management, such as planning, 
prevention, response, recovery, and learning. The governments should prioritize the 
planning and prevention efforts to avoid or reduce the likelihood of risks. Besides, 
close and active cooperation between the authorities and key stakeholders is 
required, which should establish a shared understanding of a national evacuation 
plan, type of crises and the roles and responsibilities each party before, during and 
after the crisis.  
 
The authorities could consider mandating the integration of crisis management 
practices in all Ukrainian higher education institutions. Regular educational sessions 
about the campus security and prevention of crisis should be conducted to educate 
academic stakeholder groups about the potential threats and rehearse the action 
steps that can be initiated during a response to the crisis.   
 
Additionally, in the absence of an explicit state strategy for the further development 
of the crisis-affected higher education institutions, the displaced institutions, the 
reintegration strategy and a rescue plan of these educational centers and 
preservation of their identity should be given more priority by the government. 
Merging or liquidation of some struggling displaced institutions that cannot compete 
with local and other national higher educational establishments should be 
considered as an optimization and strengthening tool and a strategy to preserve the 
regional identities of these institutions by effectively combining their resources and 
missions.  
 
Higher education institutions should record the current experience of crisis to assess 
the damage and extract useful strategies to learn how to prevent future crises. The 
university leadership and faculty should generate an institutional crisis management 
plan. The institutions should re-assess the limitations and good practices about the 
crisis response in higher education and narrowly focus on the contingency planning. 
Crisis management plan enables higher education institutions to prevent or mitigate 
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the consequences of crisis regarding their essential functions and operations. The 
crisis planning and prevention efforts of the universities should be considered with 
great importance. The revision of crisis management efforts of the academic 
institutions should be a routine part of the university operations.  
 
The students and faculty should be educated about the crisis prevention in advance 
to avoid or reduce significant losses. Therefore, practitioners should deliver the 
training of staff to increase an effective response that is understood by the internal 
stakeholders. The universities should design a crisis management strategy that would 
be understandable and delivered to all target audiences. The institutions can harness 
a culture of crisis awareness, security, and prevention. Systematic work regarding 
leveraging this culture needs to be facilitated by the university administration.  
6.4. Suggestions for future research  
 
The application of the crisis management framework that has been previously 
utilized mainly through the business management perspective. The study of higher 
education institutions affected by conflict using the framework is, therefore, unique 
and presents significant contribution to the study of higher education. While 
borrowing the crisis management framework from the corporate management, the 
pointed out there is a need to always point out the difference of both sectors. 
Nonetheless, a more meaningful application of crisis management framework in 
higher education can be supported by other educational theories. For examples, 
further study can combine the crisis management framework with the institutional 
theory and look at the organizational culture impacted by crisis and mechanisms 
used in response to it. The resource-dependency theory can be also combined with 
the crisis management perspective by looking at what resources suffer from critical 
damage and what crisis mechanisms exist to answer this issue.  
 
The contribution of this study to higher education field is also in pointing out that 
the higher education institutions due to their open nature can be critically impacted 
by crisis, thus, there is a need to reflect about the methods to protect and safeguard 
it. In addition, the study showed that the higher education institutions that suffer 
from conflict have urgent needs and, therefore, should to be treated with more 
attention and priority. Further research can focus on finding practical tools and 
practices that can be incorporated by the higher education institutions to increase 
their security and protection.  
 
In addition, the study focused on examining the crisis impacts and management 
practices of the displaced higher education institutions only. The data used for the 
analysis and extraction of findings were collected based on the interviews with the 
top management, faculty, and students of the displaced universities. This thesis tries 
to provide a general understanding of the overall conflict ramifications for the higher 
education sector, and strategies that could be used by various stakeholders to cope 
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with such consequences. Therefore, future studies can focus on a more narrow 
approach, for example by investigating the impacts of the crisis on individual 
stakeholder groups, or by evaluating the crisis management mechanisms from the 
perspective of top management only. 
 
Future studies can also investigate the perspectives of other stakeholders that helped 
to coordinate and steer the management efforts of the universities, such as the 
Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. The coordination efforts administered 
by the Ministry can also provide an insightful glimpse into the role of the 
government in managing crisis of public higher education institutions.  It is also 
essential to analyze the legislative documents issued by the government to assist 
public higher education institutions in crisis, to understand their effectiveness and 
limitations in supporting the crisis-affected higher education system.  
 
Also, researchers need to investigate more empirically the effects of violent conflict 
and war on the functioning of higher education institutions. Due to limited attention 
to the problem, the area receives less priority at the national and international arena. 
While the crisis management analytical framework used in this study provides a 
functional characterization of crisis management mechanisms, no unified and 
comprehensive framework exists to study the impacts of armed conflicts and wars on 
the function of higher education. Therefore, future research can focus on 
systematizing the experiences of conflict-affected higher education systems and 
generating a roadmap of impacts of conflicts for higher education.   
 
Examining the reintegration problem of the higher education institutions evacuated 
due to a natural disaster or violent conflict can also offer useful insight for 
understanding the problem of war-torn higher education systems. The study 
revealed the great struggle of higher education institutions detached from the home 
communities in finding relevance and value in a new environment and fighting for 
preserving their identity. Also, the study hinted at the psychological trauma suffered 
by students and faculty as a result of the conflict and evacuation. Further studies can 
focus on investigating the effect of psychological traumas on the academic and 
professional performance of students and faculty, and how higher education 
institutions are responding to that problem. Lastly, it would be valuable to examine 
the humanitarian assistance for higher education during an armed conflict or any 
crisis. This could help provide a better understanding of the kind of help that is 
provided to these institutions and the areas that are being prioritized by the 
humanitarian organizations to aid higher education systems in crisis.     
6.5. Limitations of the study  
 
The main limitation of this study can be seen in the number of universities 
participating in this study. While five public displaced universities provide valuable 
insight regarding the state of higher education in crisis in Ukraine, this sample is too 
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small to be representative of other higher education systems affected by the similar 
emergency. Despite a limitation regarding generalizability, the research questions 
can guide similar study in different contexts on crisis-affected higher education 
systems.  
  
Another limitation of the study can be related to participants of the research and 
their views on the experience.  Although mainly expert interviewees and those 
involved in the process of managing the crisis were selected, the level of 
representation of top management representatives was different at five universities, 
in some cases higher than in others. Therefore, the views of particular target groups 
can be more dominant in certain sections than others’ views.  Finally, the process of 
making interpretations and analyzing the data is affected by the researcher’ 
subjective judgment. The researcher compiled the analytical framework based on her 
understanding of the literature on crisis management and the impacts of conflicts on 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide  
 
 
Interview questions for faculty: 
1. How and when did the crisis begin for the university? How did the conflict 
threaten the faculty? 
 
2. Describe how the process of displacement process took place. How did the 
evacuation of faculty take place? 
 
3. How was the decision made about the displacement of the university? How 
have the faculty been informed about the displacement of the university? 
 
4. How was the educational process organized in the period of university's 
destabilization? What were the challenges? How is the educational process 
organized today? 
 
5. How was the research activity organized in the period of university's 
destabilization? What were the challenges? How are research activities 
performed today? 
 
6. What infrastructural losses did your university experience as a result of the 
crisis What losses were the most acute for your university? What is the current 
state of infrastructure? 
 
7. How did the crisis affect the reputation of your university? With regard to 
what it is most noticeable? 
 
8. What was the main problem during in the process of displacement? What 
remains the main problem faced by the university? 
 
9. What worked well, what could have been avoided or done better in coping 
with the crisis at your university? 
 
 
Interview questions for students: 
 
1. How and when did the crisis begin for the university? How did the conflict 




2. Describe how the process of displacement process took place. How did the 
evacuation of students take place? 
 
3. How was the decision made about the displacement of the university? How 
have the student been informed about the displacement of the university? 
 
4. How was the educational process organized in the period of university's 
destabilization? What were the challenges? How is the educational process 
organized today? 
 
5. What infrastructural losses did your university experience as a result of the 
crisis What losses were the most acute for your university? What is the current 
state of infrastructure? 
 
6. What was the main problem during in the process of displacement? What 
remains the main problem faced by the university? 
 
7. What worked well, what could have been avoided or done better in coping 
with the crisis at your university? 
 
Interview questions for administration: 
1. How and when did the crisis begin for the university? How did the conflict 
threaten the students? 
 
2. Describe how the process of displacement process took place. How did the 
evacuation of students and faculty take place? 
 
3. How was the decision made about the displacement of the university? How 
have the student and faculty been informed about the displacement of the 
university? Who informed them? 
 
4. What challenges emerged in the process of evacuation of students and faculty? 
 
5. What infrastructural losses did your university experience as a result of the 
crisis? What losses were the most acute for your university? What is the 
current state of infrastructure? 
 
6. How did the crisis affect educational and scientific activities at your 
university? 
 
7. How did the conflict affect the administrative functions of the university?  
 
8. What was the main problem during in the process of displacement? What 
remains the main problem faced by the university? 
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9. What worked well, what could have been avoided or done better in coping 
with the crisis at your university? 
 
Appendix 2: List of all displaced universities 
 
1. Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade named after M. Tugan-
Baranovsky 
 
2. Vasul Stus Donetsk National University 
 
3. Donetsk National Technical University 
 
4. Donetsk Sergei Prokofiev State Music Academy 
 
5. Donetsk State University of Management 
 
6. Donetsk M. Gorky National Medical University 
 
7. Donetsk Regional Institute of Postgraduate Education 
 
8. Donetsk Law Institute of MIA of Ukraine 
 
9. Gorlovka Institute of Foreign Languages 
 
10. Donbass State Technical University 
 
11. Luhansk Taras Shevchenko National University 
 
12. Luhansk National Agricultural University 
 
13. East Ukrainian Volodymyr Dahl National University 
 
14. Lugansk State Medical University 
 
15. Lugansk State Academy of Culture and Arts 
 
16. Lugansk E. Didorenko State University of Internal Affairs 
 
17. Donbass National Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture 
 
18. Taurian V. Vernadskyi National University 
  













Some issues of the 
organization of the 2014/15 
academic year in educational 
institutions located in the 
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts 
- Scholarship students from the Donbass region who were 
unable to pass the examinations in 2013/2014 academic year 
are guaranteed scholarship for the next semester. 
- Heads of educational institutions located in the Donbass 
region in coordination with the MESU determine the date of 
the beginning of 2014/15 of the academic year. 
- Educational institutions independently determine the 
conditions and procedure for admission process of applicants 
who live in the Donbass region and were unable to undergo an 
external independent assessment. 
- Students from the Donbass region can temporarily enroll in 
other institutions in Ukraine and receive records of their 







Regarding the organization of 
education at 
educational establishments of 
persons residing in 
temporarily occupied territory 
in Crimea and in the places 
carrying out an antiterrorist 
operation in 
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts 
“We emphasize that any statements and actions of terrorist 
organizations aimed at simulating the "educational process" are 
legally null and void. Similarly, they will not have and will in 
the future have no legal effect any "education documents" 
issued by the occupation structures of the Russian Federation 
and the self-proclaimed "authority" on the peninsula and, 
accordingly, by terrorists on the part of the territory 
temporarily controlled by Donetsk and Luhansk regions. There 
will be no "recognition", "nostrification", "exchange" of such 
"documents", etc. from the Ministry of Education and Science, 
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Heads of higher 
educational institutions 
regarding the implementation 
of the order 
Regulations regarding students who transfer (renew) their 
education placement at displaced universities and documents 







Some issues of access to 
education for foreign students 
in Donetsk and Luhansk 
oblasts 
Regulations regarding foreign student who transfer (renew) 
their education placement at displaced universities and 







Concerning the Use of Illegal 
Documents of Terrorist 
Organizations for Studies in 
Higher Educational 
Institutions of Ukraine 
- The MESU informed about the attempts by representatives of 
the so-called LNR and DNR to use illegal documents of terrorist 
organizations for studying in higher educational institutions of 
Ukraine. 
- Informed the administration of higher educational 
institutions that admission of such illegal documents issued or 
certified by the self-proclaimed "authority" in Crimea and part 
of the occupied territory of Donbass region tis contradictory to 
the legislation of Ukraine. 
- Informed the administration of higher education institutions 
to inform law enforcement officials of attempts to use such 







Order on the formation of the 
Council of Rectors of Higher 
Educational Institutions 
temporarily transferred from 
the area of the anti-terrorist 
operation 
- To form a temporary consultative and advisory body of the 
Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine - the Council of 
Rectors of higher educational establishments temporarily 
transferred from the area of the anti-terrorist operation 
- To approve the Regulations "On the Council of Rectors of 
Higher Educational Institutions Temporarily Moved from the 
Territory of the Anti-Terrorist Operation". 
- To approve the membership of the Council. 
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Order to establish the 
Ministry for Temporarily 
Occupied Territories and 
Internally Displaced Persons 
of Ukraine 
"Address the need to respond quickly to problems and threats 
stemming from the antiterrorist operation in certain areas of 
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as well as from temporary 
occupation of Ukrainian territories. Existing institutions, whose 
activities target recovery and peacebuilding in eastern Ukraine 
as well as reintegration of occupied Ukrainian territories, were 
unable to fully perform their tasks and functions due to 
insufficient powers. Therefore, it was necessary to consider 
creation of a public authority responsible for shaping and 
implementation of public policy on recovery and peacebuilding 
in areas affected by the conflict and on reintegration of 







The Law On Amendments to 
Certain Laws of Ukraine 
Regarding the Activities of 
Higher Educational 
Institutions, Scientific 
Institutions Displaced From 
Occupied Territories  
-Legally defines the displaced institutions as institutions of 
higher education, which changed their location due to the fact 
that the state authorities temporarily do not exercise their 
powers 
-The validity of accreditation certificates for temporarily 
transferred higher education institutions is prolonged for the 
duration of the anti-terrorist operation, but not more than five 
years after the expiration of the relevant accreditation 
certificates 
-Temporary displaced higher education institutions retain 
national status 
- The norms of the number of persons studying on one position 
of scientific and pedagogical worker in temporarily displaced 
higher educational establishments, temporarily displaced by 
scientific institutions are determined by the Cabinet of 
  
101 
Ministers of Ukraine with a coefficient of 0.8 from the 
established norms. The central executive authority in the field 
of education and science has the right to initiate the transfer of 
the rights of the founder of specialized vocational education 
institutions to transferring higher education institutions, 
displaced state-owned scientific institutions, with the consent 
of the parties, and reorganization of temporary-moving higher 
education institutions, temporarily displaced scientific 
institutions through merger or accession in accordance with the 








  On the formation of the 
commission 
on monitoring activities 
displaced higher education 
institutions 
-To develop a strategy for the development of transferring 
institutions of higher education for 5 years of the issue of 
reintegration within the framework of the adopted law. 
- To create of network consortia of Donetsk Lugansk Donbass. 
-To conduct monitoring of housing and public or communal 
property buildings that can be used for the needs of displaced 
higher education institutions 
- To create conditions for housing for scientific and pedagogical 
workers of displaced institutions of higher education with the 
involvement of the Ukrainian social investment fund 
-To facilitate the updating of the material and technical base of 
the displaced institutions of higher education 
 -To initiate amendments to paragraph 2, part 9, article 11 of 
the Law of Ukraine on the management of state-owned objects 
that will promote the efficient and rational use of state property 
and the provision of facilities for the transfer of higher 
education institutions 
 -To strengthen the control over the granting of permits for 




Provide weekly reports on student attendance 
-To introduce a system of verification of plagiarism and 
adherence to the principles of academic integrity in all 
displaced institutions of higher education 
Actively use the opportunity to participate in projects of the 









centers began to work. 
-Due to this Center, any entrant from the Crimea and an 
uncontrolled territory of the Donbas may enter Ukrainian 
universities by a simplified system - without the use of external 
testing. This is stated on the website of the Ministry of 
Education and Science of Ukraine. 
- Donbass-Ukraine Centers operates on the territory of  
universities located in the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk 
regions under the control of the Ukrainian authorities.  
- Students are assigned a fixed volume of government orders for 
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Crisis of leadership and management 
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